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Abstract
This thesis examines the political philosophy of Karl Popper and his concept of open
society in particular. It argues that despite Popper's hostility to nationalism there is
no incompatibility between his concept of open society and the nation state. Indeed,
it is shown to be both theoretically and practically possible for nation states to be
constituted as open societies.
Popper considered nationalism to be a tribal ideology and an enemy of open society
as a form of political community. The thesis develops the argument that Popper's
dismissal of nationalism was unduly hasty, in part, because he failed to distinguish
between different interpretations of nationalist ideology and thus gave no
consideration to the prospect of a liberal or open form of nationalism. Liberal
nationalism is shown here to be a coherent theoretical position that can accommodate
Popper's conception of open society.
The extent to which Popper in fact assumed the nation state as a framework and
context when theorising open society is also revealed and highlights a degree of
ambiguity and inconsistency in his political philosophy. This leaves the way open
for a re-conceptualisation of Popperian philosophy in which open society and the
nation state are reconciled theoretically and a defence of the nation state as a locus
for open society is developed.
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Introduction
Assessing the Compatibility of Open Society and the Nation
State
1.1 Open Society and Popper's Attack on Nationalism
This thesis examines the political philosophy ofKarl Popper and his concept of open
society in particular. It considers the relationship between open society and the
nation state as a form of political community in a bid to establish the extent to which
the two are compatible. In doing so. ambiguities ofPopper's philosophy are probed
such as his dismissal of nationalism as a political ideology whilst simultaneously
assuming the context and framework of the nation state in much of his theorising.
Another potential tension that comes under scrutiny is the appearance of both liberal
and conservative characteristics in Popper's theoretical approach. Understanding the
nature of political community from a Popperian perspective is crucial to the task in
hand here. It is also the case that the institutional framework of open society must be
established in order to determine whether or not it can be accommodated within the
nation state. Beyond that I seek to examine the implications for open society of the
development of the European Union and this facilitates further consideration of open
society as a concept as well as the possibility of instituting it in post or supranational
contexts.
Although I take the concept of open society to be a normatively desirable political
ideal, establishing such a claim is not the central aim ofmy thesis. Instead, the
argument that I seek to defend is that open societies and nation states are compatible
despite the hostility that Popper displays toward nationalism. An additional
argument defended here is that a world comprised of nation states presents more
opportunities than it does threats to attempts to institute open societies across the
globe. Popper did not take nationalism or the nation state particularly seriously and I
l
seek to address that oversight in the pages that follow. It is an oversight on Popper's
part because the international political system continues to be structured in
accordance with the principle of national sovereignty as indeed it was when Popper
first theorised open society.1 A re-conceptualisation of Popper's liberalism is shown
to be possible in which the nation state is accommodated as a viable form of political
community and host of open society.
The research questions that animate the theoretical discussion of this work are
therefore concerned with the potential linkages between Popper's open society and
nation states. Can a nation state also be an open society? To what extent is open
society to be considered a cosmopolitan concept? What, if any, accord can be
reached between nationalism and Popperian liberalism? Can a defence of the nation
state as a form ofpolitical community be simultaneously employed as a defence of
open society? In addressing these questions my thesis constructs a defence of liberal
democratic nation states as instances of open society and suggests that such political
entities warrant conservation from a Popperian perspective.
This study seeks to fill a distinctive gap in the literature on Popper's political
philosophy because very little has been written about the approach that Popper takes
regarding the nation state. Even where the significance of Popper's attack on
nationalism is acknowledged, such as is the case in Tamir's account of liberal
nationalism, it is not subjected to detailed scrutiny and is encountered as something
of a curiosity. An exception to this is provided in an article by Andrew Vincent on
Popper and nationalism.3 Vincent notes that for Popper, 'nationalism was considered
a characteristically closed ideology - akin to totalitarianism - and the precise
opposite of liberalism'.4 I do not dispute the characterisation that Vincent proposes
here but suggest that given the relatively little attention Popper himself devoted to
1
George Soros, Open Society — Reforming Global Capitalism, London: Little, Brown and Company,
2000, p. 168.
2 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p.80.
3
Andrew Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism", in Jarvie, Ian, Karl Milford and David Miller (eds),
Karl Popper-A Centenary Assessment, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006
4 Ibid, p.157.
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attacking nationalism in comparison with his book length case against totalitarianism
it seems that he felt the latter to constitute a far greater enemy of open society.
The argument is made by Vincent, and echoed in this thesis, that Popper's views on
nationalism are especially interesting at the present historical juncture of the early
twenty-first century which has seen 'a practical renaissance of nationalism in the
politics of Europe and elsewhere'.5 Vincent concludes his short assessment of
Popper's relationship to nationalism with the observation that Popper's case against
national politics was not systematically developed and nor did he resolve the relation
of nationalism to contemporary politics.6 The work of this thesis provides an
opportunity to look in more detail at those relationships in order to reach a fuller
understanding of the actual critique that Popper made of nationalism along with the
implications of it for his own philosophical position.
My examination of Popperian liberalism, his arguments against nationalism, and his
conception of open society is designed to produce a piece of work that can make a
contribution to general accounts and interpretations of Popper's political philosophy.
It can be situated then as a detailed inquiry into a particular aspect of Popper's
philosophy and thus provide an enhanced understanding of a prominent and
influential political theorist. It is also a timely investigation because the issues
explored here such as sovereignty and its limits along with the prospects for liberal
interventionism have come increasingly to the fore in international politics. My
assessment in chapter four ofTony Blair's doctrine of the international community
from a Popperian perspective is illustrative of this point. The enduring relevance of
Popper to such contemporary debates is something that the thesis seeks to illustrate.
The thesis presented here is a work of political theory but it is one that pays close
attention to practical applications of theoretical perspectives. To do so is to take a
Popperian approach to political philosophy. Popper described the challenge of
checking and balancing political institutions, and controlling their power, as 'the
3 Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism" p. 157.
6
Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism" p. 175.
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fundamental problem of political theory'.7 It is evident from such a description that
Popper sought to apply his philosophy to particular political matters and envisaged
that it could serve as a practical guide for statesmen and decision-makers. He also
stresses the need to avoid large-scale and abstract attempts at socio-political reform,
urging instead a focus on 'practical problems' utilising the theoretical method of trial
and error which Popper holds to be fundamentally the same in all sciences, natural
8 • •and social. This thesis takes up that Popperian challenge by seeking to apply
Popper's political philosophy, and the concept of open society in particular, to a
range of contemporary 'problems' such as renascent nationalism, humanitarian
intervention and the potential construction of a supranational community and polity
in the context of the continued development of the European Union. One of the
purposes of doing so is to highlight the enduring relevance of Popper's theorising to
current debates around those issues.
The structure of the thesis takes account of the applied nature of the theorising herein
and is thus split into two distinct but connected parts. Part I addresses Popper's
philosophical thought, both scientific and political, and sets it in the context of
theoretical issues such as the nature of community and its boundaries as well as the
conduct of change. It comprises chapter two - Popper's Conservative Liberalism -
and chapter 3 - The Boundaries of the Open Society and the Limits of Openness. A
more detailed account of those chapters is given slightly later in this introductory
chapter but for now it is important to recognise the preparatory role that they perform
in terms of setting out a version of Popperian liberalism, compatible with the nation
state, that can subsequently be utilised as an analytical framework for considering
contemporary philosophical and political questions about nations and nationalism.
The theoretical work of Part I of the thesis has its foundations in Popper's
philosophy of science, not least because 'Popper's political theory builds on his
analysis of the scientific enterprise, of the conditions necessary for the growth of
7 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, London: Routledge, 1992, p.219.
8 Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies Volume 2 - Hegel andMarx, London: Routledge, 1986,
p.222.
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knowledge, and for rational thought in general'.9 Such conditions are central to the
conception of political community that Popper provides, albeit often implicitly, and
the notion of Popperian political community is one that the thesis seeks to examine
and extend by analysing it in relation to the nation state as a communal political
form. Chapter three takes that task on to more explicitly political terrain as a
precursor to looking at specific issues of liberal nationalism, humanitarian
intervention and the development of the European Union from a Popperian
perspective in Part II of the thesis. The two part division is helpful in a thesis such
as this because it facilitates the construction of a theoretical framework as a specific
and distinctive task that subsequently can be demonstrated to be applicable as an
analytical tool for examining debates on the nature of political community and the
nation state.
Part II of the thesis addresses the application of Popperian philosophy to the
contemporary debates around nationalism mentioned above. It comprises chapter 4
- Open Society and the Nation State, chapter 5 - Open Society and the European
Union, as well as the concluding chapter, chapter 6 - Promoting Open Society and
Defending the Nation State. The focus in chapters 4 and 5 in particular is on the
ways in which Popper's theorising can contribute to an examination of the nation
state and its place in twenty-first century politics. Open society is shown to be a
form of political organisation that can be realised within the context and structure of
the nation state whilst also potentially serving as an exemplar against which actual
national states could be assessed. The challenge set to contemporary Popperians on
this basis is to find ways of rendering existing nation states more open rather than
seeking to dismiss or ignore national configurations of political community as
Popper himself tended to.
This is important in a study of Popper's open society since he intended the concept
to be applied and sought to make the case for it serving as the basis ofpolitical life.
The applied nature of the investigation that I have sought to conduct is exemplified
9 Michael Lessnoff, "Karl Popper: Critical Rationalism and the Open Society", in Political
Philosophers ofthe Twentieth Century, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 176.
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in the reference made throughout to the attempts initiated by George Soros to
implement Popper's political philosophy through his Open Society Institute.10
Soros' work merits analysis because he not only provides a detailed account of the
concept of open society but has built an influential organisation that seeks to advance
Popper's liberal vision by funding programmes aimed at 'building vibrant and
tolerant democracies'.11
Popper conceived of open society as the ideal at one end of a continuum that has
closed society at the opposite end. It is crucial to remember that Popper wrote of the
open society and its enemies and he devoted more attention to the enemies he
identified such as totalitarianism, historicism and utopianism than he did to
explaining the conceptual basis of open society. Thus Popper offers a fuller
description of closed society than he does of open society. He describes a closed
society as resembling 'a herd or tribe in being a semi-organic unit whose members
are held together by semi-biological ties — kinship, living together, sharing common
12
efforts, common dangers, common joys and common distress'. Popper's
methodological and normative individualism make him suspicious ofwhat he terms
tribal communities and structures but it is not at all clear that things such as sharing
common efforts and dangers are inherently tribal activities. After all, the welfare
states that Popper praises are predicated on the basis of shared effort and insurance.13
In Popper's conception open society is markedly more abstract than the closed
alternative and he suggests that 'it may, to a considerable extent, lose the character of
a concrete or real group ofmen, or of a system of such real groups'.14 It is not
entirely clear what Popper means by this but insofar as he merely implies a level of
abstraction beyond the face to face interaction of a small tribe then nation states can





Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies Volume 1- The Spell ofPlato, London: Routledge,
1984, p. 173
lj
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p. 125.
14
Popper, Open Society Volume /, p. 174.
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to develop a richer, fuller description and explanation of open society than that
offered by Popper. Examining open society in relation to nation states turns out to be
a useful way of doing this.
Whilst pointing to discrepancies, ambiguities and deficiencies in Popper's political
philosophy and defence of open society, the intent remains to develop his philosophy
by highlighting a potentially wider range of application for the principles of open
society than Popper recognised. In a sense my task is to reengage Popper's liberal
political philosophy with nationalism and the nation state. Doing so opens up new
possibilities to advance and defend open societies, and suggests the utility of the
nation state as a framework for instituting open societies in the early part of the
twenty-first century. Popper's political philosophy is shown to be of continued
relevance to deliberations on the nature and future development of forms of political
community. It makes sense for any such deliberation to take, for the moment, the
nation state as a starting premise given its enduring basis as the foundation of the
international political order. The remainder of this introductory chapter will provide
a brief overview of subsequent chapters and conclude the opening statement of the
aims and objectives of the inquiry into Popper's political philosophy.
1.2 The Conservative and LiberalAspects of Popper's Philosophy
Chapter two explores the liberal and conservative elements that together give
ideological definition and contours to Popper's philosophy. Those elements are
developed in both Popper's philosophy of science and his political philosophy and
have implications for the approach that Popper takes to questions of reform and how
it should be conducted. The analysis of the Popperian methodology of reform is
intended to pave the way for subsequent analysis of the concept of open society. The
purpose of chapter two is not to seek to attribute a particular and definitive
ideological label to Popper but rather to begin to examine key concepts in Popper's
philosophy, such as political reform and change, and understand more broadly the
potential bases for seeking to apply those concepts.
7
Popper himself was not inclined to essentialism and was relatively unperturbed by
the assignment of labels.15 In fact he was quite explicit that we should give up the
view that 'in every single thing there is an essence'.16 I do not attempt therefore to
uncover either a liberal or conservative essential core to Popper's theorising.
Instead, the interest in Popper's ideological orientation lies in examining the extent
to which that orientation may have an influence in guiding political action and
decision-making. This is of particular importance when applied to contemporary
questions and challenges surrounding the nation state and its future as a form of
political community. If, as this thesis contends, the nation state can be a suitable host
for open society then the prospect of a conservative defence of the nation state, at
least of liberal nation states, becomes a viable, practical political project from a
Popperian perspective. The suggestion is not made here that Popper was a
conservative. He described himself as a liberal17 and reasonably so, but his was a
conservative liberalism and it is useful to consider the enduring effect of that
conservative element to Popper's thought when reflecting upon its applicability to
debates on sovereignty, interventionism and the changing nature of the state which
have come to the fore in political and theoretical discourse during the final decade of
the previous century and the first decade of this century.
In putting Popper's philosophy under an ideological lens chapter two concludes by
drawing upon the work of John Gray who has written at length on the evolution of
the liberal tradition. At the outset it is useful to acknowledge Gray's view that
'whereas liberalism has no single, unchanging nature or essence, it has a set of
distinctive features which exhibits its modernity and at the same time marks it off
] 3from other modern intellectual traditions and their associated political movements'.
Gray discerns a 'single tradition' composing a specific conception ofman and
15
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p. 13.
16 Karl Popper, "The Aim of Science", in Popper, K (ed.), Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972, p. 195.
17 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 160.
18 John Gray, Liberalism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995, p.xi.
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society.19 Part I of the thesis looks in detail at Popper's conception ofman and
society, and the relationship between the two.
The central tenets of liberalism outlined by Gray help to set parameters of the
discussion in chapter two along with the sketch of conservatism as 'maintenance of
the social ecology' offered in recent work by Roger Scruton.20 Scruton defends
conservatism as inherently local in opposition to the global aims of liberalism and
seeks to mount a specific defence 'of some pocket of social capital against the forces
of anarchic change'.21 This thesis inquires as to the social ecology ofPopper's open
society and the extent to which it can be a localised rather than globalised concept.
Scruton expresses the aim ofmounting a 'qualified defence of the nation state' on the
basis of his conservative philosophy.22 His book does not recognise Popper as a
potential ally in that task but this thesis suggests that he could be. Chapter two lays
the initial ground for the building of that argument.
It is important to note that Popper was a philosopher of science prior to turning his
attention to politics and his scientific philosophy had a significant influence on the
development of his political philosophy.23 It is for this reason that chapter two opens
by looking at Popper's philosophy of science and the logic of discovery that
underpins it. After outlining the central components of Popper's philosophy of
science and what he perceives to be the nature of scientific community, the critique
of his position developed by Thomas Kuhn is introduced. The comparison of the
Popperian and Kuhnian philosophies of science serves two useful purposes. The
first is to examine the difference between liberal and conservative approaches to
science and the implications for politics that can be derived from them. Secondly,
the nature of change in the world of science is highlighted by Kuhn and parallels can




Roger Scruton, A Political Philosophy — Arguments for Conservatism, London: Continuum, 2006,
p.ix.
21
Scruton, A Political Philosophy, p.ix.
22 Scruton, A Political Philosophy, p.ix.
23
Steve Fuller, Kuhn v.v. Popper, Popper - The Strugglefor the Soul ofScience, Cambridge: Icon
Books, 2003, p.26.
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developing an understanding of open society and the prospects of fostering open
societies across the world.
The chapter continues to a discussion of Popper's notion of critical rationalism as
both a methodological and moral doctrine. A question is raised in this section of
chapter two as to the extent to which Popper treats critical rationalism as a tradition
to be conserved. It is worth noting at the outset that for Popper, 'true rationalism is
the rationalism of Socrates' and that reason 'grows by way ofmutual criticism'.24
Out of this discussion the question arises of how critical rationalism is to be
embedded and preserved. Addressing this question shifts the emphasis of the chapter
towards Popper's political theorising.
The scene is then set to consider the concept of piecemeal social engineering which
represents Popper's attempt to transfer his methodology of scientific research to
politics, and the conduct of political reform in particular. A conservative element to
Popper's political philosophy can be glimpsed in the concept of piecemeal social
engineering. Popper defines this method as the method of trial and error. He
suggests that 'the kind of experiment from which we can learn most is the alteration
of one social institution at a time' in order to avoid the risks inherent in large-scale
and revolutionary projects whereby the outcomes are decidedly uncertain. The
chapter serves as an important starting point in tracing the roots of some of the
ambiguities that complicate Popper's account of open society.
1.3 Political Community in Popper's Philosophy
Chapter three raises the question of the possible boundaries of open society and the
implications for attempts to apply Popper's version of liberalism. The chapter begins
with an examination of the institutional and structural aspects of open society to
provide a comprehensive picture of the concept that can then serve as a backdrop to
24
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.227.
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the consideration of the nature of political community from a Popperian perspective.
This allows for the investigation of open society as a framework and that
investigation is made a comparative one via reference to communitarian and pluralist
alternatives. In this way a fuller understanding can be reached as to the bases on
which Popper would declare a society or state open rather than closed. The question
of the boundaries of political community is shown to be relevant to this study and in
relation to Popper's account, influenced by the interplay of the conservative and
liberal elements of his philosophy.
The account of open society as a political community that emerges from the initial
section of the chapter is then scrutinised through the communitarian critique of
liberalism set out by Michael Sandel. At this point the conservative aspect to
Popper's liberalism is shown to aid him in defending open society from
communitarian criticism. The notion ofmoral community that Popper outlines
forms a constitutive part of the investigation undertaken in chapter three. In a
Popperian sense, communitarianism serves as a test for open society revealing both
strengths and weaknesses. Viewing open society from a communitarian perspective
enhances the argument as to the compatibility of open society and the nation state.
The communitarian test of open society is followed by a pluralist test in the form of
the post-liberal position defended by John Gray. The pluralist philosophy ofGray
poses challenges to both liberalism and communitarianism and so has considerable
utility as a comparative framework here. Gray bases his theorising on a conception
of value pluralism and contends that no one political regime can make a privileged
claim on reason.25 Popper of course seeks to make just such a claim for open society
and the chapter concludes that Popperian liberalism passes both the communitarian
and pluralist tests. The chapter does highlight however that open society cannot
avoid confronting questions of community and part of the work of the chapter is to
address the relative lack of retlection on the nature of political community in
Popper's theorising.
25 John Gray, Post-Liberalism - Studies in Political Thought, London: Routledge, 1996, p.312.
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1.4 Opening the Nation State
The fourth chapter takes a fresh look at the nation state from a Popperian perspective
and in doing so seeks to re-conceptualise Popper's liberalism. Such a task is not
quite as difficult as might be imagined because the concept of the nation state lurks
as a hidden assumption in Popper's general political philosophy and his theory of
open society in particular. In this chapter the nation state is shown to be both a
potential and an actual locus and host of open society. By engaging with the political
ideology of nationalism Popperians can focus attention on using the concept of open
society as an ideal against which particular nation states can be judged. This
highlights that nation states are not inherently hostile to open society but can be
variously more or less open in the way that they are constituted.
The initial section of the chapter focuses primarily on Yael Tamir's theory of liberal
nationalism, along with that outlined by David Miller and Joseph Raz, in comparison
with Popper's liberalism. Such a contrast illustrates considerably more convergences
than divergences and calls into question much of Popper's scepticism towards
nationalism. Popper's dismissal of nationalism is shown to be somewhat superficial
and a more nuanced understanding of differing variants of nationalism invites
affinity between open societies and nation states. Tamir successfully demonstrates
that nationalism need not be diametrically opposed to liberalism.
The next section of the chapter turns from the theory of liberal nationalism to the
attempted application of a liberal worldview. The worldview at issue is that outlined
by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his famous speech on liberal
interventionism, delivered a decade ago in Chicago. Blair argues that the
international community is entitled, in certain circumstances, to uphold liberal
principles of democracy and human rights where they are threatened by repressive or
authoritarian regimes. In many respects Blair is laying out a doctrine for the
international defence of open societies and in chapter four I seek to examine the
12
extent to which the Blair doctrine could be endorsed by Popperians. Blair's liberal
interventionism is predicated on the notion of national sovereignty and so the focus
is sustained as to the relationship between nation states and open society.
The following section of the chapter brings together the theoretical and practical
elements explored in the earlier sections by examining the contribution made by
George Soros in his philanthropic efforts to advance the cause of open society.
Whilst in no way a nationalist, Soros is far more willing than Popper to acknowledge
the compatibility of open societies and nation states. He also provides a more
detailed account of the criteria that can be utilised in determining the extent to which
a particular society is open rather than closed. Like Blair, Soros also sets out a
doctrine of liberal internationalism and this is examined as part of chapter four.
The conclusion of the chapter returns to the initial issue of the nature of nationalism
and the nuances of different variants. A distinction is drawn between positive and
negative types of nationalism and whilst open society can reach no accommodation
with negative nationalism the same cannot be said of positive nationalism. By
acknowledging the existence of different variants of nationalist ideology, and thus
different variants of nation states, the concepts of open society and the nation state
can be brought into closer proximity.
1.5 The European Union's Relationship to Open Society
The final of the main chapters looks at open society in the context of the European
Union and the process of European integration. The question of the potential
opportunities and threats presented to the concept of open society by the
development of the EU is raised and addressed in the theorising of chapter five. The
level of cooperation between nation states that has been instrumental in the creation
and maintenance of the EU holds out the prospect of cooperative endeavours in
support of open society. Threats are evident at the European level however in terms
of the democratic and accountability deficits that continue to constitute a problematic
13
for supranational institutions. The nature of governance at a supranational level is
also examined in order to determine the extent to which it satisfies the requirements
of open society. The issue of sovereignty remains relevant here and as the creators
of the European Union, nation states continue to be a central category of analysis.
The future prospects for the nation state, and the relationship between national
political community and open society, is then explored by way of Habermas's vision
of an emergent post-national constellation. Habermasian political philosophy has
broad parallels with that of Popper, particularly in the way that each regards a critical
form of rationality as providing a basis for an abstracted form of political
community. The merit of engaging with the work of Habermas here is due to the
explicit position he takes in relation to the nation state in terms of the crisis he posits
it to be experiencing.
After taking account of the post-national constellation, Soros' idea of the European
Union as a prototype for a global open society is considered. Whilst this would
suggest a strong cosmopolitan orientation to Soros' thought it is shown that any such
orientation on his part is held and pursued moderately. Soros continues to view the
nation state and national sovereignty as the foundational elements of international
political order. This means that he theorises, advocates, and seeks to develop open
societies within the context provided by the nation state and the role that he
envisages for the European Union is explored in chapter five. Doing so ensures that
the relationship between the nation state and open society is considered in a context
whereby the concept of sovereignty is evolving.
1.6 The Continuity between Popper's Earlier and Later Works
This thesis argues that Popper's dismissal of the nation state as a form of political
community was unduly hasty. His disregard for national politics stems from the
attitude he took toward nationalism. Popper regarded nationalism as a tribal
ideology and viewed it as being fundamentally at odds with his liberal vision of open
14
society. He did not recognise that nationalism, just like liberalism, is capable of
being interpreted in a variety of different ways. Once this possibility is recognised
however, then it becomes apparent that not all variants of nationalism are inherently
hostile to liberal principles such as that of open society. Indeed, Yael Tamir makes
the case that there is a defensible liberal version of nationalism that combines
elements of the two ideological positions.26
Just as nationalism as a concept is potentially open to varying interpretation27 so too
is Popper's political philosophy itself. In particular, it is worth pausing to reflect
briefly on the question of the coherence of Popper's philosophy as a whole, and
more specifically over time between his earlier and later works. Is there evidence to
suggest a distinction between Popper's political philosophy as outlined in his early
writings on the subject such as the two volumes on Open Society and that which
appears in the theorising of texts such as Conjectures and Refutations which was
published some considerable time after Popper initially set out his approach to
politics?28 It should come as little surprise that a philosopher's work will evolve
gradually over the course of a lifetime's thinking and writing. In this sense then, it is
possible to detect in Popper's theorising some subtle shifts of degree and emphasis in
terms of his political philosophy. His treatment of the concept of tradition serves as
a useful illustration here.
In the essay "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition", contained within Conjectures
andRefutations, Popper speaks of the 'need for tradition in social life' as a source of
regularities in life to prevent the anxiousness and frustration that he associates with
29disorder. Popper even goes on to refer to the need for traditions to provide a
regulatory aspect to social life 'whether or not they are in other respects rational or
26 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism
21 For an introduction to a wide range of theories of nationalism see Hutchison J & Smith A (eds.),
Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
28 Lessnoff notes that the two volumes ofOpen Society were first published in 1945 whilst
Conjectures and Refutations appeared in 1963 and includes important elaboration of Popper's
political philosophy. Lessnoff, "Karl Popper: Critical Rationalism and Open Society", p. 177.
29 Karl Popper, "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition", in Conjectures and Refutations, London:
Routledge, 1963, p. 130.
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necessary or good'.30 This displays a greater acceptance of the role of tradition than
that he accorded it in Open Society where he insisted that all traditions must be
judged rationally 'according to their influence upon individuals'.31 Popper's
seemingly greater accommodation of tradition in his later work however does not
constitute a radical departure from his earlier views in which he recognised the
importance of traditions in calling for studies 'of the way in which new traditions
32
may be created, and of the way in which traditions work and break down'.
Latterly, Popper appears to suggest the necessity of traditions in the provision of
social order but crucially he still contends that they can, and should, be criticised and
• • • 33
changed in accordance with his piecemeal social engineering methodology. On the
question of the role of traditions in social life, the 'later' Popper places a subtly
greater emphasis on the extent to which traditions can help anchor individuals but
does not grant them immunity from rational examination. He therefore maintains a
broadly consistent position with that established in his earlier work.
More generally, and more importantly in the context of this thesis, is the consistency
that Popper displays in seeking to defend his conception of open society throughout
all his writings on political philosophy. As is discussed in subsequent chapters,
Popper defends western liberal (nation) states as examples of open society and
western civilisation as the birthplace of open society. He does so in Open Society34
and continues this same defence in his intellectual autobiography In Search ofa
Better World in which he asserts that the citizens ofwestern democracies enjoy a
35social order that is better and more just than any other in history.
Part of the purpose of this thesis is to provide a clearer account of what open society
is, and the nature of community required to sustain it, than that outlined by Popper.
Popper devoted considerable care and attention to historicism and utopianism for
'°
Popper, "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition", p. 130.
31
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.226.
'2 Karl Popper, The Poverty ofHistoricism, London: Routledge, 1972, p. 149.
33
Popper, "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition", p. 131.
34
Popper, Open Society Volume /, p. 171.
35 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, Routledge: London, 1992, p. 13.
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example as enemies of open society but less so to a positive vision of open society
itself beyond broad notions of democracy and a degree of economic egalitarianism.
That general account of open society is constant however when Popper's political
philosophy is considered as a whole and it is on that basis that for the purposes of
this thesis I am content to treat Popper's body ofwork as unified and consistent in
respect of its treatment of open society as a theoretical, and indeed practical, concept.
There is therefore no particular distinction made in this work between an 'earlier'
and a 'later' Popper but that is not to suggest that such a distinction would be entirely
unwarranted in all circumstances.
1.7 Open Nationalism - Issues under Discussion
In concluding this introductory chapter it is important to set the parameters of the
thesis and make clear which issues are and which issues are not under discussion.
The thesis aims to rearticulate Popperian liberalism to highlight the compatibility of
Popper's concept of open society and the nation state as a form of political
community. In arguing that nationalism need not necessarily be an enemy of open
society the thesis opens up space for the application ofPopper's political theory to
debates on the future of the nation state and attendant matters such as liberal
interventionism, post or supranational political communities and developments, as
well as the prospects for realising in today's world what Popper terms the 'rational
unity' of humankind.36
The two part approach taken in the thesis of firstly covering the theoretical ground in
reassessing Popper's liberalism in the context of the nation state prior to applying
that theoretical perspective to practical questions of inter-national politics is
designed to ensure that aims posited above are met in a way that accords with a
Popperian approach to social science which stresses the need to identify and resolve
concrete problems.37 The bridge between the theoretical and the practical here is in
part built upon the notion of critical rationality that Popper outlined and the
,6
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.243.
'7
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.222.
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implications of that, often underappreciated by him, in terms of the nature of
political community. In particular the thesis raises the question as to whether it
makes sense for Popperian critical rationalists to conserve the nation state as a form
of political community given that it appears to offer no severely inherent theoretical
or practical impediment to the development of open societies. The argument is
advanced here that the pursuit of the goal of a world comprised of open societies
does not require the overthrowing of a nationally-based framework of politics.
This thesis then is concerned with the utility of Popper's open society as an
explanatory and potentially exemplary model in seeking to understand the endurance
of the nation state and nationalism as animating political concepts. It is not an
attempt to reconstruct Popper's entire political philosophy nor is the aim specifically
to propose a range of ways in which societies that remain closed, in a Popperian
sense, can be opened up. To some extent, the task undertaken is somewhat more
modest than that in illustrating that potential reform beyond or away from the nation
state runs the risk of endangering already established open societies. Furthermore,
by considering open society from the perspective of the nation state, the relevance of
Popper's work to a number of debates becomes more readily apparent than it
otherwise would be. On issues such as liberal interventionism and the development
of the European Union, the purpose of the discussion is not to cover all angles of the
debates that pertain to them but rather demonstrate the particular contribution that a
Popperian liberalism, based on a fuller positive account of open society, can make to
those debates.
The title of the thesis introduces the term 'open nationalism'. What is meant by this?
One way to distinguish between variants of nationalism is to identify two broad
interpretations as positive and negative and this is the approach adopted by John
Ralston Saul. He contrasts a positive civic version of the concept with a negative
ethnic alternative. Whilst positive nationalism strives to be inclusive negative
38nationalism is based on exclusion. In Popperian language we might distinguish
,s John Ralston Saul, The Collapse ofGlohalism, London: Atlantic Books, 2005, p.245.
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between open nationalism and closed nationalism. The exclusionary and tribal
nature of closed nationalism is the only form of nationalism that Popper could
conceive of and so he dismissed it as an enemy of open society. This thesis posits
that open nationalism is not an enemy of open society. It does not automatically
follow that it is therefore a friend but it can at least be an acquaintance and
companion.
19





2.1 Introduction - Popper and Ideological Orientation
This chapter explores Popper's philosophies of science and politics. In doing so
account is taken of the ways in which they diverge and cohere, particularly with
regard to ideological orientation. By ideological orientation I mean the extent to
which an enduring tendency of thought or inclination can be discerned as
underpinning his philosophical investigations.
One hypothesis that I seek to test in this chapter is that Popper's philosophy,
especially when considered as a whole in its scientific and political guises, exhibits
both liberal and conservative ideological orientations. The purpose of this initial test
is to bring greater clarity to subsequent assessments of Popper's approach to political
change and the conception of open society that he set out as a normative political
model. By first surveying the broader ideological outlines of Popperian philosophy,
surer steps can then be taken in applied theorising that attempts to utilise concepts
such as open society in understanding the contemporary political circumstance that is
the endurance and, arguably, resurgence of the nation state.'
Popper was an implacable opponent of nationalism and yet as we shall see later in
the chapter, and further in chapter four, his open society, or open state as I term it,
was very much framed in the context of the nation state. This leads me to two
further questions to be addressed in this thesis: 1, does the open society offer a
template for political reform away from, or beyond, the nation state? 2, is it possible
that despite Popper's thorough aversion to nationalism, his concept of the open
1
Roger Scruton, for example, has recently argued that accession states to the EU from Eastern
Europe, and indeed Turkey, in a bid to protect their sovereignty and 'ratify' their nation state status.
Roger Scruton, A Political Philosophy, London: Continuum, 2006, p.31.
21
society can be reconciled with that of the nation state? To put it slightly differently, I
am interested in the extent to which Popper theorised open society as opposed to
many different open societies. Following on from that, the question also emerges as
to the extent to which he was a cosmopolitan thinker.
Andrew Vincent detects a latent cosmopolitanism in Popper's philosophy but
suggests that it was an idea that he failed to work out in any great detail.2 The next
chapter will undertake a wider consideration of the boundaries, if any, that might be
thought to attach to open society. For now it suffices to observe that a cosmopolitan
strand can be evinced in Popperian philosophy and that the process of doing so is
aided by a preliminary inquiry as to the ideological basis of that philosophy.
The starting point ofmy inquiry in this chapter is the philosophy of science that
Popper developed and the 'logic of discovery' that he held to underpin it. The
purpose ofmy efforts to unravel the liberal and conservative elements of Popper's
philosophy is to permit an analysis of the open society concept and its possible
limitations both as a theoretical device and normative ideal. Insofar as the open
society, and the philosophical approach that it represents, was conceived by Popper
as being, at least in part, an antidote to nationalism, was he perhaps too hasty in
dismissing the nation state? In arguing that nation states can satisfy Popperian
criteria to qualify as open societies, I suggest that he was.
After an opening examination of the basic tenets of Popper's philosophy of science
and the nature of the scientific community as he perceives it, attention will turn to
the critique of this approach developed by Thomas Kuhn. A comparative analysis of
Popper and Kuhn's philosophies of science will facilitate the exploration of two lines
of inquiry. Firstly, it will help to highlight the liberal-conservative aspects that in
part divide the respective philosophers as well as complicating Popper's own
2 Andrew Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism", in Jarvie et al (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary
Assessment, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006, p. 169.
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philosophy.3 Secondly, Kuhn's work brings to the fore the issue of the nature of
change as it applies to the scientific world but this also has clear parallels, at least in
Popper's case, with regard to the nature and conduct of political change. The initial
section of the chapter draws to a close with a consideration of Kuhn's psychology of
research in comparison with Popper's logic of discovery, a contrast that is thought by
Fuller to hinge on the question of the extent to which science, and scientific
endeavour, is rooted in the world.4 This is a question that will be shown to get to the
heart of the divergences between liberal and conservative philosophies, and the
complexities posed to a single philosophical position that seeks to contain them.
Thereafter the focus shifts to take a closer look at Popper's concept of critical
rationalism. This begins to herald the move from science to politics since critical
rationality is central to the way in which Popper theorises both. It is, in Popperian
philosophy, simultaneously a methodological and a moral doctrine. This is true for
the manner in which he conceptualises politics as well as science. One of the key
questions that I raise in this section is the extent to which critical rationalism is to be
regarded as a tradition that Popper wishes to conserve along with being a vision of
rationality that he attempts to liberate and distinguish from other approaches.
Having introduced the concept of critical rationality and subjected it to scrutiny the
issues of embedding and preserving it in democratic states can then be addressed
further in later chapters.
The consideration of critical rationalism is informed by Michael Oakeshotfs work
on rationalism in politics.5 Oakeshott's conservative philosophy has a number of key
points of both convergence and divergence with Popper's liberalism and constitutes a
useful comparative framework for exploring both liberalism and conservatism in
Popper's philosophies of science and politics. Oakeshott's account of tradition and
3 The divide to which I allude is referred to, albeit in slightly different terms, by Fuller who labels
Kuhn 'authoritarian1 and Popper 'libertarian' in their attitudes to science.
Steve Fuller, Kuhn v Popper - The Strugglefor the Soul ofScience, Cambridge: Icon Books, 2003,
p.13.
4 Ibid, p. 126.
5 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1962.
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practical knowledge help to shed light on the extent to which Popper takes a
conservative approach to the concept of critical rationality and seeks to defend it as
tradition.
The discussion of critical rationality paves the way for a fuller investigation as to the
nature and conduct of political change from a Popperian perspective. Popper's
notion of piecemeal social engineering becomes crucial at this point and represents
the boldest effort he makes to apply his methodology of scientific research and
discovery to the social and political spheres. This effort is at once bold and
conservative as it highlights his aversion to radical change in the domain of politics.
Popper warns of the dangers of Utopian planning and blueprints whilst I seek to
assess how close this takes him to conservatism. In the final part of the section on
political change I transfer the analysis to the level of political community.
2.2 Science and the Logic of Discovery
Karl Popper's most famous work in the philosophy of science is entitled 'The Logic
of Scientific Discovery' and thus the title makes clear that it is indeed the subject of
discovery, of scientific revelation, with which he is primarily engaged. The
recognition of this is important because it subtly illustrates the attitude that Popper
takes towards science; not only does science enable the discovery of things but there
is an identifiable logic that guides the way in which scientific practice should be
pursued. It is significant also that the book should be called 'The Logic' of scientific
discovery rather than 'The Logics' for this denotes Popper's belief that there is a
single unitary method of science rather than a multiplicity of such.
Falsificationism and Popper's Philosophy of Science
The formulation ofPopper's philosophy of science can be seen as a project of
overturning attempts to found the method of science on the support given to theories
and generalisations by experience and corroborative observations. The key problem
encountered by any such method is the problem of induction. Induction is a process
24
of reasoning that derives empirical conclusions from empirical premises but
conclusions that are not deductively entailed by those premises. The premises may
indeed provide a degree of supporting evidence for the conclusions reached but for
Popper, the problem of induction raises the question ofwhether or under what
conditions inductive inferences can be justified.6
Popper suggests that inductive inferences pass from 'singular statements', an
observation for example, to 'universal statements' such as theories.7 He concludes
that inductive inferences cannot be justified logically 'for any conclusion drawn in
this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white
swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are
• 8 • •white'. Popper acknowledges his debt to Hume in addressing the matter of
induction and shares with Hume the insight that the principle of induction breaks
down because it leads to a process of'infinite regress' whereby each inductive
inference must be justified by reference to another.9
Having taken the view that the problems of inductive logic are 'insurmountable'
Popper proceeds to elaborate his own theory that stands 'directly opposed' to
inductivism.10 He describes his approach as 'the theory of the deductive method of
testing, or as the view that a hypothesis can only be empirically tested - and only
after it has been advanced'. 1 Popper advances here his solution to the problem of
induction and indeed the pivotal plank of his philosophy of science. By replacing
the inductive method with the deductive method Popper sought to outline a logic of
discovery that demonstrated the particular manner in which science could make
progress. The particular manner of that progress is to be found in the fact that the




Ibid, p.5. Hume himself puts it that 'there is nothing in any object, considered in itself, which can
afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it; and ... even after the observation of the
frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any
object beyond those ofwhich we have had experience'.
David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature, London: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 189.
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'falsity' of universal statements can be derived from single statements deductively;
thus a single observation of a black swan falsifies the statement that all swans are
white and simultaneously permits the universal statement that not all swans are
white.12
This breakthrough that Popper has made is to introduce the concept of
falsificationism into the methodology of science. Popper's theory is that science
proceeds by a process of trial and error with the bold propounding of hypotheses that
are then subject to empirical testing. Those that survive the test, in the sense that
they have not been 'falsified' by it, are not thereby verified but are instead
corroborated for the time being and with the crucial caveat that subsequent tests may
indeed falsify the specific hypothesis under examination.13 By progressing
deductively Popper holds that science can avoid the problem of induction and also
therefore avoid the need to assume that 'by the force of verified conclusions, theories
can be established as true, or even as merely probable'.14 The 'truth' of a scientific
theory for Popper then is only ever provisional and always subject to the possibility
of future falsifying in the light of some new test or observable instance.
It is worth noting at this point Fuller's insight in suggesting that most of Popper's
'positive views were really negative ones in disguise: his deductivism was anti-
inductivism, his liberalism was anti-authoritarianism, his individualism anti-
holism'.13 This characteristic not only anchors his work in the philosophy of science
but also provides a guiding influence for his political philosophy. It also partly
explains some of the ambiguities of Popper's work that I am concerned with insofar
as he was, for example, less preoccupied with developing a theory of liberalism than
with highlighting the dangers of authoritarianism.
Part of Popper's intention in employing the falsification criterion to explain the
12
Popper, Logic, p. 19.
13
Popper, Logic p. 10.
14
Popper, Logic, p. 10.
15 Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p. 142.
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methodology of science was in order to provide a clear demarcation between the
scientific and the non-scientific. This is part of his initial project to dethrone
induction from a sovereign position in science and he makes this plain in stating that
'not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of
demarcation'.16 Hypotheses, and theories built upon them, that do not render
themselves testable (that are not formulated in such a way as to make inter-
subjective testing possible) are thus excluded from the realm of science and scientific
activity. Popper elaborates his position in the following manner:
T shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out,
once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be
such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it
must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience'.17
Popper suggests that this demarcating line renounces the requirement for all
empirical scientific statements to be 'conclusively decidable'18 and as such
constitutes an advance on the inductivist position.
Popper shows himself here to be concerned with the procedure as well as the content
of scientific practice and his philosophy of science sets out a procedural guide for
both hypothesis framing (singular statements that can serve as premises in falsifying
inferences)19 and testing (a Darwinian process whereby competing theories are
90
submitted to inter-subjective tests). The procedural aspect to Popperian philosophy
and the demarcation line drawn between science and non-science will be seen to be
significant in looking at his political philosophy. Popper's open society in politics is
a largely, and consciously, procedural guide to political action and reform whilst his
mistrust of ideological 'pseudo-science' stems from the falsification procedure that
16
Popper, Logic ofScientific Discovery, p. 18.
17





20Popper, Logic, p.91, Popper contends that 'we choose the theory which best holds its own in
competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive''
(my italics).
27
* jy j *21he developed in the scientific domain.
The Problem of Observation
Popper's falsificationist account of science is not without its detractors and before
engaging with the more general critique of the Popperian approach that Kuhn
outlines I shall firstly consider the specific problem of observation raised by
Chalmers in respect of falsificationism. His objections lie in what he describes as
the fallibility of observation statements.22
Chalmers argues that observation statements are fallible in the sense that it is
difficult for a scientist to be sure that what they observe is an accurate reflection of
reality and not potentially distorted by the act of observation itself. He goes on to
suggest that:
'consequently, if a universal statement or complex of universal statements
constituting a theory ... clashes with some observation statement, it may be the
observation statement that is at fault. Nothing in the logic of the situation requires
that it should always be the theory that is rejected on the occasion of a clash with
observation'.
Whilst Popper readily admits the fallibility of hypotheses and theories Chalmers
wonders if he is prepared to extend the same doubt to observation itself.
Popper acknowledges the difficulties of ensuring a secure and reliable observational
basis for science but thinks that the sort of criticism offered by Chalmers begins from
the wrong place. For Popper, the epistemological question that matters is not on
what does our knowledge rest but rather how do we test scientific statements by their
deductive consequences?24 It is precisely because we cannot be sure upon what our
knowledge rests that testing and, it emerges, inter-subjective testing becomes so
valuable. Popper argues that testable events must be observable events and testable
21 Frederic Raphael, Popper, London: Phoenix, 1998, p.9.
22 Alan F. Chalmers, What is this thing called science?, Open University Press, 1982, p.58.




'inter-subjectively'.25 The experimental tests that an individual scientist devises
must be capable of being repeated by 'anyone who has learned the relevant
technique'.26 This means that the problem of observation can be at least mitigated
inter-subjectively. Furthermore, the observation problem applies both to induction
and deduction and so Popper's concern is to formulate a method for dealing with
such uncertainty rather than eliminating it entirely.
Paradigms and the Logic of Science
A more systematic critique of Popper's theorising of science is offered by the
philosophical investigations pursued by Thomas Kuhn. In 'The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions',27 Kuhn sets out a philosophy of science that differs to that of
Popper's in a number of important respects. Foremost among these differences are
the procedures by which scientific inquiry is conducted, the nature of the scientific
community itself and the logic thought to underpin it. In this section I shall sketch a
brief overview of Kuhnian philosophy highlighting the features outlined above
before moving to a closer comparison of Popper and Kuhn's work. In doing so I
attempt to show not only the existence of a liberal-conservative dividing line
between Popper and Kuhn but also the emergence of a similar, ifmore faint, such
line within Popper's philosophy.
Kuhn's primary task is to elucidate what he terms 'normal science', the ordinary,
everyday activity that scientists find themselves engaged in. Fie suggests that
'normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community
28
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice'.
Several elements of this description are noteworthy at the outset. Firstly, Kuhn
reveals something of a conservative approach with an immediate reference to the





27 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, Chicago: University ofChicago Press,
1970.
28 Kuhn, Structure, p. 10.
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achievements become foundational at least for a period of time and thirdly he
introduces a notion of particularism by mention of'some particular scientific
community'. Popper's falsification methodology by contrast is intended to be
timeless, anti-foundational and designed to serve as a guide to the scientific
community as a whole, indeed to demarcate that community and its practice from
others.
The past scientific achievements that serve as a basis for ongoing work and
development, Kuhn terms paradigms. He elaborates to say that 'a paradigm is an
accepted model or pattern' and that it is Tike an accepted judicial decision in the
common law ... an object for further articulation and specification under new or
9Q
more stringent conditions'. For Kuhn then, a given paradigm provides the
foundations for the practice of science by a particular group of scientists who both
recognise it and adhere to it. Within the security of a paradigm, researchers find a
common pattern of work as well as common standards for the adjudication of
knowledge claims.30
Normal science can thus be regarded as scientific practice incubated by a particular
paradigmatic structure or research programme whereby the practice consists in
articulating, refining and investigating the 'puzzles', as Kuhn terms them, prompted
•*31
by the research paradigm itself. What is interesting about this procedure is the
extent to which the paradigm assumes a taken for granted quality in the conduct of
normal science and that one of the characteristics of normal science is a lack of
32
disagreement over fundamentals. Kuhn recognises this quality inherent in
paradigms33 and suggests that the breakdown and disruption of periods of normal
science is heralded by emergent disagreement over fundamentals that had previously
gone unquestioned.
29 Kuhn, Structure, p.23.
3° Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p. 19.
31 Kuhn, Structures, p.36.
32 Chalmers, What is this thing?, p.92.
33 Kuhn, Structure, p.37.
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He argues that whilst normal research problems do not usually produce major
conceptual or phenomenal novelties they nevertheless represent tests of skill and
ingenuity as well as making a contribution to extending the scope and precision of
scientific knowledge.34 Periods of normal science tend not to endure however
because eventually anomalies begin to appear between the paradigm and the
anticipated results of puzzle solving.
'When scientists disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field
have been solved, the search for rules gains a function that it does not ordinarily
possess. While paradigms remain secure, however, they can function without
agreement over rationalisation or without any attempted rationalisation at all'.35
This approach contrasts starkly with that of Popper who sought to lay down rules,
those of falsification, that would inform and direct each and every instance of normal
science. Moreover, Popper does not believe that fundamental problems can ever be
solved, instead trial solutions can be proposed, tested, and perhaps corroborated
albeit provisionally. Where Kuhn uses security almost in a psychological sense as
bringing comfort, or at least providing assurance, to scientific practitioners Popper
contends that the enterprise of science is fundamentally uncertain and that scientists
must learn to risk the failure (by way of falsification) of their theories.
In Kuhn's conception of science periods of normality are punctuated by episodic
crises whereby cracks begin to appear in collectively assumed foundations as well as
in the security that they had previously supplied to the scientists employing them.
Upon a crisis becoming too acute for a particular paradigm to be sustained a
revolutionary disruption follows as the crisis-ridden paradigm collapses and gives
way to an alternative. Kuhn argues that this process is 'far from cumulative' and the
transition to a new paradigm from which 'a new tradition of normal science can
emerge' is neither a gradual process nor does it result from the extension of the old
paradigm.36
34
Kuhn, Structure, pp. 35, 36, 52.
,5Kuhn, Structure, p.48.
j6 Kuhn, Structure, p.84.
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The description of traditions of normal science constitutes further evidence of the
conservative thread woven into Kuhn's philosophy. Popper does not recognise
traditions of this sort since for him the significant question is whether or not a
statement belongs properly to the realm of science (by virtue of the falsification
principle) rather than the ability to situate it within a particular tradition. From
Kuhn's conservative perspective, the progress of science is heavily reliant on its past,
and the traditions entailed by it, whereas Popper contends that advance is primarily
made possible by adherence to procedural rules.
Far from being gradual however, the transition that Kuhn describes from an old to a
new paradigm entails a radical re-alteration not only of the research programme but
even of the method of scientific practice itself. Kuhn defines the structure of
scientific revolutions as 'a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a
reconstruction that changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical
37 •
generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications'. This
sets out the scale of the change and transformation as Kuhn sees it. Indeed, so great
is the change, Kuhn is prepared to conclude that 'after a revolution scientists work in
a different world'.38
Popper would rule out this conclusion on the basis that his philosophy does not
distinguish between different scientific worlds, or even in any significant sense
between fields, but rather between the scientific world and the non-scientific world.
Popper's falsificationism does not separate normal and revolutionary abnormal
periods of science because all statements that are to be regarded as scientific must be
formulated in hypotheses that are capable of being inter-subjectively tested. This has
implications for the nature of scientific community as conceived by both Popper and
Kuhn.
Conserving and Liberating the Scientific Community
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in divergent conceptions of scientific community on the part of the respective
philosophers. Fuller captures something of this divergence when he notes that
'whereas actual scientific communities existed for Popper only as more or less
corrupt versions of the scientific ideal, for Kuhn the scientific ideal is whatever has
historically emerged as the dominant scientific communities'.39 Looked at in this
way Kuhn appears to be accounting for a historical process, that of recurring
revolutionary spasms in the progress of science, whilst Popper attempts to construct
a procedural ideal against which scientific practice can be evaluated.
For his part, Kuhn observes that in science 'novelty emerges only with difficultly,
manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation'.40 This
attests to the power of the paradigm in the Kuhnian conception and the extent to
which it influences and constrains the activity that occurs within it. The expectation
that Kuhn refers to is that provided by the paradigm and the paradigm itself is a
historical construct that sets the parameters of current research. Popper attacks this
approach, calling it 'the logic of historical relativism'.41 In doing so he demonstrates
his opposition to the Kuhnian notion that a scientific community should judge its
efforts in relation to its own past achievements as established by a specific piece of
historical research.
It is, in part, Kuhn's conservatism that Popper is taking issue with here. The
historical relativism that he perceives in Kuhn's work can inhibit the application of
the falsification principle by leading to an unquestioning acceptance of the pre-given
paradigmatic structure. Popper argues that science 'consists of bold conjectures,
controlled by criticism, and that it may, therefore, be described as revolutionary'.42
The difference from Kuhn's 'revolutionary' account of science is that Popper holds
this revolutionary quality to be inherent in the scientific enterprise rather than an
episodic quality denoting periodic crisis. The normal scientific task of the Kuhnian
39 Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p.6.
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scientist is the conservation and tradition-led development of the research paradigm;
the normal scientific task of the Popperian scientist is the permanent revolution of
hypothesis testing whereby novel attempts to overthrow a theory, if only to assess its
ability to resist such attempts, constitute the ordinary practice of science.
The contrast between these two positions has particular consequences for the way in
which Kuhn and Popper conceive of the nature of the scientific community. In
Kuhn's view, a particular paradigm provides more than just a setting for scientific
practice.
Those 'whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules
and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it
produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation
of a particular research tradition'.43
Scientific communities require shared commitments on this account, commitments
that give rise to at least the appearance of consensus amongst the community.
Indeed, given Kuhn's description of normal science it would seem likely that actual
consensus would prevail whilst the paradigm remained secure. Kuhn in fact goes
even further in describing the commitment to their paradigm that he attributes to
scientists when he suggests that 'to desert the paradigm is to cease practicing the
science it defines'44 It is precisely this sort of commitment, in its character and
extent, that Popper believes scientists must liberate themselves from.
Only by doing so can they hope to take the critical attitude necessary for the inter-
subjective testing of hypotheses. The shared rules and standards for scientific
practice that Popper demands commitment to are those of science itself, in its
falsificationist guise, and the community formed by those thus committed is the
scientific community, distinct from other communities that do not practice science at
all. Kuhn's paradigms demarcate particular scientific communities, each concerned
with its own conservation. Popper sees no need for demarcation at this level as he
4"' Kuhn, Structure, p. 11.
44 Kuhn, Structure, p.34.
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conceives of a universal scientific methodology applicable across all scientific
disciplines and by all practitioners of science.
It is apparent on this basis that Popper's philosophy of science is a universal one in
terms of being applicable to all scientists, at all times, and in all places. His
objection to Kuhn's philosophy concerns its inclusion of a common framework (the
paradigm) to mediate the practice of science. In particular Popper takes issue with
the notion that scientific rationality is dependent on 'something like a common
language and a common set of assumptions' and dismisses as 'dangerous dogma' any
suggestion that 'different frameworks are like mutually untranslatable languages'.45
For Popper, the rationality of science is not located within specific scientific
communities but rather within the deductive methodology that he argues makes its
practice possible. Popper seeks to defend his logic of discovery against what he
terms Kuhn's 'psychology of research'.
The Logic of Discovery and the Psychology of Research
Popper's logic of (scientific) discovery is the deductive method of falsification as
already discussed. In defending this position he attacks Kuhn for having developed a
'psychology of research' that enforces a commitment on the part of scientists to
particular paradigms. Given, as we have seen, that Kuhn describes any
renouncement of that commitment as an act of desertion then Popper is entitled to at
least question the nature of the relationship between scientist, scientific community
and the methodology of science.
It is on this basis that Popper dismisses the success of Kuhn's normal scientists for
consisting 'entirely in showing that the ruling theory can be properly and
satisfactorily applied'.46 This fails to impress Popper because he views the task of
science as being to question the ruling theory as severely as possible in order to
determine that it can even begin to justify a ruling, or more modestly for Popperians,
corroborated position. Any individual adopting Popper's methodology is in principle
45
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capable of the questioning and testing that Popper advocates, they do not need to
have assimilated into a particular tradition of normal scientific research conditioned
by a specific paradigmatic framework.
In a bid to find an element of common ground with Popper, Kuhn proposes that they
are 'both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is
acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific
research'.47 This does not entirely accurately capture Popper's position however
because in his view the products of scientific research will only present a logical
structure if the logic of falsificationist methodology is employed.
Kuhn goes on to suggest that Popper is concerned 'with the logical spurs to
knowledge rather than with the psychological drives of individuals'.48 Popper would
not be likely to dissent from this claim since he takes the logic of discovery to exist
independently of the psychological drives of individuals. Indeed his philosophy of
science can be read as an attempt to institutionalise his logic of discovery and give it
a greater degree of formality than is implied by invoking the psychological drives of
individuals. Popper seeks to avoid a position whereby an account of the
psychological drives of individuals practicing science is taken to be an account of
science itself. It is necessary in Popper's view to demarcate science from non-
science by appeal to the logic of discovery. If appeal is permitted to psychological
drives then the basis for distinguishing the scientific and non-scientific is eroded and
dissolved.
The case against Kuhn's normal science and psychology of research is taken up by
Watkins who suggests that 'Kuhn sees the scientific community on the analogy of a
religious community and sees science as the scientist's religion'.49 In other words,
47 Thomas S. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?", Criticism and the Growth of
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Kuhn is accused of attributing to scientists faith, faith in the paradigm that guides
their research, at the expense of reason, the reason of a consistent methodological
principle. Watkins lays out the contrast between the logic of discovery and the
psychology of research starkly. He refers to the clash between Kuhn's:
'view of the scientific community as an essentially closed society, intermittently
shaken by collective nervous breakdowns followed by restored mental unison, and
Popper's view that the scientific community ought to be, and to a considerable
degree actually is, an open society in which no theory, however dominant and
successful, ... is ever sacred'.50
The assessment provided of Kuhn's view here is couched in psychiatric terms so as
to illustrate its psychological foundations as Watkins perceives it. Collective
nervous breakdown accompanies the crisis of a particular paradigm and mental
unison is only restored with the passing of such crisis.
If the passing of a paradigm can be considered to prompt a psychological crisis for
Kuhn's scientists then Popper has rather more faith that scientists can and should
welcome the change brought about by a fundamental absence of sacredness as
applied to hypotheses and theories. Subjecting a theory to testing may not be
psychologically easy or comfortable for an individual scientist but to fail to do so is
to fail to apply the method of science in Popper's eyes and pass up the opportunity
for logical discovery.
The logic of discovery that he propounds attests to Popper's liberalism in that it has a
distinctive focus on the individual, a central concern with freedom, an unswerving
commitment to reason and rationality (of a critical form) and an underlying respect
for the principle of toleration. Popper's falsificationist theory is designed to be
applied by individual scientists in their scientific endeavours although, as we shall
see below, it does have an importantly social aspect to it. The theory is intended as a
disciplining influence on individuals rather than to provide an account, as Kuhn
seeks to, of the communal relations and commitments that particular and distinct
50 Ibid p.26.
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groups of scientists share.
Popper's philosophy of science addresses freedom in terms of the liberty he seeks to
provide to scientists in order to continually question and test theories. For Popper,
the removal of inductive certainty from science is to be considered a liberating step.
His work on science seeks to highlight the importance of reason to the scientific
enterprise by anchoring it within his deductive methodology and via his insistence
that even between Kuhn's different frameworks, rational critical discussion and
comparison is always possible.51 Indeed Popper describes what he calls the 'myth of
the framework", that is to say Kuhn's distinct and separate paradigms, as 'the central
52 • .bulwark of irrationalism'. For Popper, the community of science is simply all
those individuals employing the methodology of falsificationism to the study of
phenomena.
The liberal principle of toleration is also implicit in Popper's philosophy of science
because a diversity of hypotheses and theories must be permitted to flourish if robust
inter-subjective testing is to take place. It has been argued that Popper's advocacy of
pluralism in science stems from his belief that it is 'intrinsic to the day-to-day
conduct of scientific enquiry, as scientists are encouraged to proliferate alternative
hypotheses that then face stiff cross-examination by standards that command
universal assent'.53 Such pluralism illustrates Popper's desire to ensure that progress
is made possible through the free battle of ideas. Scientists are the combatants in the
battle of scientific ideals with Popper's logic of discovery designed to serve as the
appropriate weapon of choice. It is the battle for science itself however, identified
by Fuller in his comparison ofPopper and Kuhn's philosophies, which is the subject
of the final part of this section.
The Struggle for Science's Soul
According to Fuller, the respective philosophies of science of Popper and Kuhn do
51 Watkins, Against Normal Science, p.56.
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not constitute merely a methodological dispute but rather a deeper epistemological
disagreement. Before examining the basis and nature of the disagreement that Fuller
perceives, we can acknowledge a point of agreement that he detects between the two
philosophers. That is 'that science requires an essentially social epistemology. The
sustained pursuit of systematic knowledge means that certain social relationships
must be maintained over time and space'.54 For Kuhn, the relevant relationships are
those entailed by the paradigm and the quasi-ideological commitment to paradigms
that he attributes to scientists working within them. For Popper, the social
relationship necessary for the conduct of science is a shared commitment to the
falsificationist deductive logic that facilitates inter-subjective testing.
Fuller raises one key question that warrants consideration here. It is a question that
gets to the very heart of the differences between Popper and Kuhn's philosophical
systems and it also has implications for the nature and ideological persuasion of the
political philosophy defended by Popper. He asks simply, 'is science about being
rooted in the world, as Kuhn thought, or being uprooted, as Popper thought?'55
Kuhn roots scientists in the world through the paradigms that serve as the
foundations for normal science and via the historical authority that they are
envisaged to convey. Popper, on the other hand, uproots scientists by treating
disciplinary or communal boundaries as irrelevant and demarcating simply between
science and non-science. He does not recognise paradigmatic foundations that could
give root to science hence his appeal to the universal method of criticism by way of
inter-subjective test.56
Kuhn reveals the paradigm-rootedness of his scientists when he suggests that a
paradigm can 'even insulate the community from those socially important problems
that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of
the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies'.57 It is precisely this
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insulation that Popper opposes, although his concern is to ensure that hypotheses are
not granted sanctuary within paradigms.
Popper claims that science involves the testing of theories by scientists but for Kuhn
the emphasis appears to be on the testing of scientists by theories. Kuhn argues that
the object of normal science 'is to solve a puzzle for whose very existence the
validity of the paradigm must be assumed. Failure to achieve a solution discredits
only the scientist and not the theory'.58 It is difficult to reconcile the approach that
Kuhn takes here with his acceptance that paradigms can and do fall into crisis.
Having admitted this possibility, the failure to find a solution to a puzzle could
indicate a problem with the paradigmatic theory as readily as representing the
deficient application of it by a scientist.
It is in these assumptions that Kuhn permits and Popper forbids that some of the key
divergences in their respective philosophies are to be found. Popper suggests that
'agitation' is an essential component both of life and the conduct of science.59
Kuhn's paradigms seek to soothe agitation by offering frameworks of mutual
comfort for specific communities of scientists. Fuller suggests that beyond that in
the Kuhnian model, 'the entire sociology of science is reduced to the process of
training initiates for a life of total commitment to their paradigm'.60 Popper
disagrees with this approach because the commitment he demands is to the scientific
logic and method itself, a method that can liberate scientists, uproot them perhaps,
from particular communities to allow them to engage in the universal practice of
science.
Fuller captures the very essence of the different paths taken by Popper and Kuhn
through reference to transcendence and immanence.
'Popper held that truth is always 'transcendent' of the community of inquirers,
58 Kuhn, Structure, p.80.
59 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 13.
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whereas for Kuhn truth is always 'immanent' in the community. If Kuhn located
truth within a scientific paradigm, Popper found it in a 'meta-language' into which
the knowledge claims of the paradigm may be translated and evaluated'.61
Science is a universal language for Popper and he rejects Kuhn's attempts to erect
barriers and boundaries around particular communities of scientists, each with its
own native language.
By placing such emphasis on community Kuhn removes from individuals a degree
of responsibility, at least in the Popperian sense of a responsibility to formulate and
subject hypotheses to critical tests in a liberal environment that calls forth a plurality
of both theories and tests. Normal science, for Kuhn, is an inherently conservative
activity whereby scientists seek to preserve the paradigm that guides their work and
pursue the puzzles that it prompts. Individual scientists are faced with a process of
assimilation into the paradigmatic structure and the acceptance of the standards and
assumptions that are contained by it. For Popper, this is a corruption of the scientific
ideal because questioning is the purpose of science and he seeks to ensure that
nothing escapes being questioned, including paradigms or the theoretical positions
that they represent. Kuhn's approach allows such questions only rarely and as a last
resort upon the discovery of crisis within a paradigm. He holds that the
understanding of a science's significance comes only after the resolution of its major
disputes.62
Popper takes science to be an essentially critical enterprise and thus is liable to be
suspicious of enduring and sustained consensus. Kuhn takes such consensus to be a
prerequisite of the practice of normal science and posits that its loss is felt primarily
as a psychological blow to those scientists that had previously relied on it to instruct
their day-to-day endeavours. Indeed, in the transition from an old paradigm to its
new replacement 'lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive
careers have committed them to an older tradition of normal science, is not a
violation of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research
61 Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p.56.
62 Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p.90.
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itself'.63 The situation that Kuhn describes here is a violation of Popperian scientific
standards.
Kuhn's conservative sympathy for those affected by radical change leads him to
excuse such resistance whilst Popper is not prepared to tolerate the intrusion of
psychological preferences into his scientific methodology. As we shall see however,
Popper is less permissive of political revolution, more willing to concede its
potential psychological draw backs for individuals and far more cautious about
recommending it as a policy prescription. In turning our attention towards Popper's
political philosophy we begin with an investigation of the nature of the critical
method that he employs to both science and politics, that of critical rationalism.
2.3 The Tradition ofCritical Rationalism
Popper's commitment to reason is of a particular kind. The power of reason, he
contends, is unleashed when it is employed in a critical manner; that is when
rationality is utilised deductively as part of the process of hypotheses testing in
science for example. Critical rationalism is the method he perceives as underpinning
both scientific progress and controlled political reform. Indeed, whilst a virtue in all
walks of life, it has been suggested that Popper 'invested science with symbolic
import as the standard-bearer for critical rationality'.64 This interpretation could also
be reversed as Popper attached symbolic importance to critical rationality itself and
saw in the scientific method of falsificationism an exemplar of this attitude and
approach. Popper sums up his commitment to critical rationalism in proclaiming
that 'in order to learn to avoid making mistakes we must learn from our mistakes. To
cover up mistakes is, therefore, the greatest intellectual sin'.6:5 This establishes
Popper's position that critical rationality is fundamentally about openness and
involves an attitude whereby individuals must be prepared to actively seek out their
Kuhn, Structure ofScientific Revolutions, p. 151.
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own mistakes in a bid to learn the lessons that they may teach.
For Popper, such an attitude was embodied in Socrates and he was an admirer of the
Socratic approach to rationality. Popper suggests that Socrates came to believe that
wisdom constitutes 'simply the realisation: how little do I know! Those who did not
know this, he taught, knew nothing at all'.66 This indicates the sense of intellectual
humility that Popper held must necessarily underlie the critical rational method
because without such humility the prospect of mistakes being overlooked or, worse,
ignored, would be magnified. It is a liberal creed that draws out the principles of
freedom, in an intellectual sense, that is permissive of competition amongst ideas,
and toleration in that mistakes are not only to be tolerated but in fact embraced for to
spot a mistake is to make a discovery of a kind. Such discoveries are seen by Popper
to be conducive to refining scientific hypotheses and, as we shall see, to refining
attempts at political reform.
Kuhn of course disputes the efficacy of a critically rational attitude towards the
development of science. He argues that kit is precisely the abandonment of critical
discourse that marks the transition to a science. Once a field has made that
transition, critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the
field are again in jeopardy'.67 This returns us to the distinction that Kuhn makes
between normal and revolutionary periods of science and he considers it quite
appropriate for scientists to operate without a critical attitude or methodology when
attempting to solve the puzzles prompted by paradigm anchored normal science.
Chalmers argues that this Kuhnian account of science and its attendant rationality
equates to a conservative position and furthermore, one that 'leaves us with no way
of criticizing the decisions and mode of operating of the scientific community'.
Chalmers point is slightly undermined however with the appreciation that in making
66 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies Volume 1 - The Spell ofPlato, London: Routledge,
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it he is in fact critiquing the operational mode of the scientific community as
conceived from Kuhn's point of view. What I suspect he meant to raise instead is
that Kuhn appears to deny to scientists the opportunity to be self-reflective and self-
critical of the methodologies they utilise, at least insofar as normal science is
concerned. It is this denial that concerns Popper and leads him to dismiss Kuhn's
approach on account ofwhat he perceives to be its dogmatism. 'The normal
scientist, as described by Kuhn, has been badly taught. He has been taught in a
dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of indoctrination. He has learned a technique which
can be applied without asking for a reason why'.69 Notice that Popper does not
regard Kuhn's failing as merely technical for in referring to the normal scientist as a
'victim' of indoctrination he reveals that he regard's Kuhn's approach as a moral
failure also.
To learn a technique which is applicable without the need to ask for reasons why is,
for Popper, to abandon rationality and the critically rational method. To strip critical
rationality out of the normal scientific process is Kuhn's great mistake as Popper
sees it. Moreover, Popper does not recognise the distinction between normal and
revolutionary periods of science since he believes that the methodology of science is
what separates it from non-science and so the introduction of Kuhn's distinction
blurs the clear line of demarcation that Popper sought to trace. Kuhn accepts this
implication of his work by noting 'that it is normal science, in which Sir Karl's sort
of testing does not occur, rather than extraordinary science which most nearly
distinguishes science from other enterprises'. 0 It is difficult to see on what basis
'extraordinary' science, during periods of scientific revolution, is still to be
considered science at all on this Kuhnian account. From a Popperian perspective
Kuhn fails to provide an adequate general demarcation between science and non-
science and then proceeds to compound this error by mistaking the non-critical
method of normal science as representative of genuine scientific methodology.
As we have already seen, Popper considers Kuhn to have made both technical and
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moral errors but he goes on to suggest that a further shortcoming of Kuhn's position
is its discounting of the contribution made to science by imagination. Popper
suggests that criticism itself solicits the imagination whilst dogmatism by contrast
will tend to suppress it.71 In attacking what he sees as the dogmatic approach of
historicism Popper regards historicism's poverty to be first and foremost 'a poverty
of imagination'.72 As highlighted previously, Popper held Kuhn's philosophy of
science to inhere the logic of historical relativism that is diametrically opposed to
73
Popper's own logic of discovery and critical rationalism.
Popper's invoking of the imagination is a function of his progressiveness and a
desire on his part for human beings to be capable of liberating themselves from
present circumstance where that circumstance is found to be in some way oppressive
or not conducive to individual flourishing. Popper disdains Kuhn's conservatism for
lacking an appreciation of imagined possibility and preferring instead the comfort of
the status quo. What is interesting, as we shall see later the chapter, is the extent to
which Popper seeks to temper the imagination in matters of political reform.
For now, it is worth exploring the sort of commitments that Popper's critical
rationality implies along with the relationships within the scientific community that
it presupposes. It is at this point that the universalism of Popper's philosophy of
science comes under the microscope. Popper lays out explicitly the nature of the
commitment that is entailed by critical rationality. The adoption of critical
rationalism implies:
'that there is a common medium of communication, a common language of reason; it
establishes something like a moral obligation towards that language, the obligation
to keep up its standards of clarity and to use it in such a way that it can retain its
function as the vehicle of argument'.74
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Popper attaches here to reason a commonality, a morality and functionality. The
commitments entailed do not apply to a particular group of scientists, working within
a paradigm for example, but rather to all scientists as members of the scientific
community.
The commonality that Popper infers in his critical rationalism is of a communicative
and linguistic quality; scientists are able to communicate with each other by virtue of
employing a common methodology that is understood, and capable of being
interpreted, by the entire community. Popper does not envisage the scientific
community as being linguistically subdivided in terms of the interoperability and
communicability of the critical rationalist method. Popper's 'common language of
reason' not only serves as a methodological device but also appears to some extent to
denote the boundaries of scientific community and give it a communal sense of
belonging and identity. Via the positing of this common language Popper implies
that scientists can both understand and identify each other.
It is interesting that Popper talks of the 'moral obligation' due to the common
language of rationality on the part of scientists. It is clear from this that Popper's
story of science is to be read as a morality tale and that critical rationality brings with
it certain responsibilities as part of the price of entry into the scientific enterprise.
The primary responsibility that scientists are obliged to accept is that of clarity in
respect of the hypotheses that they outline as well as the tests that they design for
examining those hypotheses. Beyond that, Popper instructs scientists to remember
the purpose to which critical rationality is to be put.
That purpose, or functionality, is described by Popper as 'the vehicle of argument'.
Such a vehicle is the means by which science progresses, or at least is afforded the
opportunity to progress through the testing of theories. Popper is setting out here
that his concept of critical rationality is a method of argumentation and thus the
scientific enterprise comprises arguments conducted in this way. Kuhn recognises
the stark contrast between this approach and his own. He understands the Popperian
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approach to require of scientists that they endeavour at all times to be critics and
proliferators of alternate theories but suggests that for his own part he advocates 'the
desirability of an alternate strategy which reserves such behaviour for special
75 • *i • ... .occasions'. Popper objects to this because for him every test situation is a 'special
occasion' or at least should be as each critical rational test presents a learning
opportunity. The paradigmatic framework is as close as normal scientists, in Kuhn's
conception, come to encountering a vehicle of argument. That said, with argument
marginalised during periods of normal science, the paradigm is less a provider of a
vehicle of argument than it is an arena for the technical task of working out a pre-
given blueprint.76 The notion of technical knowledge, or rationality, as it divides
Popper and Kuhn can be usefully examined with reference to the work of Michael
Oakeshott.
Technical and Practical Rationality
Oakeshott was a critic ofwhat he termed rationalism in politics and his conservative
scepticism led him to be doubtful as to the faith and trust that could be placed in
reason as a guide to both discovery and conduct in human affairs. In Oakeshott's
view, the rationalist (for him a pejorative term) stands:
'for independence ofmind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any
authority save the authority of 'reason'. His circumstances in the modern world have
made him contentious: he is the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely
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traditional, customary or habitual'.
Oakeshott seeks to defend the roles of authority, prejudice, tradition and custom
against the contentions of rationalists that would have them dismissed or sidelined
on account of their paying insufficient heed to reason. It is clear that on the basis of
the definition outlined above, Popper would qualify as a rationalist in Oakeshott's
eyes.
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Popper, as we have seen, makes plain the obligation he takes to be owed to reason
and its authority. He considers that obligation to be owed because only reason can
operate the deductive methodology of falsificationism; prejudice and custom are not
equipped to perform such a task as far as Popper is concerned even although Kuhn
permits them as principles capable of directing the enterprise of normal science.
Popper's objection to the approach shared by Oakeshott and Kuhn here derives, at
least in part, from a desire to institutionalise a rational methodology as a vehicle for
argument. This is illustrated in his suggestion that the abandonment of the rationalist
attitude invariably produces in its place an 'attitude which considers the person of
no
the thinker instead of his thought'. For Popper such an attitude is both dangerous
and methodologically flawed, that is to say that it represents both a moral and
technical failure. Rational criticism, Popper suggests, must always be specific: it
must clearly specify any apparent falsity of specific statements and hypotheses and
in doing so 'it must be impersonal'.79 Popper seeks to guard against the potential
relativism of personal criticisms and does so by attempting to institutionalise a
technical methodology that can serve as an independent basis upon which to proceed
with rational critique.
Unity in Rationalism
Universalism is another significant feature of rationalist thinking according to
Oakeshott and such a feature can indeed be attributed to Popperian philosophy of
science and, arguably as we shall discover, to his political philosophy but with a
greater degree of ambiguity. Oakeshott's rationalist 'is fortified by a belief in a
'reason' common to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration, which
80is the ground and inspiration of argument'. Again Oakeshott's description captures
Popper's account of science and thus provides further evidence that Popper is to be
considered a rationalist in Oakeshottian terms.
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Popper's critical rationalism is in principle common to all of humankind, it is a
choice open to individuals as to whether they adopt or reject it, and the rationality
that he conceptualises is deemed to be independent of particular time, place and
circumstance. Popper, once more appealing to the teachings of Socrates, contends
that critical rationalism is founded on a 'faith in the rational unity ofman' and that in
its scientific outlook in particular its universal roots can be traced back to the ancient
Socratic and Christian belief in the 'brotherhood of all men'.81 Popper's philosophy
of science seeks to explain the rational unity of science as he perceives it, or indeed
the unity of scientists, as much as provide a basis for such unity. This also serves to
highlight further that Popper's account of science is not merely a methodological one
but is also infused with a specific morality. Science serves for Popper as an
exemplar of the potential unity of humanity. It is important to note in the context of
that morality that it is reason that provides the basis for unity and enables the
overcoming of barriers between individuals and communities.
The principle objection raised by Oakeshott to rationalism of this form, including
critical rationalism, is that it neglects the cumulative character of experience and that
it recognises and incorporates experience only when it has been converted into a
formula. The past, Oakeshott suggests, is significant to the rationalist 'only as an
82encumbrance'. Popper's deductive falsificationism is formulaic in that it expresses
a formula of scientific methodology: science proceeds via the proposing of
conjectures that are subsequently subjected to refutation attempts in controlled tests
that are critical, inter-subjective and capable of being replicated. The past is not
necessarily viewed as an encumbrance in Popper's philosophical schematic however,
O T
since such a high priority is accorded to learning from mistakes. To do so is to
institute a reflective process in which the past does not encumber the present but
rather helps to inform it. The Popperian approach is historically oriented insofar as it
involves, in many instances, the repeated testing of conjectures and hypotheses that
have been previously formulated.
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In attacking rationalism Oakeshott considers himself to be engaging in a defence of
the conservative disposition. He argues that inherent to the rationalist disposition is
a reluctance to practice repair, preferring instead the invention of a new device over
the utilisation of a current and well-tried expedient. Kuhn's approach involves the
continued deployment of the paradigm framework as a well-tried expedient, at least
as far as normal science is concerned. He refers to challenges and 'adjustments' as a
standard part of normal research.85 For Popper, each new hypothesis constitutes the
invention of a new, potentially revolutionary, device as do the tests invented to assess
hypotheses.86 In their respective philosophies of science Kuhn appears to exhibit a
conservative disposition whilst Popper is far more disposed towards liberalism in
terms of the freedoms that he seeks to defend. The epistemological differences that
separate Kuhn and Popper can usefully be explored through the distinction that
87Oakeshott draws between 'technical" and 'practical' knowledge.
The Technique and Practice of Science
Oakeshott suggests that every human activity involves knowledge and that such
• 88
knowledge is always of either a technical or practical nature. Technical knowledge
is of a form that it can be 'formulated into rules' and thus is susceptible to precise
formulation.89 Practical knowledge, by contrast, exists only in its use and
application, is not reflective and unlike technical knowledge is not capable of being
precisely formulated in rule form.90 As an advocate of practical knowledge,
Oakeshott argues that its unreflective character does not render it 'an esoteric sort of
knowledge'. Rather, the effect of its character is that the method by which practical
knowledge 'may be shared and becomes common knowledge is not the method of
formulated doctrine'.91 With the distinction that Oakeshott sets up here it is clear
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that normal science as outlined by Kuhn has a practical quality whilst Popper's
critical rational falsificationism can be regarded as a scientific technique and thus as
technical knowledge. Popper's scientists are expected to learn a technique; Kuhn's
scientists are expected to adopt a practice.
Taking up the case of science specifically, Oakeshott suggests that technical rules
make up only one component part of the scientist's knowledge and that scientific
92
discovery is not achieved merely by following and applying the rules of technique.
This has important implications for what Chalmers calls The sociological
93characteristics of scientific communities'. Both Popper and Kuhn recognise that
the scientific community, in Popper's case, and particular scientific communities, in
Kuhn's case, share a number of commonalities. Popper talks of the common
language of reason that unites science whilst for Kuhn a scientific community
consists 'of the practitioners of a scientific specialty' that have undergone 'similar
educations and professional initiations'. Furthermore, such a community will see
itself as responsible for 'the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of
their successors'.94 This illustrates not only the extent of the communal bonds that
Kuhn envisages to exist amongst members of scientific communities but also the
sense in which new members are initiated into the community.
Popper's scientists exist in a single community of shared technique; Kuhn's
scientists inhabit communities of shared practice. Oakeshott makes the point that
technical knowledge can be both taught and learned but practical knowledge can
only be 'imparted and acquired" and acquisition comes through apprenticeship to a
master.93 Initiation into a paradigm does appear to involve something resembling an
apprenticeship for scientists. In this sense Kuhn's philosophy displays a high regard
for Oakeshott's notion of practical knowledge; such a notion is central to the practice
of normal science. With his concern to establish a criterion of scientific demarcation
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Popper's scientists are distinguished by their knowledge and application of the
technique of science denoted by critical rationalism.
It is important to note that although the technical-practical distinction drawn by
Oakeshott does capture a significant sense of what is at stake in the different
approaches taken by Popper and Kuhn a danger exists in overstating that distinction
and the differences it encapsulates. Kuhn, as we have seen, recognises that
professional initiation sits alongside shared educational backgrounds and thus
practical and technical components are combined in the induction process to
scientific communities. In suggesting that testing regimes be inter-subjective Popper
too invites the possibility of a practical component into his system in the sense that
the scientific enterprise can be learned, in part, from others. That said there is no
doubt as to the primacy given to technique by Popper. Indeed, he makes explicit his
aim as being 'to establish the rules ... by which the scientist is guided when he is
engaged in research or in discovery'.96 In making this his aim Popper reveals the
extent of his rationalism as seen from an Oakeshottian perspective.
Oakeshott argues that 'the sovereignty of reason, for the Rationalist, means the
sovereignty of technique'.97 For Popper, the sovereign position granted to reason in
93his philosophy marks him out not only as a rationalist but also as a liberal. By
investing sovereignty in reason Popper places high demands upon it but he does so
out of a fear that an opposing attitude that would scorn human reason 'must lead to
an appeal to violence and brutal force as the ultimate arbiter in any dispute'.99 It is
apparent therefore that the strength ofPopper's commitment to rationalism stems in
part from his view of irrationalism as fundamentally dangerous.100 This is not to
suggest that Kuhn, for example, in positing less sovereignty to reason (vis-a-vis
96 Popper, Logic, p.29.
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Popper) leaves science without rational means of dispute resolution. It does however
reinforce the distrust Popper has of approaches that grant considerable authority to
frameworks that assume a taken for granted status and indeed to past achievement in
the form of traditions. It is to the issue of tradition that I now turn.
Tradition and Critical Rationalism
As a conservative, Oakeshott places a high value on tradition and the practical
knowledge he perceives to reside within it. Oakeshott in fact argues that what he
describes as practical knowledge can, without being at all misleading, also be
described as traditional knowledge.101 In the case of science Oakeshott suggest that
scientific:
'traditions are not fixed and finished, and they are not to be identified with merely
current scientific opinion, or with an identifiable 'method'; they are the guide in
every piece of scientific investigation and at the same time they are being extended
and enlarged wherever scientists are at work'.102
In this conservative description of science as a tradition Oakeshott takes issue with
Popper's scientific philosophy and in doing so displays a considerable affinity with
the conception of science proposed by Kuhn.
In refuting the existence of a timeless and universal method that can be identified as
scientific, Oakeshott follows a similar path to Kuhn that leads to an anti-
methodological position. Science becomes, on this view, more or less whatever
scientists (themselves an essentially self-defining and self-referencing group or
groups) actually do in their daily endeavours. With Oakeshott making the claim that
mere current opinion cannot of itself be considered a tradition it is difficult to see
what bases remain available for the identification of scientific traditions. In
Popperian terms, for a scientific tradition to perform the task set by Oakeshott, that
of guiding every investigation, then it must be a methodological one if it is to qualify
as scientific to begin with. This raises the interesting question, which I shall come
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on to address very shortly, as to whether or not critical rationalism can be conceived
as a, or indeed the, tradition of science.
As Oakeshott suggests that scientific traditions are extended and enlarged in the
course of scientists going about their work he is invoking Kuhn's notion of
paradigms. Whilst Oakeshott indicates the character that he attributes to traditions of
science, and the purpose he sees them as coming to serve, he does not tell us what
they are or where they emanate from. Kuhn is less opaque in this regard since he is
at least able to define paradigms as exemplary pieces of research, or 'shared
examples', that pave the way for future research programmes.103 Popper, by
contrast, is able to describe a methodology of science. The question remains
however as to the extent to which it may be considered a tradition.
The first thing to note regarding Popper's attitude to tradition is the emphasis that he
places on the individual when evaluating traditions.
He takes the view that 'we can get rid of that attitude which considers every tradition
as sacrosanct, or as valuable in itself, replacing this by an attitude which considers
traditions as valuable or pernicious, as the case may be, according to their influence
upon individuals'.104
Considered from this perspective traditions are not the bearers of intrinsic value but
rather are to be valued in accordance with the contribution that they make to
individual wellbeing. In Popper's conception here individuals must judge traditions
instead of being judged by them. It is worth remembering in this context Kuhn's
claim that in relation to normal science the failure to achieve a solution to a puzzle
'discredits only the scientist and not the theory'.105 The theory at issue here of
course is the paradigm and the particular tradition of science that it is representative
of.
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Having reiterated his methodological individualism in examining the concept of
tradition it is interesting to discover the extent of the role and influence that Popper
is prepared to concede to tradition. Firstly, he suggests that 'traditions are needed to
form a kind of link between institutions and the intentions and valuations of
individual men'.106 Popper does not detail the exact nature of that link and thus the
statement has an inescapable ambiguity about it but at the very least it is apparent
that he detects a relationship between individuals and the past that can be mediated
through institutions. It would seem that Popper accepts that traditions can possess
sediments of historic intent and value that is often manifest in particular institutional
structures and arrangements. Perhaps the point that he is seeking to make is that
without such a link institutions may well seem abstract and peculiar to individuals in
circumstances whereby they have not consciously or directly brought them into
being.
The second characterisation of tradition that Popper provides is less ambiguous and
more illuminating. He notes that 'all laws, being universal principles, have to be
interpreted in order to be applied; and an interpretation needs some principles of
concrete practice, which can be supplied only by a living tradition'.107 On the face
of it this conception of the relationship between universal principles, subsidiary
principles of interpretation and tradition brings Popper much closer to Kuhn's
philosophy and account of science. Kuhn's paradigms provide living scientific
traditions to scientists and are the settings for 'concrete practice'. The interpretative
competency required by scientists is provided in part by the paradigm itself as well
as by the practical initiation into the community that all scientists encounter. I would
argue however that Popper can avoid endorsing the Kuhnian approach by
differentiating more clearly between falsificationism as a methodology and critical
rationality as an attitude.
The extension of this difference facilitates the conceptualisation of the falsificationist
method as a 'universal principle' and critical rationalism as a 'living tradition'.
106 Popper, In Search, p. 156.
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55
Popper himself, as we have seen, traces a historical trajectory of the rationalist
attitude through Socrates and the early Christians so it is a plausible interpretation of
his work to suggest that critical rationality can be characterised as a tradition of
thought. It is a tradition of thought that Popper held to be applicable to both science
and politics. But what then of 'concrete practice' in relation to Popper's approach?
It seems to me that this role can be performed by practicing critical discussion
distinct from critical rationality as an attitude. Popper denotes a rationalist as being
'a person who is willing to learn from others, not simply by accepting their opinions,
but by allowing them to criticize his ideas and by criticizing theirs: in other words by
critical discussion'.108 In this way the critical rational attitude can be translated into
critical discursive practice.
By partially reconciling his philosophy of science with tradition Popper opens up a
channel within it for the incorporation of a conservative aspect. He is adamant that
tradition must be utilised in service of the individual rather than the other way round
but it is nonetheless significant that he is prepared to sanction a guiding role of any
sort to tradition. Of course it should be recognised that Popper is predominantly
content with a particular sort of tradition, that of critical rationalism. Even so, once
critical rationalism is conceived as a tradition of thought the boundary between the
liberal and the conservative elements of Popper's philosophy becomes less clear cut.
The possibility emerges, for example, to conceptualise the Popperian philosophical
project as that of preserving and extending the critical rational tradition. Such a task
is at least as conservative as it is liberal and there is little doubt that Popper views
critical rationality as an inheritance to be both cherished and protected.109
Conservative Defences of Tradition
In conceptualising critical rationalism as a tradition a degree of affinity can be traced
between Popper's attitude and that of the conservative disposition as outlined by
Oakeshott. To say as much is to not to label Popper a conservative on this basis
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alone but it does, I contend, permit the argument to be developed that Popperian
philosophy has a conservative element inhering within it. The extent and
implications of such an element will be explored in greater detail in the final section
of this chapter with an assessment of the nature of political change from a Popperian
perspective. As a prelude to that however, I conclude this section with a brief
consideration of the continuity between scientific and political traditions that
Oakeshott perceives.
Oakeshott's conservatism shares many similarities with the conservative philosophy
of science developed by Kuhn. He envisages science as a practical craft, learned by
way of apprenticeship110 and practiced within specific 'traditions of scientific
inquiry'.111 Oakeshott also suggests that the role played by tradition in science is
reprised in the political world.
'Just as a scientific hypothesis cannot appear, and is impossible to operate, except
within an already existing tradition of scientific investigation, so a scheme of ends
for political activity appears within, and can be evaluated only when it is related to,
an already existing tradition of how to attend to our arrangements'.112
This description of the scientific enterprise is one that Kuhn could endorse since it
parallels his conception of normal science with paradigms acting as existing
traditions of scientific investigation that prompt particular programmes of research.
Popper, by contrast, would not accept the tradition dependent nature of scientific
hypotheses outlined by Oakeshott. Indeed, he believes that the creativity that is
central to the practice of science is most readily found in the imagination and
propounding of bold conjectures.113 Popper would likely contend that Oakeshott has
subscribed here, with Kuhn, to the 'myth of the framework' as entailed by tradition
in this instance. Popper's individualistic, rationalist, and tolerant (of a very wide
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range of hypotheses for example) liberalism stands opposed to this form of
conservatism.
Popper is happy to accept that human reasoning is considerably limited and thus that
we are, without exception, fallible creatures but he sees the prospect of overcoming
some of that limitation through cooperative effort - inter-subjective testing in the
case of science.114 For all that Popper seeks and defends individual liberty, and the
liberty of free thought as a fundamental component of personal freedom, he can
neither fully escape nor abandon a slightly conservative adherence to tradition even
if that tradition is the critical rationalism of Socratic teaching. Similarly, he is forced
to accept that his advocacy of reason rests ultimately upon a faith in it, a quasi-
religious commitment that is not easily disposed to rational deduction or critical test.
These aspects of Popper's thought indicate that he is not entirely a stranger to the
conservative disposition. Whilst that disposition emerges only episodically and
relatively delicately in his philosophy of science it tends to inform his political
philosophy rather more strongly and frequently.
2.4 The Nature and Conduct of Political Change
It has been argued that Popper's political philosophy is at heart a 'philosophy of how
to change things' rationally and humanely"5 as well as being an attempt to outline
ways in which society could be reorganised 'so that it could be as genuinely
experimental in its policies as a laboratory science is in its hypotheses'.116 It is
apparent that Popper himself considered his political philosophy to be an extension
of his philosophy of science and that the same basic methodology was applicable and
conducive to both the scientific and political domains. He makes clear that in order
to introduce scientific methods into the study of society and into politics, as is his
intent, 'what is needed most is the adoption of a critical attitude, and the realization
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that not only trial but also error is necessary'.117 It can be seen straight away
therefore that Popper seeks to apply critical rationalism to politics alongside the
methodology of inter-subjective testing.
There follows in this section a consideration of the manner in which Popper
undertakes that task and the success or otherwise of it. I will argue that Popper
consistently and successfully translates his scientific methodology to politics but in
doing so the shape and tone of his political philosophy begins to diverge somewhat
from his philosophy of science in the scale and scope of the conservative aspects that
it incorporates. One of the significant effects of this divergence is that whilst
Popper's philosophy of science sought to both encourage and aid scientific
revolution (as an intrinsic component of scientific discovery) his political philosophy
strongly discourages and seeks to obstruct social and political revolutions. With
regard to science, such an approach is indicative of Popper's liberalism, in the case
of politics however his liberalism is tempered to a far greater extent by a disposition
that is of a conservative character.
The task here then is to look into both the continuity and disjuncture of Popper's bid
to translate his philosophy of science into a political philosophy. His key purpose in
doing so is to lay the foundations for what he calls the 'open society', a society that
plans rationally and step by step 'for institutions to safeguard freedom, especially
freedom from exploitation'118 animated by a faith in humanitarianism."9 The
concept of open society itself shall be explored in the next chapter but for now it
suffices to note that Popper's political philosophy has such a society as its aim. The
subject of immediate inquiry here is that of the nature and conduct of political
change that Popper advocates as a means both of advancing toward open society (or
indeed preserving it where it is thought to exist) and toward a scientific approach to
politics. The method developed by Popper in seeking to achieve these goals is that
of piecemeal social engineering.
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Piecemeal Social Engineering
In taking the attitude of an engineer toward questions of political change Popper
views organisations and institutions as 'machines' for implementing policies.120 As
we have noted previously, Popper's positive positions often have their roots in a
profound opposition to something and his advocacy of the engineering method is no
different in this regard. The social theory that Popper opposes is that of historicism
which he describes as an approach to the social sciences that aims at historical
prediction derived from attempts to discover the rhythms, patterns, laws or trends
imagined to underlie the evolution of history.121 In contrast to this approach,
Popper's social engineers do not ask questions regarding historical tendencies
believing instead that humans are masters of their own destinies; history therefore, or
perhaps more accurately the future, can be influenced and changed by the actions
and efforts of human individuals, it can be created in a manner similar to the
(engineering) creation of new machinery.122
Whilst historicists interest themselves in seeking out the origin and destiny of
institutions in a bid to uncover their role in history Popper advocates that social
engineers should focus on the appropriateness, efficiency and simplicity of
123institutions as means serving particular ends. Institutions matter to Popper as part
of the task that he sets himself of depersonalising politics in a similar vein to his
attempts to do likewise with science. In Popper's philosophy institutions represent a
form of aggregated power beyond the physical capacity of individuals and, again
drawing a comparison with machines, he suggests that 'institutions multiply our
power for good and evil'.124 The extraordinary, almost mechanistic, capabilities
possessed by institutions are such that they require constant and intelligent
supervision.
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The institutionalisation of politics is intended to serve two primary purposes for
Popper. Firstly, it is designed to make politics more susceptible to an engineering
methodology and attitude which Popper equates with the approaches of
falsificationism and critical rationalism he defended in relation to science. Secondly,
he hopes to institute an impersonal politics, and disposition to political reform, that
has reason as its basis rather than emotion. His fear of drawing upon the latter is
encapsulated in the suggestion that 'he who teaches that not reason but love should
rule opens the way for those who rule by hate'.125 He is advancing a technical
conception of politics as an alternative that is drained of emotion so as to be able to
focus on the technocratic task of institutional and structural modification. In this
way Popper considers himself to be introducing both a rational perspective and
scientific methodology into the world of politics.
Proceeding in such a manner offers further evidence of Popper as a rationalist
thinker as defined by Oakeshott. Recalling the Oakeshottian distinction between
technical and practical knowledge it is apparent that Popper's piecemeal social
engineers are supposed to work with the former whilst engaged in political reform.
For his part, Oakeshott suggests that the knowledge involved in political activity is
of a 'dual character', that is, a combination of the technical and practical.126 There is
no suggestion on my part that Popper operates a strict dichotomy between technical
and practical knowledge with regard to politics. Fie provides a greater degree of
clarity on his position in noting that 'all social entities are products of history; not
inventions, planned by reason, but formations emerging from the vagaries of
historical events, from the interplay of ideas and interests, from sufferings and from
passions'.127 With this recognition Popper all but concedes the difficulties and
limitations inherent to any attempt to introduce processes of engineering into
politics.
That said the realisation that political institutions are not exclusively rational
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inventions does not preclude subsequent attempts to render them, and their reform,
susceptible to rational intervention that is of an engineering mode. It is also
noteworthy that Popper incorporates historical vagaries, interests and passions in his
conception of the factors that cohere in the production of social entities such as
political institutions. Here he displays an appreciation that the introduction of a
technical approach to politics will still have to contend with passions and emotions
since they appear to be intrinsic to social constructions. It is also the case that by
explaining institutions as 'products of history' and formations emergent from a
multitude of interacting factors, Popper gives a further example of a periodic
tendency toward conservatism in his philosophy. At the very least this highlights a
degree of acceptance that his liberal desire to put politics on a more rational footing
is likely to be constrained to some extent by forces of conservatism.
Whilst Popper seems unable to fully distance himself from conservatism he remains
altogether more dismissive of historicism as a theoretical approach. He complains
that historicists tend to the view that 'political planning, like all social activity, must
stand under the superior sway of historical forces'.128 By this Popper means the
historicist belief in historical patterns and laws that will be more influential in
determining the outcome of political events and the shape of political institutions
than conscious attempts to rationally plan or reform them. It is difficult for Popper
to entirely dismiss the historicist approach however after having reached an
acceptance that political institutions cannot fully extricate themselves from the sway
of historical forces. Thus the dispute becomes a matter of, admittedly large, degree
because it is of considerable importance to the Popperian approach that the sway of
historical forces is in no way superior to political planning in the form of piecemeal
social engineering. History may well play a part in informing and shaping the
present, and through it the future, but that part is far less significant than the one
potentially played by political planning. For Popper, whatever hold is granted to
history over the political present, the political future of humankind remains open to
be engineered.
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The central critique that Popper is making of historicism is that it 'denies to human
• • 190
reason the power of bringing about a more reasonable world'. Much like the
criticisms that he levelled at Kuhn the denial of human reason referred to here
implies both a technical and a moral failing. The technical failing is the
underestimating of the engineering technique as a guide to social and political reform
whilst the moral shortcoming is to be found in the marginal position allocated to
morality itself in the historicist understanding of political change. If history is
largely predetermined then political planning, of whatever moral value or quality,
will have little or no bearing on the societies it seeks to effect. In defending his
rationalist engineering method Popper seeks to challenge the efficacy of the
historicist approach along with that of what he considers to be historicism's strategic
ally, utopianism.
Liberation from Utopia
Popper takes the view that utopianism suffers from a very similar poverty to that
which he finds in historicism. Indeed, part of his reasoning for suggesting that this is
so can be attributed to the strong parallels that he sees as existing between their
respective approaches. Popper refers to an 'alliance' between historicism and
utopianism founded on a holistic approach common to both. The holism that he
detects is that of an interest in the development 'not of aspects of social life, but of
society as a whole'.130 Historicism concentrates on trying to discover the rhythms
that govern societal development whilst utopianism aims at the remodelling and
reconstruction of society as a whole. It is worth noting here that Popper uses the
term 'utopian planning' in describing this method in contrast to the piecemeal
method of his philosophy.131
Once again Popper pursues technical and moral criticisms together when examining
historicism's alliance with utopianism. If holism is the technical deficiency common
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to both, then unchosen ends represent their shared moral shortcoming. Popper
contends that historicism and utopianism are predicated on a belief that 'their aims or
ends are not a matter of choice, or of moral decision, but that they may be
132
scientifically discovered' from within their respective fields of inquiry. In
Popper's understanding, historicism constrains present political action by an undue
deference to history meanwhile utopianism is prepared to gamble the present by
initiating radical and fundamentally transformative societal change in pursuit of an
imagined or ideal state that is taken to be the end point for Utopian engineering.
Popper describes the Utopian approach as dealing in 'ultimate aims' and only
133
drawing up plans for 'practical action' on the basis of a 'blueprint' for society.
Popper's opposition to utopianism is primarily an opposition to what I term blueprint
politics, the notion that political reform must be based on a preconceived model of
society as a whole to be engineered. Interestingly, this is an opposition that he shares
with Oakeshott, albeit that they express their opposition in slightly different ways.
The Epistemology of Planning
For Popper, utopianism and Utopian engineering in particular, come undone on
epistemological grounds. His own piecemeal engineering however is argued to be
able to stand on the epistemological ground that brings about the fall of Utopian
engineering.
'Social life is so complicated that few men, or none at all, could judge a blueprint for
social engineering on the grand scale; whether it be practicable; whether it would
result in real improvement; what kind of suffering it may involve; and what may be
the means for its realization. As opposed to this, blueprints for piecemeal
engineering are comparatively simple. They are blueprints for single institutions, for
health and unemployed insurance, for instance, or arbitration courts, or anti-
depression budgeting, or educational reform. If they go wrong, the damage is not
very great, and a re-adjustment not very difficult'.134
Popper seeks to draw a sharp distinction between the epistemological requirements
of piecemeal social engineering and those, perceived to be far more considerable and
L'3
Popper, Poverty ofHistoricism, p. 74.
133
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p. 157.
Ij4
Popper, Open Society Volume /,, p. 159.
64
perhaps even impossible, of Utopian engineering. It is the complications of social
life that render the Utopian model so problematic in that the range of information and
knowledge that needs to be factored into the planning process is beyond the scope of
any group that might be constituted to consider and judge it. Popper's
epistemological critique of Utopian engineering is closely mirrored by Hayek who
sets out very similar objections to planning in the economic sphere.13:1
Popper is justified in highlighting the epistemological obstacles to a Utopian
engineering approach but it is arguable that the difference between that approach and
his own piecemeal method is not as stark as he believes himself to have established.
Firstly, it is evident that his opposition to blueprint politics is a matter of degree since
his own method still takes guidance from blueprints even if of a smaller scale and
more restricted scope. Secondly, and more importantly, however it is not all obvious
that the single institution projects that he lists as examples could avoid the
epistemological difficulties posed to Utopian engineering. Educational reform in the
UK for instance would be likely to involve social engineering on a 'grand scale' and
be characterised as complex rather than simple. Part of the reason for that
complexity stems from the fact that a term such as 'educational reform' does not
even denote a single institution in a British context and this would add to the
complications identified as being detrimental to planning of any kind. Similarly in
the case of'anti-depression budgeting' there is no evidence to suggest that such a
task can be pursued uncomplicatedly or indeed judgements be made as to its
practicability, real effects, or the sufferings that may result from it. The current
global financial crisis does not appear to be particularly amenable to piecemeal
social remedy. Furthermore, the potential damage to be done in any getting
something such as anti-depression budgeting wrong is likely to be severe in terms of
job losses, insolvencies and home repossessions.
Popper, I suggest, does not overestimate the likely epistemological difficulty to be
faced by Utopian planning but he does underestimate the extent to which similar
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difficulties befall his own approach, at least as conceived on the scale that he sets out
here. In spite of such challenges the Popperian method of piecemeal political reform
remains a more modest and cautious approach than that of Utopian animated attempts
to remake society at large. The restraint of ambition that Popper cautions in respect
of political change as well as being anti-utopian and anti-historicist has considerable
sympathy with conservative aversion to revolutionary change. Popper's
epistemological preference for a cautionary approach to political reform also has
roots in the particular unease that he displays toward unchecked power. He criticises
the Utopian or holistic planner for overlooking that whilst power can be centralised
with relative ease it is far more difficult to centralise the knowledge 'distributed over
many individual minds' that would be necessary for the 'wise wielding' of such
centralised power.136 Planning for society as a whole would require a conjunction of
power and knowledge that Popper considers dangerous in respect of power and
infeasible in terms of knowledge. His liberal concern here is to protect the
individual from the invasiveness and revolutionary turmoil that could potentially
result from wholesale change however meticulously planned it might claim to be.
Oakeshott too has grave reservations about projects of reform of such scale and
ambition that they entail the redrawing of society from scratch; such a tendency, he
asserts, is rationalist in origin. He suggests that undertakings of this kind require a
'blank sheet of infinite possibility' as a starting point. If however the tabula rasa of a
particular society 'has been defaced by the irrational scribblings of tradition-ridden
137
ancestors, then the first task of the rationalist must be to scrub it clean'.
Oakeshott's anti-rationalism stems from his conservative concern that much of value
risks being lost in the process of scrubbing clean that he outlines here. Popper shares
the fear that large scale social change is inherently risky and points specifically to an
1 3R
increased risk of 'unintended and largely unexpected repercussions'. From a
Popperian perspective then, the conducting of social and political change warrants an
attitude composed of a degree of conservative caution in order that it can proceed in
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a controlled manner that maximises the opportunity to learn from mistakes as they
arise.
This conveys the essence of Popper's attempt to introduce his methodology of
science (developed in the context of the natural sciences) into social and political
matters. As he regards the scientific method to be encapsulated by 'a readiness to
learn from mistakes'139 it is not surprising that political reform from a Popperian
perspective must be conducted in such a way that is both attuned to the possibility of
error and prepared to amend in light of it. It is on this basis that Popper argues that
the kind of 'experiment' from which most can be learned, and hence is most
scientific, is that of the 'alteration of one social institution at a time'. It is by such
advance that piecemeal engineers can learn to 'fit institutions into the framework of
other institutions' and adjust them as required to work as intended.140 I have already
noted that by proceeding on the scale of institution at a time piecemeal planning may
be rendered difficult on epistemological grounds. Whilst undoubtedly more
cautious, and conservative, than attempts at broader social reform it would still be
unlikely to satisfy a theorist such as Oakeshott that, conceived in this way, it was
sufficiently cognisant of the nature of the risk inherent to institutional reform.
Popper's reference to the 'framework of other institutions' is a rather ambiguous
term. On one hand, it can be read as a simple reflection of the fact that if focus is
concentrated on a single institution then it must be remembered that it exists in
relation to others and so internal institutional changes may well reap change beyond
the institution itself. Indeed, in many cases this will be precisely the intent. On the
other hand though, the term could be taken to imply a broader framework for society
that is conceived by the instigator(s) of change. In this case the separation between
institutions that would allow them to be engineered one at a time can be called into
question. Furthermore, the wider framework is also suggestive of planning in that
the engineer may be seeking to influence it in the particular reforms being
undertaken. If this is so then even piecemeal engineers cannot avoid drawing upon
139
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p. 163.
140
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p. 163.
67
some wider societal conceptions and blueprints of their own to inform the particular
changes that they aim to make. The issue at stake here is whether or not specific
(institutional) aspects of society can be isolated to the extent that would appear to be
necessitated by Popper's approach.
He is convinced that they can be and argues that one of the key benefits of the
technological approach to political reform is that it 'imposes a discipline on our
speculative inclinations' in forcing the submission of theories 'to definite standards,
such as standards of clarity and practical testability'.141 It is not especially clear
however that submission to definite standards will suffice in and of itself as a
disciplinary imposition. Popper contends that the piecemeal engineer 'will avoid
undertaking reforms of a complexity and scope which makes it impossible for him to
disentangle causes and effects'.142 There seems to exist at least the possibility that
the sort of the complexity and scope described here could be encountered by reform
at an institutional level such as Popper is prepared to permit. It may well be that to
achieve the avoidance that he seeks then reform would be better concentrated at a
sub-institutional level particularly in its early stages. Otherwise, it is difficult to see
how Popper can confidently insulate his engineers from potential complexities in
relating cause and effect.
One of the most important claims that Popper makes in defence of piecemeal
engineering is the ability, as he sees it, of its practitioners to proceed 'with an open
mind' as to the scope of reform in contrast to Utopian engineers who will have
decided in advance that a 'complete reconstruction' is both possible and necessary.143
The reason for this is the manner in which the respective approaches treat the
question of ends. Popper suggests that piecemeal social engineering resembles
physical engineering in 'regarding the ends as beyond the province of technology'.144
The alternative Utopian approach to political reform he characterises as aiming at the
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'movement of society itself' in that like a physical body it can 'move as a whole' in a
particular direction. This notion, Popper dismisses as 'a holistic confusion'.
Anti-utopianism and anti-holism are twin pillars that Popper considers integral to the
structural strength of piecemeal social engineering. Similarly, it is the Utopian and
holistic aspects of alternative approaches that lead them, he argues, to set out on
journeys of political reform with pre-identified and pre-fixed destinations in mind,
very often destinations that will require engineering on a grand scale if they are to be
realised. The question remains though as to how the issue of ends is to be addressed
and Popper's answer raises further questions still. He contends that:
'there is no rational method for determining the ultimate aim [of political reform],
but, if anything, only some kind of intuition. Any difference of opinion between
Utopian engineers must therefore lead, in the absence of rational methods, to the use
of power instead of reason, i.e. to violence'.146
The claims that Popper puts forward here provide further evidence of affinity
between his philosophy and that developed by Oakeshott, suggest that the distinction
he makes between piecemeal and Utopian engineering is overblown in some respects
and overstate the consequences of pursuing reform from a Utopian perspective.
Firstly, the use of the word 'intuition' is an interesting one and highlights to an extent
the challenges faced by Popper in attempting to institutionalise a methodology of
political reform in the shape of piecemeal engineering. Institutions do not have
intuitions, only individuals do and thus we return to the politics of the personal
whereby individuals are faced with choices, including over whether or not to initiate
any reform, in particular political contexts. For his part, Oakeshott explains that in
his conservative politics, political reform should be in pursuit not of a dream or a
general principle but rather an 'intimation'.1 7 Individuals and groups pursue
intimations, or intuitions, guided by traditions and informed by practical knowledge.
Political education for Oakeshott is thus 'learning how to participate in a
145 Popper, Poverty ofHistoricism, p.l 14.
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conversation: it is at once initiation into an inheritance in which we have a life
interest, and the exploration of its intimations'.148 Popper's piecemeal engineers are
also expected to learn the art of conversation, critical rational conversation in their
case, and, it turns out, pursue intimations of their own in the conduct of political
reform. In the conservative philosophy of Oakeshott those intimations are to be
found in the traditions that shape communal life. Popper, in setting up the pursuit of
intuitions as an aspect of political reform in a manner so similar to Oakeshott reveals
a further conservative strand to this thought but he is far less explicit as to the source
of those intuitions. Presumably they are constructs of individual imagination and
open, upon formulation into hypothesis form, to subsequent testing.
Popper does in fact offer some sort of a guide to which his engineers can turn in
search of pursuable intuitions and this is to adopt the 'method of searching for, and
fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching
for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good'.149 He argues that such a method is
to be preferred because human suffering makes a direct moral appeal in a way that
the call for an increase in happiness lacks. Popper also posits the existence of 'some
kind of analogy' between this view of ethics and his view of scientific methodology
in terms of negative formulation; of the elimination of suffering rather than the
promotion of happiness in the case of ethics and the task of science conceived as the
elimination of false theories rather than the attainment of established truths.130
Even with the introduction of a methodology of ethics to parallel his scientific
method it is not clear that piecemeal engineers should be able to avoid the
differences of opinion that Popper thinks will likely be confronted by their Utopian
counterparts. The elimination of avoidable suffering may serve as a useful principle
for political reform and action but it remains a general principle and so within it
considerable disagreement might arise as to what is to count as suffering as well as
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what particular sufferings should be prioritised for elimination. Popper does suggest
however that social evils causing suffering 'can be comparatively well established'
by contrast with imaginings of idealised social conditions, whatever form they may
take.131 He appears to be on firmer ground here as a society such as the UK probably
is capable of formulating a list of problems facing it that would find fairly general
agreement - issues such as unemployment, educational and healthcare standards and
provision, crime and the dangers of climate change for example. The manifestos of
political parties seek, by in large, to address these same challenges but propose, to
varying degrees, differing solutions. Popper's injunction toward the avoidance of
suffering seems reasonable then but it does not circumvent the question of
disagreement in attempts to actualise the principle.
Popper seems to suggest that to pursue an approach of Utopian engineering will lead
by way of disagreement to the use of violence instead of reason but it does not
follow logically that disagreements over an attempt to engineer a vision ofUtopia
will be a prelude to violence. The French and Russian revolutions may for example
be conceived as instances of Utopian engineering from a Popperian perspective. It is
also possible from such a perspective to view the violence that accompanied those
revolutions to be intrinsic to change on a revolutionary scale that aims at a complete
transformation of society but the fact that violence has been witnessed in conjunction
with revolutionary change on occasion does not necessarily make it intrinsic to that
type of change. To assume so is to fall for what Hume called the fallacy of 'constant
conjunction'.152 It is surprising given his anti-inductivism that Popper should appear
to make an assumption of this sort in relation to Utopian engineering. There is no
reason in principle to preclude Utopian engineers from pursuing their (varying)
projects via the ballot box instead of at the point of a gun.
Popper's piecemeal social engineering can generally be regarded as an extension of
his falsificationist scientific methodology, and as we have seen he does regard it as
such, but there are also components residing within it which hint at subtle but
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significant divergences in his conception of the nature and conduct of political as
opposed to scientific change. In particular, he sets out a clear, and conservative,
opposition to revolutions in politics. Political change or reform from a Popperian
perspective should never aim to be revolutionary whereas every scientific hypothesis
and test can legitimately and uncomplicatedly be conceived as a revolutionary
enterprise with potentially revolutionary consequences. Whilst Popper's scientists
must, in Fuller's description, be 'uprooted' from their world in order to participate in
a universal enterprise of critical inter-subjective testing, his piecemeal social
engineers seem to be rather more rooted by comparison, reliant on intuition to guide
them in the specific tasks entailed by the attempted elimination of suffering as found
in particular communities. Even if we modify the uprooted/rooted distinction to
make it more explicitly a matter of degree it is apparent that Popper's political
philosophy tends further towards the latter than does his philosophy of science and in
doing so displays a conservative disposition inherent to it.
The attack upon rationalism in politics, and rationalists, developed by Oakeshott is
nullified in large part by Popper's philosophical rationalism in that Popper shares
some of the concerns that animate Oakeshott's position. They exhibit a common fear
of large-scale political planning in terms of its potential disruptions and unintended
consequences. Whilst Popper is more questioning of traditions he is nonetheless
content to follow Oakeshott's disposition that prefers reform to destructive
(re)creation of the political world. Popper is also prepared to countenance repair
over invention when engaged in political reform. Popper's piecemeal engineers are
expected to recognise 'that only a minority of social institutions are consciously
designed while the vast majority have just grown, as the undersigned results of
human actions'.153 This is recognition of the organic growth of the social institutions
inhabited by human beings and it is a conservative recognition.
Popper argues that the task of the physical engineer is 'to design machines and to
remodel and service them' and similarly that 'the task of the piecemeal social
l5.
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engineer is to design social institutions, and to reconstruct and run those already in
existence'.154 Reconstruction, reform and the conservation of institutions is shown
here to be a key feature of Popperian philosophy. Physical engineers are expected to
service machines not simply invent replacements and the same reparative disposition
is held to apply to the machinery of social institutions. Popper and Oakeshott can
find common conservative ground but a divide remains and the question remains
open as to the extent to which Oakeshott would still be inclined to dismiss Popperian
piecemeal social engineering as merely another instance, sophisticated or otherwise,
of rationalism in politics.
Oakeshott makes clear that in his view the 'assimilation of politics to engineering is,
indeed, what may be called the myth of rationalist politics'.153 The engineering
divide between these two philosophers does go beyond the merely semantic but is
perhaps not quite as vast as either might imagine. Popper can, on occasion,
overestimate the susceptibility of politics to engineering be it piecemeal or Utopian
whilst Oakeshott tends to underestimate the extent to which engineering can be
indicative of reform as well as (re)invention. It is possible that in taking somewhat
incommensurable views on the enterprise of engineering Popper and Oakeshott find
the commonalities of their respective positions obscured. One potential consequence
of this is that in considering the question of the nation state and its future both would
favour reform over revolution. Popper might seek to engineer reform in a piecemeal
fashion and Oakeshott would preference the pursuit of intimations prompted by
particular traditions but the reforming task would in all likelihood be remarkably
similar.
2.5 Conclusion - Popper's Bid to Conserve Liberalism
This chapter began by examining Karl Popper's philosophy of science and did so
primarily by comparison with the alternative posited by Thomas Kuhn. The debate
between Popper and Kuhn was seen to centre not only on the nature of the scientific
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enterprise itself but also on the nature of the scientific community, or communities in
Kuhn's case. Popper set out a logic of scientific discovery, exemplified in his
deductive method of falsification, whilst Kuhn can be argued to have theorised a
psychology of research that sought, in part, to explain the attachment of scientists to
the particular research paradigms in which he considers them to work. Kuhn's
scientists seek to conserve the paradigmatic frameworks that guide their research, at
least insofar as the framework continues to provide useful lines of inquiry, or puzzles
to solve. Popperian scientists have rather greater liberty, and indeed duty, to
continually question and test theories on the basis of critical rationality.
In respect of their general philosophies of science then there is a readily apparent
liberal-conservative divide separating Popper and Kuhn. More significant in terms
of this thesis however is the emergence of a similar divide within Popperian
philosophy itself, particularly when attention is turned to the concept of critical
rationality and Popper's political theorising. Whilst Popper regards science, and the
scientific method, as a more or less revolutionary activity, he is decidedly more
suspicious of revolutionary political projects. His preference in politics is for a type
of reform that he terms piecemeal social engineering which aims to proceed
gradually and avoid the drawing up and pursuit of large-scale blueprints.
In concluding this chapter let us to return to the four constitutive elements of
liberalism identified by Gray and referred to in the introductory chapter -
individualism, universalism, meliorism and egalitarianism. Gray argues that each of
these elements have been fundamentally undermined in a world characterised by
what he calls value pluralism'56, and that liberalism therefore is dead as an animating
political philosophy. Whilst the central purpose of this thesis is not to defend
Popperian liberalism against Gray's pluralist attack it is worth exploring briefly the
bases of that attack as part of a project that demonstrates the enduring value of
Popper's philosophy to recent and current debates on liberalism and its applications.
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Gray defines liberal individualism as the claim that since 'nothing has ultimate value
except states ofmind or feeling, or aspects of the lives of human individuals,
therefore the claims of individuals will always defeat those of collectives'.157 There
is no doubt that Popper values individualism as a political and philosophical concept
but does so in a social context. 'That man, and his aims, are in a certain sense a
product of society is true enough. But it is also true that society is a product ofman
and of his aims and that it may become increasingly so'.158 Gray's individualist-
collectivist distinction is drawn overly sharply and Popper's liberalism can withstand
this challenge. The concept of open society suggests the manner in which
individuals can form and benefit from participation in a democratic collective.
Similarly, the inter-subjective testing required in Popperian science suggests a
symbiotic relationship between individuals and at least some of the collectives or
communities ofwhich they are a part.
In terms of universalism, Gray contends that 'doctrinal liberalism must still affirm
that all political institutions are to be assessed on the single scale that measures their
approximation to a liberal regime'.159 For Popper, open society does serve as such a
scale. It could do so more effectively however with increased clarity around what is
implied and required by the concept. This thesis seeks to give greater clarity to the
concept of open society and extend its range of application by suggesting that it can
be utilised as a scale for measuring the approximation of particular nation states to
Popper's vision of liberal society. This has two effects, firstly in highlighting the
need for Popperians to engage with the nation state in any bid to advance open
society and also to demonstrate the contribution that Popper's theory can make to
contemporary debates around the efficacy of the nation state.
Gray's third element is meliorism, the view that 'even if human institutions are
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imperfectible, they are nonetheless open to indefinite improvement by the judicious
use of critical reason'.160 Gray's attack here centres on what he considers to be a
misguided liberal commitment to progress. Popper is certainly a critical rationalist
who thinks that progress is possible in both science and politics via the application of
the critical rational method.161 Again, the task at hand here is not to debate the
possibility or otherwise of progress but Gray's critique raises some interesting
questions in the context of this thesis. In particular, is movement away or beyond the
nation state to be considered progress? What prospects exist for modifying
institutions? From a Popperian perspective, the case is built that to jettison the
nation state, especially liberal nation states, would be dangerous because it is
difficult to guarantee that any replacement form of political community would be
more liberal or more closely approximate open society. There is a Popperian case
then to mount a conservative defence of liberal nation states where they exist.
The final element that Gray discusses is egalitarianism which he describes as The
denial of any natural moral or political hierarchy among human beings'.162 Popper
however considers equality to be a political demand rather than a natural fact.163 The
question for Popper is whether that demand can best be satisfied by some sort of
cosmopolitan world order or whether it can be accommodated within an international
order comprised of nation states. Although Popper does not provide an explicit
answer on this much of his theorising assumes the existence of the latter and
Popper's concern seems to be with how to render it more liberal. A world comprised
of liberal, national open societies would be capable of satisfying this Popperian
demand and this strengthens the case for aligning Popper's philosophy with liberal
nationalism. This will be explored further in chapter four.
When considering Popper's philosophy. Gray makes clear the approach that he
thinks should be adopted and the relevant aspects to examine.
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'The object of any significant exploration of Popper's work in political theory is to
identify its most distinctive features, to comment on its relationship with his
philosophy of science, and to evaluate its contribution to some of the central
problem-areas of contemporary political thought'.164
That is exactly the exploration that this thesis seeks to undertake with the nature and
future of the nation state viewed as a central problem-area of contemporary political
thought. Having identified conservatism as a feature of Popper's philosophy I
conclude this section by revisiting the conservative arguments of Scruton mentioned
in the previous chapter.
For Scruton, conservatism is the maintenance of what he calls the 'social ecology'.165
He suggests that individual freedom is a part of that social ecology but that it is not
the sole or true goal of politics. That goal is rather the conservation of shared
resources - social, material, economic and spiritual.166 From a Popperian
perspective, this thesis examines the social ecologies of the nation state and of open
society and seeks to establish their compatibility. Individual freedom is central to
Popper's philosophy and Popper is prepared to accept that 'the most important part
of our environment is its social part'.167 The important point for Popper is that as
individuals, through cooperative engagement with others, we can modify and adapt
the social ecologies that we inhabit.
Scruton goes on to suggest that conservatism 'is the politics of delay, the purpose of
which is to maintain in being, for as long as possible, the life and health of a social
organism'.168 A nation state would qualify as an organism to be maintained from
Scruton's perspective. Popper would not grant it such status automatically but it
does make sense, in Popperian terms, to give thought to the conservation of those
nation states that function, more or less, as open societies. Scruton is keen to defend
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the nation state as a social organism in its own right and commends what he regards
as the inherent localism of conservatism in contrast to the globalism of liberalism.
Again, Popper's liberalism has the potential to be developed in a way that bridges
this divide. The concept of open society is capable of local application and
adaptation (within particular nation states) whilst still serving as a 'global' measure
against which the openness of societies can be assessed.
The potential tension between Popper's desire to liberate individuals, be they
scientists, politicians or citizens, on the basis of critical rationality and his
conservative aversion to radical political change becomes especially important in
attempts to apply his philosophy. Popper's concept of open society sets out a model
of political community but it contains ambiguities and uncertainties that partly result
from the liberal and conservative elements that coexist in his underlying philosophy.
This raises a crucial question about what Popper actually means by open society:
does he mean a multiplicity of open societies, similarly constituted, that could easily
recognise each other's legitimacy and so be peaceful and cooperative or does open
society entail a more expressly cosmopolitan concept whereby the boundaries of
political community simply divide those committed to critical rationality from those
who are not?
Subsequent chapters take up the challenge of answering that question whilst this
chapter has endeavoured to trace the roots of that question in Popper's philosophy.
This thesis concerns itself with the boundaries that attach to political communities
and those implied by the concept of open society. The nation state is one answer to
the question of where political boundaries should be drawn. For Popper, it is an
inadequate answer and one that he held to be incompatible with this vision of open
society. Whatever the inadequacies of the nation state as a form ofpolitical
community in the early part of the twenty-first century, the argument is made in this
thesis that an incompatibility with the concept of open society is not one of them. As
the chapters that follow illustrate, the interpretation of the relationship between open
society and the nation state is crucial to addressing issues such as how to conserve
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The Boundaries of the Open Society and the Limits of
Openness
3.1 Introduction - The Open Society and its Boundaries
This chapter sets out to explore the concept of open society advanced and defended
by Popper. In particular, the question is raised as to the possible boundaries of open
society as a form of political community and the potential implications of any such
boundaries in the application ofPopper's political philosophy. The previous chapter
introduced some of the key elements of that political philosophy and the manner in
which it emerged out of his philosophy of science. Indeed so intertwined are
Popper's approaches to science and politics that Fuller is drawn to conclude that
'once Popper's philosophy of science is read alongside his political philosophy, it
becomes clear that scientific inquiry and democratic politics are meant to be
alternative expressions of what Popper called the open society'.1
While the previous chapter focused on the nature of political change from a
Popperian perspective, with a specific analysis undertaken of the notion of piecemeal
social engineering, the task here is to outline what Popper means by open society and
submit it to critical examination. My overarching interest remains in the extent to
which the open society is necessarily hostile to the concept of the nation state and
although that issue is raised explicitly and in detail in the next chapter it warrants
restating here. Before any such assessment can be made of open society a closer
look must be taken at how it is conceived and the basis upon which Popper defends
it. In tracing the outline of Popper's open society philosophy one of the features that
I aim to demonstrate is that he is in effect positing what I call an 'open state'; and the
state that Popper advocates implicitly presupposes many of the features common to
1
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nation states. The open society is, for Popper, an ideal state, that is to say, a
particular vision for the organisation of political community and power.
The first section of this chapter will offer a preliminary sketch of the open state with
a consideration of what Popper suggests a society needs in order to be deemed open.
This includes institutional and structural aspects as well as the values held to support
them. Having outlined a Popperian version of the state the opportunity subsequently
arises to compare it with communitarian and pluralist alternatives. This provides for
a fuller understanding ofwhat Popper actually means in declaring a society, or state,
open whilst also helping me to revisit the liberal-conservative divide in his
philosophical structure and its political application. Questions of the boundaries and
purpose of the state are pertinent to this investigation and are seen to be influenced
by the balance struck between liberalism and conservatism. The rather opaque
boundaries of open society are teased out in relation to those imposed by
communitarianism and pluralism. This process reveals a crucial ambiguity lying at
the heart of Popper's open society. That ambiguity is whether it is devised (ideally)
to be a single universal society or state or whether he intended the concept to find
application in a range of particular open societies or states that bound distinct
communities whilst holding an open philosophy and structure in common.
Communitarians take issue with liberal philosophy and politics for misconceiving
the nature of the relationships between individuals and the societies of which they
are part.3 Via an examination of communitarian critiques of liberalism, particularly
as found in the work of Michael Sandel, the relationship between individuals and
open society is scrutinised. Does Popper's form of liberalism render the open
society acutely vulnerable to communitarian attack or does his intermittently
conservative disposition erect a defensive barrier against the communitarian
2 The extent and character of the potential distinctiveness of particular open societies could be
compared to varieties of capitalism. Variations of capitalist economies share sufficient features to be
distinguished in common from non-capitalist economic systems whilst still exhibiting significant
divergences of structure and complexion amongst themselves.
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offensive? The answer to this question depends very much on the extent to which
particular open societies can be inferred from Popperian philosophy as opposed to a
singular and universal open society. Establishing the nature of community within
open society is an important prelude to the labour of the following chapter whereby
the compatibility of open society and the nation state is examined.
After facing the communitarian test I then view open society through a pluralist lens.
The theorising of John Gray is instructive here in that he endeavours to describe and
defend a post-liberal position emerging from the collapse, as he perceives it, of the
enlightenment project.4 For Gray the most striking failures of the enlightenment
project are to be witnessed in 'the confounding of Enlightenment expectations of the
evanescence of particularistic allegiances, national and religious, and of the
progressive levelling down, or marginalization, of cultural difference in human
affairs'.5 The pluralist political philosophy adopted by Gray is of interest not only
for the questions it raises of Popperian liberalism but also for its rejection of the
communitarian alternative. How great a challenge does Gray's pluralism pose to the
philosophy of the open society and in particular what does such a challenge reveal
about the boundaries that pertain to open society? In addressing questions of this
sort the way will be paved for a fuller consideration of the nature of political
community entailed by Popper's theorising as well as the relationship it might bear
to the nation state as a communal political form. The starting point of this
investigation however, is to describe, explain and evaluate Popper's conception of
open society.
3.2 The Open Society and the Open State
What is the citizen to demand of the state? What is to be considered the legitimate
aim of state activity? These are questions that Popper himself poses as a starting
point to what he describes as a rational inquiry into the functioning of the political
4 John Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, London: Routledge, 1997.
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state and its institutions.6 In particular, he suggests it worthwhile to ask the question
as to why a well-ordered state is preferred by human beings to an anarchical one.
Answering this question should be a priority for the 'technologist' - a piecemeal
social engineer - before proceeding to the 'construction or reconstruction of any
political institution'.7 Only on this basis, Popper notes, can an engineer determine
... . *8whether or not a particular institution is well adapted to its function. The political
engineer, as we have seen, is tasked with adapting institutions in a piecemeal fashion
and on the basis of an inter-subjective critical rationality. The adaptation that Popper
seeks is in the direction of the open society but how is that direction to be
ascertained? The Popperian method of doing so, unsurprisingly, is to root out and
seek to eliminate the dangers posed by closed society.
For Popper, the open society is conceived 'as a defence of freedom against
totalitarian and authoritarian ideas, and as a warning against the dangers of historicist
superstitions'.9 Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are thus deemed to represent
the greatest threat to the establishment and maintenance of the open society. Any
government however might pursue an authoritarian idea or policy and so eternal
vigilance is necessary on the part of those who would defend and protect the
openness of society. Popper suggests that western civilization has not recovered
from the shock of its birth (as noted previously he supposes the infant civilization to
have been delivered in the Athens of ancient Greece) - that shock being 'the
transition from the tribal or closed society, with its submission to magical forces, to
the open society which sets free the critical powers' of humanity.10 Furthermore, he
proposes that the open society aims at 'humaneness and reasonableness' as well as
'equality and freedom'.11 The initial part of this chapter explores what is meant by
such aims and the manner in which open society is designed to serve them.
6
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7 Ibid, p. 109.
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Freedom, Power and the Open Society
Popper's concern with the safeguarding of individual freedom derives from the
potential for harm that he perceives to be an ever present danger of power, and
concentrated, unchecked power in particular. Indeed he goes so far as to say that
'the fundamental problem of political theory is the problem of checks and balances,
of institutions by which political power, its arbitrariness and its abuse can be
12controlled and tamed'. His open society theory is an attempt to address this very
problem and to illustrate the necessity of the control of power and the ways in which
such control can be instituted. The desire for the institutional control of power on
Popper's part is interesting in that it suggests that his primary fear is the abuse and
arbitrary wielding of power by individuals or groups unconstrained by institutional
mechanisms and breaks.
The function of the state then is to provide institutional checks and balances to
political power that will prevent, or at least minimise, its arbitrary abuse. The
implication of this for the open state is that in order to fulfil its function 'it must have
13
more power at any rate than any single private citizen or public corporation'.
Piecemeal social engineers should be capable of designing institutions to mitigate the
danger that such power will be misused but Popper concedes that this is a danger that
cannot be eliminated completely.14 Whilst power represents a potential threat to
freedom Popper is nonetheless clear that it must be acquired by the state so as to be
put to the defence of freedom.
Popper outlines what he describes as the 'humanitarian' purpose of the state and it is
one that closely approximates the harm principle as defended by Mill.15 Popper's
open state aims at 'the protection of that freedom which does not harm other citizens'
and so 'the state must limit the freedom of the citizens as equally as possible, and not
beyond what is necessary for achieving an equal limitation of freedom'.16 This
12
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highlights two principles that can be regarded as underpinning the open society from
the outset. Firstly, the notion of equality is inherent to the manner in which Popper
conceives of freedom; inequalities are not simply undesirable in and of themselves
but also in the extent to which they detract from freedom. Secondly, just as
individuals are to be limited in their freedom, corresponding limitations are placed
upon the state. Popper recognises here that threats to individual freedom, and it is
individual freedom that he is committed to protecting, can arise both from other
individuals and also the state. Protection then is to be found in a state that is
sufficiently powerful to counter the potential threats posed by fellow citizens but the
power of which is institutionally constrained to nullify its latent potentiality to
threaten the freedom of individuals.
Defining Freedom - Two Concepts
Popper may impose limitations on his open state but he does not intend that it should
be non-interventionist. He argues that 'liberalism and state-interference are not
opposed to each other. On the contrary, any kind of freedom is clearly impossible
unless it is guaranteed by the state'.17 While the power of the state can threaten
freedom if abused, state power remains for Popper the only reliable guarantor of
freedom for individuals.
This raises a question ofwhat Popper means when he speaks of freedom, a question
that can usefully be addressed through the distinction drawn by Isaiah Berlin
between negative and positive freedom. Berlin defines negative freedom as non¬
interference or that area within which individuals 'can act unobstructed by others'.18
By contrast, the definition of positive liberty stresses the notion of capacity in terms
of the ability to make choices and follow self-generated goals. Berlin describes it as
the wish:
'to be conscious ofmyself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility
for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and
17
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purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the
degree that I am made to realize that it is not'.19
Positive freedom entails not simply the absence of barriers and constraints, as is the
case with its negative counterpart, but rather a more dynamic concept whereby
liberty is enacted in the purposeful engagement with a range of meaningful choices.
It is apparent from the limitations of freedom that Popper seeks to apply to
individuals and the state that his understanding of the concept incorporates a
substantial negative element in Berlin's terms. He does indeed seek to mark out a
realm of non-interference within which the individual can act as they please, insofar
as they do not interfere with a corresponding liberty for others in the process.
Popper calls this the right of the individual to 'model' their own life.20 However, by
explicitly linking his liberalism to state-interference and conferring the power on the
state to guarantee individual freedom he incorporates to some extent a notion of
positive freedom into his political philosophy. Advocates of Popperian philosophy
such as Bryan Magee have clearly interpreted his work as invoking a positive
conception of freedom. Magee suggests that Popper aims to 'maximise the freedom
of individuals to live as they wish' and that 'this requires massive public provision in
education, the arts, housing, health and every other aspect of social life'.21 On this
basis, the role of the state is far from restricted in Popper's philosophy.
Magee's interpretation of Popper here can be regarded as an accurate one ifwe recall
from the previous chapter the list of single institution blueprints that were made
available to piecemeal engineers - health and unemployment insurance, arbitration
• /-» 22
courts, anti-depression budgeting and educational reform. It is also the case that
the importance attached to equality by Popper will require considerable state action
to redress inequalities where they are to be found. Not only is freedom to be
administered on the basis of equality, in terms of being applied by the state to all
19
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citizens equally but inequalities, in Popper's view, are prejudicial to freedom because
77
otherwise the potential will exist for 'a tyranny of the strong over the weak'. It is
for this reason that Popper seeks to guard against the paradox of freedom whereby
'unlimited freedom leads to its opposite'. Preventing the occurrence of such a
scenario necessitates the protection and restriction of freedom 'by law', or put
another way, by the state.24
Whilst the open state must act to protect and restrict freedom in order that it can be
secured equally for all citizens, Popper concedes that 'the important and difficult
question of the limitations of freedom cannot be solved by a cut and dried
7 S
formula'. He does not elaborate on how this question can be further addressed but
it is noteworthy that he insists that his 'protectionist theory of the state' (that the
purpose of the state is to offer protection to individuals) 'says nothing about the
essential nature of the state, or about a natural right to freedom'.26 Popper, ever wary
of essentialism, prefers to leave questions surrounding the limits of freedom
undetermined and open ended so that the individuals who comprise a society can
reflect upon them and engineer an answer or solution that they can be content with in
its reasonableness. Popper in fact argues that the lack of a formula for determining
the boundaries of freedom has a powerful normative attraction by providing the
stimulus of political struggles and problems that will both engage the citizenry and
27
encourage them, where necessary, to fight in defence of their freedom.
It is not particularly obvious why such indeterminacy in the question of freedom's
limitations should result in citizens taking it upon themselves to adopt a greater duty
of care towards freedom and this appears to be an area in which Popper proceeds on
the basis of his faith in reason rather than by deductive persuasion. It is also
somewhat surprising that he is content to simply describe the question as important
23
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and difficult without attempting to posit even a general directive to be applied in
answering it. This is especially peculiar given that Popper has already raised and
stressed the significance of equality in the context of adjudicating freedom and this
represents a missed opportunity to elaborate on the manner of ensuring that freedom
is pursued equally and fairly. We might consider this issue to be that of the
democratisation of freedom. Popper states that freedom does not exist unsecured by
the state and conversely 'only a state which is controlled by free citizens can offer
them any reasonable security at alP.28 This brings us to, arguably, the defining
feature of the open state, its democratic character.
Democracy and the Open Society
We have already encountered the profound anti-totalitarianism that permeates
Popper's political philosophy and his fundamental principle that underpins liberal
politics, from his perspective, of the control and restraint of power. The control of
power is the very purpose of the Popperian state and his focus on individualism
ensures that Popper seeks to give each and every citizen a stake and responsibility in
controlling power. At the very outset of the first volume of the Open Society and its
Enemies Popper explains why he attaches so much importance to the democratic
control of power. He suggests that 'only democracy provides an institutional
framework that permits reform without violence, and so the use of reason in political
matters'.29 This explanation reveals three things about the Popperian approach.
Firstly, that the power with which he is most concerned is physical power and
therefore circumstances that are either conducive to violent reform, or deny
alternative possibilities, are to be considered a failure in the functioning of the state.
Secondly, it becomes clear that the control of power must be an institutional form of
control and so part of the efficacy and normative appeal of democracy is that it
institutionalises a check on power; a check that is shared amongst the citizens of a
given state. Thirdly, Popper views democracy as the vehicle by which reason is
introduced into politics in the sense of creating an institutional area for the contest,
28
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or battle, of ideas. Popper's fear is that in the absence of democracy reform can only
be achieved via physical contests whereby the strong will dominate the weak. The
hope that Popper attaches to democracy is that the consideration of reforming
proposals will provide the basis for political change and that such a process will have
equality at its heart in that anybody can propose a reform whilst deciding between
proposals will not involve recourse to violence.
Popper goes on to describe the principle of a democratic policy as being 'the
proposal to create, develop, and protect, political institutions for the avoidance of
tyranny'.30 This could be considered as one of the principles making up a kind of
mission statement for open society. Politicians and policymakers that may seek to
use Popper's political philosophy to inform their decision making, in respect of
either domestic or foreign policy, can recognise in this statement the core objective
that Popper sought. The importance of democracy to Popper is further elaborated
when he considers the question of political power and those that would wield power
through, and on behalf of, the state. Just as individuals are fallible so too must
governments be since they are comprised of individuals after all. Popper argues that
it is nai've and dangerous to assume or rely upon the 'goodness and wisdom' of
government, comprised as it is of fallible human beings of varying morality, and thus
political thought should engage with the prospect of bad government.31
For political philosophy to be cognisant of such a prospect then it must take a
particular approach to the problem of politics. Popper suggests that this approach
forces the replacement of the question: 'Who should rule? By the new question: How
can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be
prevented from doing too much damage?'32 Democracy is not to be valued chiefly
for permitting rule by the people, however conceived, but rather for providing a
mechanism for the removal of damaging governments (at periodic intervals) without
the need to employ force. Popper does not for instance argue the case for direct
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democracy and this is in part because he is less concerned with the form of
democracy adopted than with the fact that it is adopted at the expense of
undemocratic procedures. His approach here does echo to some extent the way he
dealt with theory selection and testing in his philosophy of science. Popper's
scientific philosophy is designed to institute a mechanism whereby bad theories, in
terms of being false, can be exposed and rooted out. The institution of democracy
can be read as a means of falsifying governments or, more regularly, the policies that
they seek to implement and so pointing the way to revision and reform where tests
are failed.
Popper does indeed describe democracy as the right of adjudication on the part of the
33
people vis-a-vis their government. He also suggests that democracy is the 'only
known device' offering protection against the misuse of political power.34 It should
be reiterated that Popper does not imagine that the misuse of political power can be
prevented but rather that its damage can be mitigated in circumstances whereby
rulers can be dismissed democratically. Two further points are worth noting on the
view that Popper takes of democracy. Firstly, that it provides a forum for the
utilisation and application of reason but the institution of democracy does not of
itself in any way provide or guarantee the deployment of reason in political matters,
it merely renders such a course possible. Secondly, that democracy is the only
sustainable and reliable means of controlling not just political power but also
economic power.
On the relationship of democracy to rationality Popper suggests that the democratic
process 'cannot provide reason. The question of the intellectual and moral standard
35 • •of its citizens is to a large degree a personal problem'. " In a simple sense this seems
obvious given that democratic institutions form but a set of relationships between
rulers and ruled and do not discriminate on the basis of intellect. Popper is arguing
here that democracy has little, if any intellectual impact upon those that operate with
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p. 127.
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it but in recognising this he does not accept that the intellectual capacity of citizens
should be beyond the concern of the state. It is instructive here to compare Popper's
view of political education with that of Oakeshott.
Having made the state the guarantor of freedom Popper seeks to ensure that
individuals attain the intellectual capacity that will allow them to recognise threats to
their freedom and take steps to defend it. A degree of 'state control' is needed in
education in order to guard against 'neglect' that would leave individuals unaware of
freedom and its importance.36 Popper is in effect arguing here that ignorance is the
friend of the tyrant and that education is crucial to the vigilance required to supervise
and preserve freedom. Popper's demand then is that citizens must be educated as
critical rationalists if they are to be meaningful contributors to the open society and
armed to combat (intellectually) its enemies. On this basis the state should make
universal educational provision but, Popper warns, 'too much state control in
educational matters is a fatal danger to freedom, since it must lead to
indoctrination'.37 Popper does not attempt to draw the line at which state control
becomes indoctrination and presumably this question can only be addressed with
reference to particular instances.
Whilst democracy may not make a direct contribution to this educational process
Popper considers political freedom to be a critical element of it. In describing
critical discussion as 'the foundation of the free thought of the individual' he
contends that 'this means that true freedom of thought is impossible without political
freedom'.38 This accords with Popper's view, discussed in the previous chapter, that
to conceal error is the greatest of intellectual sins.39 The suppression of error is
equally to be frowned upon in political matters and so too is the suppression of
critical discussion itself because the loss of that entails a corresponding loss of free
thought and hence individual liberty. Popper regards this to be a moral as well as an
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intellectual imperative and states that 'if the growth of reason is to continue, and
human rationality to survive, then the diversity of individuals and their opinions,
aims, and purposes must never be interfered with (except in extreme cases where
political freedom is endangered)'.40 Political education then must foster this
diversity whilst inculcating only a critical attitude that will liberate individuals to
think for themselves. This is a delicate balancing act that Popper requires of the state
and as an educational policy proposal it has a rather abstract character. It is of a
decidedly more abstract nature than Oakeshott would deem feasible or indeed
desirable.
Oakeshott set out his perspective on political education in an inaugural lecture at the
London School of Economics and began by restating his definition of politics as
being the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a society.41 His
definition in this context is noticeably short and does not display an overabundance
of detail but this is deliberate since he considers it inappropriate and misguided to
'seek a definition of politics in order to deduce from it the character of political
knowledge and education'; far better he insists to 'observe the kind of knowledge
and education which is inherent in any understanding of political activity'.42
Oakeshott bids to proceed on the basis of concrete observations of the
epistemological and intellectual currents of a political community and thus gain
insight into the nature and character of that community's politics.
The observations at which Oakeshott aims are of traditions of behaviour. He
concedes that these may be considered 'flimsy and elusive' but insists that they are
'not without identity'.43 This identity can be traced because the various parts that
comprise a tradition of behaviour do not all change at the same time and the changes
that it undergoes 'are potential within it'.44 Oakeshott appears here to be once more
40 Karl Popper, The Poverty ofHistoricism, Routledge Classics, London, 2002, p. 159.
41 Michael Oakeshott, "Political Education" in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Methuen
and Co, London, 1962, p. 112.





in pursuit of intimations. That pursuit is of a particular kind.
'Political education is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition, it is
learning how to participate in a conversation: it is at once initiation into an
inheritance in which we have a life interest, and the exploration of its intimations'.45
Political education for Oakeshott then is primarily, and crucially, a practical activity.
It is practical knowledge, acquired in a participative manner, that citizens must
familiarise themselves with in undertaking a political education. Popper, by contrast,
would appear to suggest that a political education can and should be taught rather
than obtained by way of communal apprenticeship. In short. Popper contends that
political education can be formulated as technical knowledge.
Popper does of course recognise a participative and conversational aspect to political
education in that he wants the state to educate young citizens as critical rationalists.
Upon becoming a critical rationalist the citizen will then be qualified to participate in
critical rational discussion (or conversation) and the inter-subjective testing of policy
proposals. The danger for Popper in this is that some citizens will likely be more
critically rational than others and therefore, however well intentioned and resourced
the state's educational provision might be, considerable inequalities may well arise
that serve to inhibit the participation of a class of citizens in rational deliberation.
From Oakeshott's conservative point of view, political education 'begins in the
enjoyment of a tradition, in the observation and imitation of the behaviour of our
elders'.46 In this sense, there is no escaping a political education. It cannot be
volunteered for as there is little or nothing in the world that does not in some way
contribute to it over the course of our formative years. Coming to understand the
societies that we inhabit is to learn to participate and communicate in them. In this
task individuals are guided by those around them, particularly those that are older
than them and who have more experience of the traditions of behaviour that shape
the society. Oakeshott's educational prescription involves the imitation of behaviour
45
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whilst Popper would consider this, potentially at least, to be a form of indoctrination.
The Popperian preference is for the protection and celebration of diversity through
which it is hoped a range of possibilities can be explored and critically evaluated.
That said, as I noted in chapter two, critical rationalism can, to some extent, be
viewed as a tradition of behaviour itself and thus Popper could be content for
education by way of imitation in this particular tradition. As Popper does not offer a
guide as to how critical rationalism should be taught, or the precise manner in which
a state can seek to develop a critically rational citizenry, it is difficult to evaluate the
degree to which he avoids following a similar path to Oakeshott. The political
education advocated by Oakeshott must also embrace 'knowledge of the politics of
other contemporary societies' at least insofar as their politics, or attending to
arrangements, relate to those of the society in question.47 The knowledge sought in
this instance is again of a traditional and practical kind and Oakeshott intends that it
be used to inform the traditions embedded within the society that so inquires.
The study of another people's politics 'should be an ecological study of a tradition of
behaviour, not an anatomical study ofmechanical devices or the investigation of an
48
ideology'. Oakeshott does not seek the transference of technical knowledge across
societies and communities nor does he perceive much of insight to be gained in
studying ideologies from distant perspectives. This partly reflects Oakeshott's
general aversion to ideologically derived and practised politics but it also implies
that ideologies can be properly understood only in relation to the societal contexts
within which they are applied.49 People in other societies will attend to different
arrangements of politics on this analysis, in a manner similar to the diversity of
paradigms envisaged by Kuhn in science. Oakeshott's conversational politics takes
place largely within a society rather than across societies. Having critiqued Kuhn for
erecting barriers between paradigms and scientific communities, Popper's politics,
47 Oakeshott, "Political Education", p. 131.
48 Oakeshott, "Political Education", p. 131.
49 This point is recognised by Mulhall & Swift who note that 'even in the language of everyday
politics the term 'liberal' means different things in the United States and the United Kingdom' for
example. Mulhall & Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p.xiii.
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and the political education that supports it. must be translatable across communities.
At least among those willing to adopt a critically rational attitude a political
conversation that transcends communal boundaries should be possible. In this way,
Popper's political education can be viewed as uprooting citizens from the world in
the same manner that Fuller suggests Popperian scientists must be. A critical rational
education is thus intended to prepare students for entry into a (potentially) universal
society of critical rationalists in which a common approach is taken to the question
of how to proceed with political reform. A state educational system promoting
critical rationalism is one institution that makes up an open society and Popper
indicates that the institutional isation ofpolitics as a principle is vital to realising the
open society.
The Open Society and the Institutions of Politics
Popper, as we have seen, contends that the open society has to be constituted by
institutions that can facilitate the rational engineering of social and political reform.
He argues that in the long run all problems of politics are institutional problems and
thus 'problems of the legal framework rather than of persons, and that progress
towards more equality can be safeguarded only by the institutional control of
power'.30 Equality re-emerges here as foundational to Popper's political project and
as we shall explore shortly, the construction of institutions that provide economic
protection and shelter to citizens is a core function of the open state. More generally
however it can be established that controlling power institutionally involves the
implementation of a framework of law that is impersonal in nature and application.
Institutions are created by fallible human beings and so are invariably liable to
contain flaws and produce unintended consequences. This is especially so if we
accept Oakeshott's characterisation that political institutions are always deeply
veined with 'the traditional, the circumstantial and the transitory'.31 Popper would
not necessarily dispute this description but he would be inclined to suggest that
traditions and circumstances, however transitory, can be evaluated rationally and that
50
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such a process is best conducted in an institutional context. Just as it is not
scientists, as individuals, that are subject to inter-subjective testing but rather their
scientific hypotheses so too in politics the focus should not be on political leaders as
individuals but rather their proposals for pursuing reform through political
institutions.
Oakeshotfs aversion to rationalism in politics stems from a perception that there is
no place in the rationalist's 'scheme for a 'best in the circumstances', only a place for
52'the best', because the function of reason is precisely to surmount circumstances'.
Popper's piecemeal social engineering does indeed attempt to surmount
circumstance to a degree but the piecemeal approach is insulated from Oakeshotfs
attack because it does not recognise the best solution, conceived as a foundational
and timeless position, but concurs that the best in the circumstances represents the
limits of ambition in matters ofpolitical reform. One important point of divergence
however is that the piecemeal social engineer is tasked with designing and
maintaining institutions that are the best in particular circumstances at enhancing and
preserving individual freedom, that is the criterion against which they are to be
evaluated. Reformers of an Oakeshottian persuasion contemplate the slightly
different task of pursuing the intimations evoked by particular traditions of
behaviour.
Both Popper and Oakeshott conceive of political reform as attempts to modify the
legal framework that denotes the governance of a society. The great benefit of a
legal framework, Popper argues, is that it 'can be known and understood by the
individual citizen; and it should be designed to be so understandable. Its functioning
is predictable. It introduces a factor of certainty and security into social life'.53 The
implication of this claim is that institutions can be engineered to be more predictable
than individuals and so render the exercise of controlling power more
straightforward. The certainty and security that a legal framework introduces to
social life is an insight that can be attributed to Hobbes who gave a vivid and
52 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p.5.
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disturbing depiction of life in the state of nature as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short'.34 Focused on the sheer unpleasantness of such a situation Hobbes sought to
remedy it, or rather held that individuals experiencing it would, by means of a social
contract that would institute an all powerful sovereign, the Leviathan.
Popper shares the Hobbesian concern regarding the circumstances of life in the
absence of a state but departs from Hobbes in terms of the type of state required to
prevent the insecurities that arise out of the state of nature. Popper suggests that 'we
must plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only
freedom can make security secure'.55 Hobbes and Popper can agree that neither
freedom nor security is to be found in the state of nature but Popper takes the view
that both are absent from the Hobbesian state also. This further illustrates the
importance of democracy as an institution for Popper in that it makes possible not
only freedom, but through that freedom security as well. From a Popperian
perspective the problem with the solution proposed by Hobbes is that is
insufficiently impersonal; the power vested in the Leviathan (potentially just a single
individual) is too great and all-encompassing to permit a feeling of freedom in their
security or indeed security in their freedom on the part of citizens subject to it.
However the boundaries of the open society are to be configured it is clear that they
must be institutional boundaries. Those boundaries should demarcate a democratic
polity that is subject to a framework of law that is readily and easily understood by
citizens. The institutions of democracy and law should be subject to checks and
balances designed to prevent abuses of power and limit the potential of either
incompetent or immoral rulers to do lasting damage. Reform of these institutions,
along with the multitude of others aimed at promoting freedom and equality or a
combination thereof, should be possible without recourse to violence and conducted
on the basis of critical rationalism. Grand reforming blueprints are to be eschewed
owing to their tendency to produce unforeseen and unintended consequences and a
piecemeal methodology employed in their place that seeks circumscribed alterations
34 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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that focus on a single institution at a time. The open state is democratic, aims at
substituting impersonal institutional politics for personal politics wherever possible,
open to continuous but gradual reform that has freedom and equality as its purpose,
permissive of a plurality of perspectives that can contest with each other in critical
battle of ideas, tolerant of all but intolerance, and strives to tame human passions by
the limited reasonableness of which individuals may be capable.56 With equality
being a vital principle underlying open society the open state must concern itself
with the control of not only political power but also economic power.
The Open Society and the Control of Economic Power
In considering economics Popper once more starts from the viewpoint that all power
is potentially dangerous and so economic power can be no exception.57 It is on this
basis that Popper concludes that the need exists to 'construct social institutions,
enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from
CO
the economically strong'. We have already encountered Popper's indication that an
interventionist state is not incompatible with his liberalism and it is apparent that he
envisages an interventionist role for the open state in the economic domain.
The minimum level of economic protection that a citizen should be able to expect
from their state is the prevention of the need 'to enter into an inequitable
arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin'.59 Any inequitable
arrangements of this kind would constitute a tyranny of the economically powerful
over the weak. Popper's concern here is not solely with the deprivations and
hardships which can accompany poverty, although he felt that every effort should be
made to eradicate the suffering caused by impoverishment, but also with the severe
curtailment of freedom that severe economic dependency brings. The open state
then should root out and seek to eliminate poverty and with it the radical, and
dangerous, power differentials that it can signify. This argument could be used to
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justify market interventions such as a minimum wage and social policies that would
include a redistributive system of taxation and the construction of a welfare state.
What is important is that interventions of the sort outlined above are political
decisions and it is imperative that they should be so since 'economic power must not
be permitted to dominate political power; if necessary, it must be fought and brought
under control by political power'. Popper's demand that economic power be always
subject to political control has significant implications for the boundaries of states in
relation to a globalised economy. The question of how to control economic power
that is of a global scale and scope is one that will addressed in subsequent chapters
but it warrants mention here in order to highlight that the political control of
economic power is not necessarily easy or straightforward. Indeed, even at a
domestic level, it may well require the accumulation of considerable political power
in order to make substantial interventions in the economy. This is exemplified by the
fact that in the current financial crisis governments around the world have found
themselves taking controlling stakes in private banks in a bid to exert political
control over economic power.60
Popper is alive to the prospect that exerting political control will in all likelihood
demand the acquisition and concentration of political power which has the potential
to be dangerous in its own right. Bureaucratic power is a particular concern in this
regard.
He observes that 'the fight against poverty has produced in some countries a welfare
state with a monstrous bureaucracy engulfing for example the hospitals and the
entire medical profession, with the obvious result that only a fraction of the money
spent for welfare actually benefits those who need it'.61
The use of the term monstrous to describe a bureaucracy out of control is instructive
of Popper's thinking as it highlights the dangers, as he sees it, of the unintended
consequences that can flow from attempts to exert political control. The example he
60 http://www.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/7929820.stm
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chooses also demonstrates that professions only indirectly related to the issue at hand
can fall under the suffocating blanket of an overextended bureaucracy.
This is another instance in which the rulers and policymakers of an open state must
tread a very fine line. They must garner sufficient political power to establish
dominance over economic forms of power but do so in ways that minimise the
potential abuse of the political power garnered. On the particular issue of poverty
Popper notes that it is best tackled by the realisation of a high standard of living
which renders it 'so rare a phenomenon that limited social work can take care of it,
thus avoiding the danger of a numerous and powerful bureaucracy'.62 Popper does
not tell us at what constitutes sufficient rarity in this context but the central point for
piecemeal social engineers to be aware of is that bureaucracies pose a potential
danger to the open society and so proposals that aim at the alleviation of poverty
must be carefully designed to avoid creating burdensome bureaucracies in their
wake.
Popper is clear that an increase in the bureaucratic power of the state is both the
greatest danger and challenge of government intervention in social and economic
life. This is another example of Popper's paradox of freedom in that the absence of
state power (unlimited freedom) is no secure freedom at all and yet as soon as power
is conferred upon the state the potentiality for its misuse is conferred with it. I would
argue therefore that one of the most critical boundaries of the open society revolves
around the balance of power invested in the state in a bid to protect individual
freedom. Establishing where this boundary falls is an exceptionally difficult task
and in the practice of politics we might wish to adopt the modest approach of
contenting ourselves with provisional positions that can be adjusted in light of
changing circumstances. Popper would expect no more other than the assurance that
the positions taken are arrived at democratically and capable of being revised on the
basis of critical rational reflection.
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Individual Freedom and the Limits of the State
In order for the open state to be a secure and reliable guarantor of freedom for the
individuals it is designed to serve then those same individuals must have a
significant degree of control over the power that the state wields. For Popper,
democracy gives citizens that control. He recognises however that democracy is a
necessary but not of itself a sufficient condition for the creation and preservation of
individual freedom. Securing an equality of freedom for all citizens requires the role
of the state to be constituted in a particular way in terms of the manner in which
reform is conducted.
Popper explains this approach as 'a systematic fight against definite wrongs' and
avoidable sufferings such as poverty or unemployment rather than the attempt to
realise an ideal social blueprint.64 One reason why Popper prefers the former to the
latter is that he perceives that this method should not lead to an accumulation of
power or the suppression of criticism on the part of the state.65 This claim appears
somewhat dubious though even ifwe concede that the combating of identifiable
problems is less likely to warrant an accumulation of power on the part of the state
than would a wider ranging social transformation seeking out a predetermined
template.
The dubiety of the claim is revealed by recalling Popper's fear that the welfare state
for example can bring a powerful, indeed 'monstrous', bureaucracy in its wake.
Popper, as has been discussed, appears to underestimate the level of power that a
state would need to acquire in order to facilitate the operation of his piecemeal social
engineering method of reform. Similarly, he seems to exaggerate the distinction
between addressing concrete pre-existing problems and the pursuit of a more
positive reform agenda animated by some conception of the good for a society. In
actuality, most policy initiatives are capable of being interpreted either way, as
alleviating a perceived problem or as pursuing a positive goal. Environmental
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legislation for example can pursue the positive goal of creating a cleaner
environment and/or be viewed as a response to the particular problems of climate
change.
The Popperian open state must be limited because the accumulation and
concentration of any power, state power included, poses a potential threat to both
individual freedom and security. Popper's concern is that the state should serve the
citizen rather than vice versa and whilst he posits democratic institutions as a means
to securing such a relationship he does accept that democracy cannot perform this
task alone. The reason it cannot is because even the principle of democracy carries
within it the potentiality of power differentials, that is the power of the majority
versus the minority and so Popper insists 'that minorities have rights and freedoms
which no majority decision can overrule'.66 The protection of these rights and
freedoms must involve the ceding of power to the state, whether in its executive or
judicial branches, if they are to be enforceable and thus a trade-off is once more
required as to where power should be held and in what concentration. Popper's
political philosophy attempts to address and manage that trade-off although in doing
so he has a tendency to misjudge the power that he invests in piecemeal social
engineers and indeed the engineering method of political reform.
This brings us back to the thread of tension between liberalism and conservatism that
is interwoven throughout Popper's philosophy. His liberalism demands the primacy
of the individual, seeks to extend individual freedom for all, is hugely wary of all
forms of power and seeks to achieve what in many circumstances would constitute a
comprehensive transformation of society in seeking to eliminate poverty for
example. His conservatism cautions as to the nature of political change however,
seeks to deal with the concrete shortcomings revealed in the present as well as the
recent past rather than aiming to realise a holistic ideal in some imagined future, and
takes as a starting point that human beings and the institutions they create
(consciously or otherwise) are inherently fallible. Amidst all of these aspects a
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balance has to be found between security and freedom for the individual as well as
between the power and limitations of the state.
Popper does not go very far in telling us where such balances should be struck but he
does indicate how they should be struck: among a free and equal community of
critically rational citizens. The inter-subjective application of rationality to the
political world, in circumstances permissive of the freedom of thought, can assist
• i*.. . .... f\7
individuals in planning for both freedom and security within their state. The open
state of Popperian philosophy endeavours to strike the balance between freedom and
security, power and its harnesses, on the basis of critical rationalism and piecemeal
social engineering. The balance is sought by way of a methodology of rationality
and in its methodological guise it could arguably be characterised by Oakeshott as a
formulation of technical knowledge. Oakeshotf s concern with an approach of this
sort is that it potentially ignores or undervalues the contribution that can be made by
practical and traditional knowledge. His conservative state would endeavour to
strike its delicate balances by reference to the intimations embedded within traditions
of behaviour.
What is perhaps ofmost interest to the discussion of the role of tradition is the view
that Popper takes of attempts to understand situational logic in historical contexts.
He suggests that there exists a need for 'studies, based on methodological
individualism, of the social institutions through which ideas may spread and
captivate individuals, of the way in which new traditions may be created, and of the
zo
way in which traditions work and break down'. Popper is focused here on the
question of what social institutions are capable of transmitting and the manner in
which they do so, his quest being that of equipping institutions to transmit the idea of
critical rationalism.
It is significant that he should inquire as to the prospect of new traditions being
created for this suggests a belief on his part that traditions themselves can be
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engineered and so consciously designed. Oakeshott would dispute such a notion on
the basis of the sharp distinction that he draws between the practice of traditions and
the engineering method of rationalism. He views traditions as emergent from
patterns of behaviour rather than as products of rational design. By seeking to pay
attention to the working and malfunctioning of traditions Popper hints at
compatibilities between his technical method for the engineering of politics and
Oakeshott's invoking of practical and traditional knowledge as a searchlight to guide
the pursuit of political intimations.
It is worth concluding this section of the chapter with Oakeshott's broader
observations as to the role and function of the state. His description of government
conducted in accordance with a conservative disposition is illuminating here.
'Governing is a specific and limited activity, namely the provision and custody of
general rules of conduct, which are understood, not as plans for imposing substantive
activities, but as instruments enabling people to pursue the activities of their own
choice with the minimum frustration, and therefore something which it is appropriate
to be conservative about'.
It is striking the extent to which this parallels a Popperian conception of governance.
The approach to governing laid out by Oakeshott in this passage could almost serve
as part of a preamble to a constitution for the open state.
Oakeshott shares Popper's perception that the act of governing, and the power
conferred for its functioning, should be limited. Furthermore, the principle function
of government should be to provide a society with general rules of conduct or what
Popper conceived as a predictable and understandable legal framework.70 The rules
of which Oakeshott's government is custodian do not seek to impose substantive
activities which could include 'that ofmaking the people happy', a political ideal
that Popper dismisses as perhaps the most dangerous.71
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In refusing to endorse substantive activities on the part of government Oakeshott
seeks to limit its power and interventionist capacity. This approach also implies an
anti-holism and an anti-utopianism that Popper would applaud. Even closer
proximity to the Popperian conception of the state is exhibited in Oakeshott's stress
on choice, and recognition of the liberty of individuals to pursue their own activities
and intimations. Insofar as such pursuits are legal and do not infringe upon the
liberty of others to do likewise then individuals should not find themselves or their
activities frustrated by the state. On this point Popper and Oakeshott would, I think,
concur. The question remains however as to whether or not Popper could accept
Oakeshott's account of government as something which it is appropriate to be
conservative about.
I would argue that there is little in the Popperian disposition to governance that
would prevent the acceptance of it as an appropriately conservative activity; in doing
so there are two separate ways of interpreting the term conservative in this context.
The first is that Popperians would be expected to seek to conserve the open state
where it exists and avoid reforms that may endanger the institutions of open society.
To take such an approach is to engage in a specific project of political conservation.
This indeed is a project that directly engaged Popper who developed his political
philosophy in response to perceived threats to the open society, and sought to defend
and maintain 'the supreme strength of the West" and western open societies against
72the closed system of communism for example. So, as would be reasonable and
expected, Popper displayed a conservative attitude towards the general structure and
principles of those societies that he viewed as having instituted the form of open
governance that he held to be most conducive to individual flourishing. Of course
considerable scope for reform remains within such societies as there will always be
particular sufferings that could be better avoided but here the change sought is partial
and not systemic.
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The other way of interpreting conservatism here, the way that Oakeshott intended it,
is as an attitude to governance itself and in fact as an attitude to life or at least certain
aspects of it.
'To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried
to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the
unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the
• 73convenient to the perfect, present laughter to Utopian bliss'.
I do not suggest that this attitude characterises Popper's political philosophy in its
entirety nor do I particularly seek to argue over the labels of liberalism and
conservatism as they may be thought to apply here. In my view Popper was
completely justified in labelling himself a liberal but he tended to overlook just how
deeply elements of a conservative disposition were embedded within his liberalism.
In its stress upon anti-utopianism and aversion to radical, revolutionary and
systematic change conservatism accords with Popper's philosophy of open society.
Where open societies and open states exist Popper seeks to conserve them, where
they are absent he accepts the conservative recognition of the dangers entailed in
attempts to institute them by way of revolution.
In the next two sections of this chapter critiques of liberalism are considered. Firstly,
the communitarian critique as exemplified in the work of Sandel, and secondly the
pluralist critique as developed by John Gray. Both the communitarian and the
pluralist approaches attack liberalism for what they perceive to be an excessive and
unfounded individualism and for a consequent neglect of the communal attachments
that they consider to be constitutive of individual identities. Ofparticular interest in
this regard is the extent to which Popperian liberalism can withstand such critiques
and indeed whether its conservative element may aid it in doing so. More
specifically, the concept of open society is examined in relation to what we might
call communitarian and pluralist society. The purpose of doing so is in order to
develop a fuller understanding of the notion of community that Popper's open
7j Oakeshott, 'kOn being Conservative", in Rationalism in Politics, p. 169.
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society assumes as well as of its limitations and boundaries.
3.3 The Open Society and the Question of Community
The question of community was raised in the previous chapter in relation to Popper's
philosophy of science. There the discussion centred on transcendence versus
immanence or the extent to which scientists were either uprooted or rooted in the
world. The issues at stake here are of a similar kind and in particular the questions
remain as to the nature of the community supposed by open society and the bases
upon which Popper defends such a supposition. This investigation can be
illuminated by considering alternative visions of social and political arrangement
such as envisaged by communitarianism. I recognise at the outset that
communitarian thinkers span a broad spectrum of thought, as of course do liberals.
Nevertheless the nature of the challenges that they pose to liberalism are sufficiently
allied in terms of the balance and relationship between individual and community, or
society, to justify reference to the communitarian critique conceived as a general and
coherent philosophical position.74
The balance and relationship between the individual and society is not a simple
equation consisting of two sides because there is the additional aspect of the state to
consider. Kymlicka suggests that 'liberals and communitarians disagree, not over
the individual's dependence on society, but over society's dependence on the state'.73
Over the course of this section attempt will be made to demonstrate that Kymlicka is
correct to posit the dependency of society on the state as a source of disagreement
but mistaken to suppose that the individual's dependency on society is not. On the
latter point there is a case to be made that liberals, and it is certainly true of Popper,
do not deny that individuals exist within societies and amidst intricate social
relationships but there are significant divergences between the liberal and
74 This issue is highlighted and explored in Mulhall & Swift's, Liberals and Communitarians, and
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communitarian positions in terms of the extent of individual dependency of society.
The interrelationship between individuals, society and the state can also be explored
in the context of the dividing lines that separate liberals and conservatives. It will be
useful here to examine the commonalities between communitarian and conservative
critiques of liberalism as well as the extent to which their conceptions of political
community overlap. The primary interest here is in the convergence of the notions
of organic communities in the conservative case and the communities of constitutive
ends posited by communitarians. Scruton goes so far as to suggest that
'conservatism presupposes the existence of a social organism' with conservative
politics being 'concerned with sustaining the life of that organism'. Sandel defends
constitutive communities against the liberal communities in which he claims the
individual is stripped of substantive attachments to become what he calls the
'unencumbered self'. He argues that 'what is denied to the unencumbered self is the
possibility ofmembership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to
choice'.77 The unencumbered individuals that Sandel regards as misconceived
no
. .
liberal creations find themselves adrift in the 'procedural republic'. In examining
what Sandel means by the unencumbered self and the procedural republic we can
derive tests for Popperian philosophy against these concepts. Does Popper render
individuals unencumbered in his political philosophy? Is his open society a
procedural republic?
Open Society and the Limitations of Liberalism
Sandel's starting point is to consider what he deems to be the prioritisation of the
right over the good in liberalism. He was primarily concerned with Rawlsian
liberalism; a 'paradigm statement of contemporary liberal theory' in the views of
Mulhall and Swift.79 As we have seen, Popper contends that the open state should
not regard its purpose as being 'to establish some ideal good' but rather limit itself to
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that which is necessary for the safeguarding of individual freedom. In this regard
Popper's liberalism can also be argued to give priority to the right over the good.
Sandel defines the prioritisation of the right over the good as the argument that:
'a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to
pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must
X1
govern by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good'.
This characterisation accurately reflects the kind of state advocated in Popper's
political philosophy particularly with the reference to individual's ability, and
freedom, to determine their own ends and to be granted an equality of liberty in
pursuing them.
Sandel goes on to argue that the implications of the prioritisation of the right over the
good are firstly that 'individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the common good' and
secondly that in denying particular visions of the good life as premises for
establishing principles ofjustice it opposes 'teleological conceptions' of politics.
Again this accurately characterises the Popperian approach which seeks to both
protect individual rights, as necessitated by its methodological individualism, and
also resist the Utopian appeals of grand and broad teleological visions for society.
Magee argues that from Popper's perspective 'a free society cannot impose common
social purposes, a government with Utopian aims has to, and is bound to become
83
authoritarian'. In eschewing common social purposes the open state seeks to avoid
the promotion of the good of the community, however conceived, as a legitimate
function or purpose of the state. Upholding the right of individuals to freedom, and
ensuring that this right is enjoyed equally by all citizens is the right that is prioritised
by the open state of Popper's theorising. For a society or state to be open then it
must prioritise the right (of the individual) over the good (of the community).
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The Unencumbered Self
Sandel considers one of the major failings of liberal philosophers, such as Rawls, to
be a tendency to theorise individuals as being in some profound way or to some large
extent unencumbered. He explains what he means by this in suggesting that 'for the
unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood,
84
are not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them'. The individual is
conceptualised as a chooser, indeed the capacity for choice is a moral one in that it
brings with it responsibility for the choices made. Popper places a strong
philosophical and moral weight on the notion of choice in proclaiming humans
masters of their own destinies and that our ends are not imposed upon us 'but rather
that they are chosen, or even created, by ourselves'.8? What is constitutive of
individuals, for Popper, is the capacity for choice itself rather than any particular end
chosen. In both science and politics this is the case; scientists must choose amongst
competing hypotheses on the basis of critical inter-subjective tests and citizens in
democracies must do likewise amongst competing parties and proposals for reform.
Sandel contends that only by making the self prior to its ends can the right be
accorded priority to the good. Thus only if an individual's identity is never tied to
the aims and interests that they may have at any time can they think of themselves as
86
a free and independent agent capable of exercising choice. In Popper's view the
determination of ends is the preserve of the individual87 and furthermore that the
emancipation of the individual was 'the greatest spiritual revolution' which led 'to
88
the breakdown of tribalism and to the rise of democracy'. The question remains
however: emancipation from what? For Popper, the emancipation sought for the
individual is from the encumbrances of the closed society. 'A closed society
resembles a herd or a tribe in being a semi-organic unit whose members are held
84 Sandel, Procedural Republic, p.86.
83
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p.22.
86 Sandel, Procedural Republic, p.86.
87
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.278.
88
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p. 101.
110
together by semi-biological ties - kinship, living together, sharing common efforts,
89 • •
common dangers, common joys and common distress'. There are two immediate
issues with this however, firstly in terms of how much of an encumbrance such
common ties represent to individuals and secondly whether or not a society could
maintain such commonalities and yet still be regarded as open.
On the first point Popper's characterisation of closed society seems rather peculiar in
that the sharing of common efforts, dangers, joys and distress are far from
necessarily 'semi-biological ties' and indeed there is no reason why individuals
should not choose, if they so wish, to share such things with others. More
intriguingly still is the line that Popper takes on the relationship between individuals
and society: 'that man, and his aims, are in a certain sense a product of society is true
enough. But it is also true that society is a product ofman and of his aims and that it
may become increasingly so'.90 This illustrates that however emancipated the
individual might be, the choices that they make, even on Popper's account, are
choices conditioned by a social context. That social context is likely to include
shared efforts and dangers.
Popper's focus is on the extent to which the individual can influence the
development of society but he demonstrates here an acceptance that individuals are
shaped by social circumstance. Given the description he provides of closed society it
would seem that the distinction he draws between closed and open society is
overblown. If closed society can simply represent a variety of shared endeavours
and problems then that does not clearly distinguish them from any number of open
counterparts. The Popperian task makes more sense if it is conceived as increasing
or enhancing the openness of a society rather than seeking the attainment of a
qualitatively different society categorised as open, at least in circumstances that do
not require the overthrow of a totalitarian regime.
We saw in the previous chapter that Popper's philosophy of science presupposes an
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extensive social context with inter-subjective testing being an explicitly social
activity. Popper's description of the social context encountered by individuals has a
contradictory and slightly ambivalent quality to it that, in part, obscures the dividing
lines between the open and the closed society.
'That our minds, our views, are in a way a product of 'society' is trivially true. The
most important part of our environment is its social part; thought, in particular, is
very largely dependent on social intercourse; language, the medium of thought, is a
social phenomenon'.91
It is difficult to conceive of a way to reconcile the contention that the most important
part of an individual's environment is the social part with the assertion that the social
conditioning of an individual's views is but a trivial truth. If thought and language,
so crucial to the practice of critical rationality, are social phenomenon depending for
their very existence on social intercourse then it makes little sense for Popper to
dismiss as largely trivial a central aspect of the nature of the relationship between
individual and society. Sandel concurs that the most important part of an
individual's environment is the social part and that is why he seeks to put that insight
at the heart of his political theorising. It is clear that the emancipated individuals of
Popperian philosophy remain socially encumbered.
The other issue identified with Popper's description of closed society as 'semi-
organic' and held together by shared or common efforts and dangers is the extent to
which this can serve to demarcate the closed from the open society. We have already
discussed Popper's advocacy of a welfare state as a means of preventing economic
domination and exploitation but what is a welfare state if not a common effort aimed
at mitigating the potential common danger of sickness, hardship or unemployment?
Similarly, what differentiates a 'semi-organic unit' from any other form of political
unit in the sharing of common efforts and dangers? Recalling Popper's admittance
of piecemeal blueprints for health insurance, anti-depression budgeting or
educational reform it is apparent that shared efforts to meet common dangers are an
91
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intrinsic part of the open society. Indeed, even democracy itself, perhaps the key
feature of open society, can be interpreted as a common endeavour for regulating and
directing the political reform of society. The citizens of an open society are expected
to commit themselves to the common employment of critical rationalism and this, in
combination with democracy, is intended to serve as a defence against the common
threat to all individuals of totalitarianism or authoritarianism.
The granting of extensive freedoms to all individuals is entirely compatible with the
recognition of communal attachments among the citizens of an open society. Popper
demonstrates a far greater awareness of the former than the latter in his own
philosophy even although both are present. He suggests that 'in an open society,
many members strive to rise socially, and to take the places of other members. This
• Q?
may lead, for example, to such an important social phenomenon as class struggle'.
If individuals can have bonds of solidarity, and a corresponding sense of collective
identity, that would give rise to class struggle in an open society then it is clear that
such a society encompasses the sorts of common dangers and efforts that Popper
suggests pertain to closed society. At this point it is worth laying a marker for the
next chapter by noting that the collective identities and endeavours that are to be
found in open societies are similarly present in nation states.
It is also interesting that Popper refers to the emancipation of the individual in the
move from closed to open society as a 'spiritual revolution'. This highlights firstly
that Popper conceives of the change in terms that are primarily moralistic. Indeed he
argues that 'totalitarianism is not simply amoral. It is the morality of the closed
society - of the group, or of the tribe; it is not individual selfishness, but it is
collective selfishness'.93 Popper may be correct to observe a collective selfishness in
totalitarianism but neglects to recognise that such a morality can also apply to a
social class engaged in class struggle for example. Selfishness may warrant moral
reproach but collectivism, in and of itself, less so. Individuals can pursue collective
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moral endeavours, in seeking to eradicate poverty for instance,94 which are unselfish
and can do so within the institutional and civic structures of the open society.
Popper considers the spiritual revolution of individualism to have broken the grip of
tribalism in society but by invoking spirituality he hints at a phenomenon that is
simultaneously individual and collective. Those that have religious faith regard it as
a constitutive part of their individual identity as well as generally perceiving
themselves to belong to a particular spiritual community. It is also worth
remembering Kuhn's conception of scientific revolutions from one paradigm to
another as processes of spiritual conversion. It is clear that for Popper the transition
from closed to open society is revolutionary, hence his view that western civilization,
the vanguard civilization in the pursuit of open society, is yet to recover from the
'shock of its birth'.95 In his bid to emancipate the individual Popper supposes that he
leaves them largely unencumbered and thus free to choose and pursue their own
ends. Whilst the open society does permit and encourage such freedom it does so in
a social context that does not discourage collective identification and does assume a
morality of its own.
For his part, Sandel recognises that the notion of the unencumbered self and its
underlying ethic point to a 'liberating vision'.96 This vision sees the human subject
'installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are'. As
such individuals become 'participants in pure practical reason' whereby they are
'free to construct principles ofjustice unconstrained by an order of value
antecedently given'.97 The critique that Sandel develops here is reminiscent of
Oakeshott's cautioning against rationalism in politics. Oakeshott regards moral
ideals as 'a sediment; they have significance only so long as they are suspended in a
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We can see here the alliance between the communitarian and the conservative
criticisms of liberalism and specifically what both regard as its excessive
individualism. Popperian liberalism is susceptible to this critique but is insulated to
some extent as a consequence of its own latent conservatism that anchors the
individual within a social context.
For Sandel, the relationship between individual, community and morality is best
illuminated in the consideration of principles of justice. Sandel does so by reference
to Rawls and the Rawlsian principles ofjustice. The first of those principles states
that 'each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all'.99 The second
argues that 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity'.100 The second
of these principles was termed by Rawls the difference principle. The principles
outlined by Rawls, of equal liberty and socio-economic arrangements designed to
benefit the least advantaged, strongly echo the position that Popper seeks in the open
state.
Popper sets out what he calls the 'humanitarian theory of justice' and the three
demands or proposals that it makes. These are '(a) the equalitarian principle proper,
i.e. the proposal to eliminate 'natural' privileges, (b) the general principle of
individualism, and (c) the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the
state to protect the freedom of its citizens'.101 This humanitarian theory ofjustice is
sufficiently aligned with that of Rawls to render it subject to the same critical
examination provided by Sandel. The first observation that Sandel makes is that the
difference principle, or here Popper's equalitarian principle, 'is a principle of
sharing. As such it must presuppose some prior moral tie among those whose assets
99 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p.302.
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102it would deploy and whose efforts it would enlist in a common endeavour'. It is
not the case that sharing as a principle need necessarily presuppose prior moral ties
but there is more traction in Sandel's linking of moral attachments with groups
engaged in common endeavours. Sharing can also be conceived as a common
endeavour and Sandel's claim could be modified to suggest that common
endeavours, including the sharing of resources, is more likely amongst individuals
that do have some pre-existing moral ties between, even if the nature of those ties
may be quite abstract. This is an issue to which we shall return in subsequent
chapters.
Sandel goes on to argue that what the difference principle fails to provide is a means
of identifying those who are to form the shared community of its operation and this
is because 'the constitutive aims and attachments that would save and situate the
difference principle are precisely the ones denied to the liberal self' in Rawls's
theory.103 Again, there is no reason to suppose that Popper's theory of justice is
sufficiently differentiated from that ofRawls to avoid this sort of critique by Sandel.
Popper's description of the closed society that we encountered previously suggested
an ambivalent and rather contradictory approach to constitutive attachments in that
he implies them to be tribal characteristics overcome in the journey from closed to
open society yet invites them back in via the communal nature of the projects that
piecemeal engineers are encouraged to undertake. Even if Popper may consider
himself to be denying constitutive aims and attachments to individuals in the open
society he does so only half-heartedly and incompletely. Whether by accident or
design then Popper's philosophy passes this particular test posed by Sandel.
Constitutive attachments take on so much importance for Sandel because he regards
individual character and moral depth as derivative of them. The conception of
constitutive ends that he advocates has a distinctly conservative tone. Sandel
suggests that to have character is to 'move in a history that I neither summon nor
command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices and conduct. It
102 Sandel, Procedural Republic, p.89.
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draws me closer to some and more distant from others; it makes some aims more
appropriate, others less so'.104 On this account character is formed in a historical
narrative, a narrative in which history conditions the choices available to individuals
and indeed the scope of communal attachments and endeavours. Quinton contends
that individuals depend 'for the realization of their moral and social potentialities on
the settled customs and institutions of their societies' and so illustrates the proximity
of Sandel's thought in this regard to conservative philosophy.105
Oakeshott goes so far as to say that 'to suppose a collection of people without
recognized traditions of behaviour ... is to suppose a people incapable of politics'.106
In a sense this captures Sandel's dismissal of liberalism for he fears that
unencumbered individuals, shorn of constitutive attachments and historical
anchorage, will be incapable of sustaining principles ofjustice and practising
politics. Twenty-first century Popperians can be content that the open society does
not leave individuals unencumbered in this way or without the resources to engage in
the practical activity of politics and political reform. In the open society critical
rationalism itself is to be regarded as a tradition of behaviour as well as a guide to
the conduct of change. There is no room for complacency however because the
defence of the open society mounted here against Sandel's charges has required the
making explicit of that which Popper merely implied and highlighting the
contradictions inherent to the differentiation he sought between closed and open
society. Popper's emancipated individuals are not so radically unencumbered as to
succumb to Sandel's critique but we now turn to the question of whether the open
society is conceived sufficiently substantively to avoid characterisation as a
procedural republic.
The Procedural Republic
The definition of the procedural republic that Sandel provides is somewhat opaque in
that he defines it simply as a public life animated by the liberal vision and self-image
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that posits unencumbered individuals.107 That is to say, a vision that prioritises the
right over the good and thus concerns itself with the procedures by which a
community will operate rather than the substantive aims or conception of the
communal good life to which it will aspire. Sandel argues that the liberal vision that
he dismisses 'is not morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it
officially rejects'.108 The consequence of this, he maintains, is that the liberal vision
'must draw on a sense of community it cannot supply and may even undermine'.109
What self-sufficiency of morality does the open society provide and what sense of
community does it draw upon?
Sandel's critique ofRawlsian liberalism centres on Rawls's conception of
individuals as 'antecedently individuated' and so excluding 'the possibility that
attachment to any good or end might ever be integral to one's identity as a person'.110
It is in this sense that Sandel considers liberalism in its commitment to neutrality to
encounter potential difficulty in sustaining a stable moral life of a community.
Against such a backdrop Popper's version of liberal morality can be explored. He is
clear firstly that ethics cannot be regarded as a science but nevertheless Popper does
conceive of an ethical basis of science and of rationalism.1" That ethical basis is
founded on a principle of impartiality.
'The idea of impartiality leads to that of responsibility; we have not only to listen to
arguments, but we have a duty to respond, to answer, where our actions affect others.
Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity
of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the
freedom ofmen. And it establishes something like a moral obligation towards the
112
support of these institutions'.
The protection of free thought and free criticism is a moral duty in Popper's view, a
duty that falls upon the state. The issue of free criticism in particular highlights the
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communal basis of Popperian morality.
In this sense, the moral community is one that protects individual freedoms equally
and impartially. The moral community establishes rational duties owing to the way
in which arguments entail a duty to respond or provide answer in circumstances
whereby individual actions produce communal affects. It is clear from Popper's
account ofmorality here that he would consider the scientific community to be a
moral community every bit as much as a rational community. Indeed, for Popper,
the two are related since rationality has an inherent morality that animates it. The
open society then can be read as an attempt on Popper's part to institute not only
rationality in politics but also the morality that he suggests accompanies it. What is
especially interesting about Popper's line of argument here is that it is a procedural
account ofmorality that he is setting out. It is moral to proceed in a particular way;
that is by mutual criticism and by recognising the duty to respond to rational
argument in engagement with others. Popper's open society is a procedural republic
but intentionally so and it manages to incorporate a procedural vision ofmorality as
a basis for regulating and sustaining relationships between individuals within it.
Of course it can be pointed out that Popper's rationalist morality will only be fully
accepted, and practiced, by those individuals who share his commitment to
rationality in the first place. Those that do not may either fail to identify with such a
morality or dissent from it if they do not recognise the responsibilities that Popper
deems it to entail. That may be so but the same problematic holds true for any
version ofmorality which is instituted by the state and seeks to guide conduct within
the public as opposed to the private sphere. Popper does recognise an inter-
subjective context to the development of the moral sphere and the notion of morality
he develops does imply that it can serve to bind a community in a moral life. The
procedural nature of Popper's moral conception suggests that it is designed to be
self-sufficient, in relation to Sandel's term, by serving as an individual ethic as well
as a communal guide.
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In setting out a procedural morality to be applied in a procedural republic, does
Popper advance a philosophy of liberal neutrality? Sandel argues that the ideal of a
society governed by neutral principles is liberalism's 'false promise. It affirms
individualistic values while pretending to a neutrality which can never be
achieved'.113 Does Popper's open society, with a morality based on a principle of
impartiality, offer a false promise? A Popperian response to this question can begin
by suggesting that the promise of the open society is a relatively modest one and in
its modesty chooses not to aim at the realisation of a particular substantive ideal
vision of society. Further, Popper's affirmation of individualistic values does not
arise from any pretence at neutrality but from an explicit commitment to it, hence his
stress on the concept of impartiality.
For Popper, impartiality is achieved when the scientist or citizen takes account of a
rational argument, or indeed where the state permits the expression of an argument,
irrespective ofwho is making it. Popper's liberalism is not in any way neutral
between rationalism and irrationalism or between tolerance and intolerance and he
makes no attempt to pretend otherwise.114 What he does seek is the greatest possible
neutrality from the state on the question of the communal good for society but he
does not require the state to be neutral with regard to the procedure by which
questions of the good are addressed. This gets to the heart of the procedural republic
that is the open society: Popper's liberalism focuses on procedure through which
morality can emerge rather than advocating a particular conception of collective
morality because he thinks that procedure is more susceptible to rational
deliberation. Popper's faith is that the substantive and affective outcomes of such
deliberations will be acceptable to individuals as a result of the critical rational
procedure that produced them.
SandeFs suspicion remains that in the practice of the procedural republic there will
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be firstly a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities and secondly a tendency
to undercut the type of community upon which it can be thought to depend."3 We
have already considered the second of these tendencies in terms of the extent to
which Popper's impartial ethic is self-sufficient in relation to the nature of the
community that it presupposes. The first tendency that Sandel posits as likely to
befall the procedural republic however is interesting to examine from a Popperian
perspective. The implication of Sandel's suggestion here is that in prioritising the
right over the good the procedural republic constructs a legalistic form of politics at
the expense of democratic participation in that individual rights serve as trumps over
broader notions of collective good even when such notions may be democratically
derived.
The open society seeks to preserve democratic possibilities but of a particular kind.
Popper upholds the democratic procedure but rejects the idea that (democratic)
majorities should be permitted to overrule the basic rights and freedoms of
minorities."6 Individualism is the abiding ethic of Popper's philosophy and
consequently the rights of the individual must always take precedence over the
collective good, however conceived. Popper's procedural republic is a democratic
republic, a republic that functions in accordance with democratic procedures. It is
also fair to say that the morality that underpins Popperian philosophy is democratic
in character with its stress on individualism, impartiality and equality. In developing
the democratic procedural republic that is the open society Popper is offering his
response to a choice that he perceives to be facing humanity.
'The choice with which we are confronted is between a faith in reason and in human
individuals and a faith in the mystical faculties ofman by which he is united to a
collective; and that this choice is at the same time a choice between an attitude that
recognizes the unity ofmankind and an attitude that divides men into friends and
foes, into masters and slaves'."7
It can be inferred from this that the morality Popper holds to underpin the open
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society is a universal one and also that the open society itself is in principle at least
capable of being conceived universally. Popper's procedural morality aims at the
unity of individuals in place of division.
Sandel would perhaps regard Popper's rationalist morality and individualism as
mystical faculties, quite alien to his own conception of political community. The
communitarian critique of liberalism put forward by Sandel accuses liberals of an
excessive individualism giving rise to communities that lack solidarity and character
because they are bound, if at all, only by procedures and not by more constitutive
goals, visions or commitments. Popper of course does not seek to bind individuals
tightly into communities but his procedural politics do aim at a unity, a unity that he
considers to be rational and to have a morality inherent to it. Sandel's critique is
undermined by an overly sharp distinction between atomised individuals and
cohesive communities. Popper's liberalism has no problem in recognising that
individuals are social and communally situated. Indeed, Popper takes the view that
the rational approach to both science and politics is a social one reliant on inter-
subjective testing in circumstances whereby institutions are created to defend and
support the critical appraisal of ideas.
With his ever present desire to uphold individual rights and liberties Popper has a
tendency to underplay the communal attachments exhibited by individuals. Popper
does not make lengthy reference to the nature of community he believes to be
entailed by the open society but he offers enough to sketch the sort of picture that has
been examined above. If Sandel's criticisms serve an enduring purpose then it is as a
reminder to liberals such as Popper that individualism, like anything else, can be
carried too far. Popper and his open society pass the test provided by Sandel though
because the individuals of Popperian philosophy are not unencumbered and the
procedural republic that they inhabit is not without a morality or mechanisms to
support communal bonds. Indeed, by enacting morality procedurally individuals can
share in a common purpose. The nature of the community that open society either
makes possible or rules out is central to the work of this thesis. Popper's theorising
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is often ambivalent on this question and to the extent that he addresses it he does so
implicitly more regularly than explicitly. That is why there is value in exploring
critiques of liberalism and the characteristics of political community that liberals are
held to assume by their detractors. These critiques can serve not only to test
Popperian liberalism and the political community represented by open society but
assist in coming to understand them better. The next test to be examined is that set
by John Gray's account of pluralism as a response to what he contends to be
liberalism's demise.
3.4 The Pluralist Challenge to Popper
This section of the chapter looks at the work of John Gray and the shortcomings he
identifies in liberal political theory. This provides a further test of Popper's liberal
political philosophy and his concept of open society. Gray pays particular attention
to the nature of political community which makes his theorising very relevant to the
discussion here. By considering his pluralist critique of liberalism assessment can be
made as to the adequacy of Popperian responses to what Gray regards as the
universal implication of radical value pluralism: That no one political regime can be
privileged as having a claim on reason'.118 Popper regarded the open society as
having a privileged claim on reason and that claim can be explored in relation to the
pluralist position adopted by Gray. The pluralism that he defends has its basis in the
"thesis of incommensurability among ultimate values', an insight that Gray attributes
to Isaiah Berlin."9
The proposition that I defend here is that Gray, like Sandel. offers a worthwhile
critique of liberal thought and a useful check on its more radically ambitious
tendencies but, again similarly to Sandel, does not evince grounds for the rejection of
liberalism but rather prompts avenues to pursue in modifying it. It is interesting to
note at the outset the view expressed by Gray on communitarianism. He argues that
the community invoked by communitarians is not 'an historic human settlement with
118 John Gray, Post-Liberalism - Studies in Political Thought, London: Routledge, 1996, p.312.
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its distinctive exclusivities, hierarchies and bigotries' such as human beings actually
live in but instead 'an ideal community, in its own way as much of a cipher as the
disembodied Kantian self the communitarians delight in deflating'.120 Gray takes the
view that communitarian communities are as much an abstraction as the liberal self
that communitarians disdain. By referring to the cipher of the 'ideal community' of
communitarian thought he implies that whilst liberals may neglect or underestimate
the notion of community, communitarians tend to romanticise it and in doing so
blunt the edge of their attack.
Gray suggests that this error is one shared by communitarians and conservatives
alike. The conservative theorist, like the communitarian critic of liberalism:
'moves unreflectively from the truth that we are none of us unencumbered or
disembodied selves to the very different, and indeed manifestly false proposition that
we are, or ought to be radically situated selves — that is to say ... selves whose
identity is contoured by membership in a single moral community and mirrored in
121the institutions of a single political order'.
If communitarians and conservatives fall into the same trap then the question
remains as to whether Gray's pluralism can avoid doing so. The argument that will
be developed here suggests that Gray does not succeed in defending his pluralism
from similar charges and that he ends up endorsing a single political order of his
own. Furthermore, his rejection of liberalism denies to him a means of instituting
and situating his version of pluralism. Interestingly, Gray contends that Oakeshott's
philosophy represents an exception to the unreflective move described above but
makes this claim on the basis of characterising Oakeshott as a liberal.
Gray argues that the only aspect of liberalism that endures and can be sustained 'is
the conception and the historic reality of civil society that has been bequeathed to
us'122 and therefore the form of liberal theorizing that should continue to command a
claim of allegiance in present historical circumstance is 'the Berlinian liberalism






which is itself founded on radical value-pluralism'.123 Berlin's value pluralism will
be considered in this chapter in light of Gray's critique of liberalism with a view to
assessing whether or not Popper's open society can be defended against it. This task
can be begun with a consideration of value pluralism as outlined by Gray.
The Reef of Value Pluralism
Value pluralism is the idea that underpins Gray's philosophical approach and an idea,
he thinks, that should be the major preoccupation of both political theory and public
policy.124 Gray argues that the 'rationalist and universalist' tradition of liberal
political theory runs aground on what he calls 'the reef of value-pluralism - on the
truth that the values embodied in different forms of life and human identity, and even
within the same form of life and identity, may be rationally incommensurable'.125
The incommensurability thesis that Gray proposes here is to suggest that different
ways of life and forms of identification are not susceptible to comparison and
rational comparison in particular.
One of the flaws in Gray's theory is a failure to define with any clarity what is meant
by different forms of life and identity. If the communities of communitarian
imagination are but ciphers and liberal individualism is merely one among many
particular forms of life then what does pluralist community consist in for Gray?126
He does not, perhaps cannot, tell us. The closest he comes is in remarking that 'on
the pluralist view, human history as a whole has, and can have, no meaning; it is, at
127
best, a series of adventures in civilization, each singular and discrete'. The term
adventures in civilization does not reveal very much about the type of community
that Gray posits or indeed what distinguishes differing communities amongst a
plurality of political communities. By appearing to situate difference at a
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of civilizations' thesis; the central theme of which, Huntington notes, is that 'culture
and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are
shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War
world'.128 The lack of definition given to his conception of political community
undermines Gray's pluralist solution to a greater extent than it does his pluralist
diagnosis.
For his part, Berlin's pluralism derives from the recognition that even in the world of
ordinary and every day experience human beings 'are faced with choices between
ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which
must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others'.129 It is due to this situation, Berlin
argues, that freedom of choice is rightly so very important to human individuals.130
The Berlinian theory of pluralism implies the ever-present prospect of conflict and
tragedy in human affairs, both personal and social, and so 'the necessity of choosing
between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human
condition'.131 For Berlin, we can say that freedom of choice is a normative principle
to be pursued because of the existence of value pluralism and the
incommensurability that it entails.
Indeed, the universality of pluralism, on Berlin's view, provides grounds for the
freedom to choose, although such choice cannot be unlimited, to be considered a
universal value applicable to all human communities132 Gray is prepared to accept
that 'the virtue of toleration is of universal value because of the universality of
human imperfection'.133 Toleration is a slightly ambiguous term here because
insofar as it implies toleration of the right of people(s) to make different choices then
Gray's position has a close proximity to Berlin's but if it means a more modest
tolerance between communities, on the part of state leaders for example, then the
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concept could serve to mask the denial of choice to individuals. Popper, as has been
discussed, is clear as to the need for toleration to be one of the pillars supporting
open society and is equally clear that it is the right of individuals to make their own
choices, insofar as they do not harm others, which warrants tolerance.134
On account of the tolerance that is central to it, Berlin's pluralism entails a
considerable measure of negative liberty. The pluralist approach is, for Berlin:
'a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great,
disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of'positive' self-mastery by classes, or
peoples, or the whole ofmankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the
fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual
rivalry with one another'.135
The vision that Berlin provides in this passage has many parallels with Popper's
ideal of open society. With its stress on humaneness, its explicit anti-
authoritarianism and recognition of the diversity of human goals Berlin's pluralism is
shown here to be an open philosophy that captures much that is crucial to the
Popperian approach.
It is apparent too that there is a form of pluralism inherent to Popper's conception of
open society. He suggests that pride should be taken in the fact that open societies
do not have one idea but many, good and bad; that they are not based on a single
belief; and that they are found to accommodate not one religion but many.136 It is,
Popper contends, 'a sign of the supreme strength of the West that we can afford
that'.137 The strength of the open society is held to reside in its diversity and in its
pluralism. Indeed this would suggest that the existence of such plurality is a critical
characteristic of open society and means of identifying a society as such. Popper in
particular, although Berlin also to some extent, concentrates on the pluralism that is
internal to a community, domestic pluralism as it were. Gray's principle concern, by
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contrast, is with a more external pluralism of and between communities, what could
be termed international pluralism.
Gray argues that the real agenda for political thought 'is given by the conflicting
claims of communities, just as the agenda for ethics is the conflict among duties and
among goods and evils'.138 He seems to draw here a rather sharp distinction between
ethics and political thought and it is not obvious as to why the former should be
largely excluded from the agenda of the latter. The conflict among duties as well as
goods and evils cannot cease to preoccupy any political theory, or indeed any
government, that seeks the imposition of particular duties or aims to mediate
conflicts between goods and evils. Indeed Popper identifies the need to moralise
politics rather than politicise morals.139 The open society must operate with a
political morality that is rooted in individualism. The conflict between the claims of
communities that Gray perceives could of course be either an intra-state one or an
inter-state conflict and his pluralist theory aims to encompass the former and the
latter. He does seek to establish the implication of pluralism on a global scale and
concludes that the likely persistence of a 'diversity of irreducibly different regimes'
both liberal and non-liberal is the most fundamental recognition that underpins his
pluralist philosophy.140 This illustrates the key dividing line between Gray and
Popper: Gray finds genuine human flourishing in non-liberal forms of life and
regimes whilst Popper seeks to defend the superiority, as he sees it, of liberal regimes
over non-liberal ones and furthermore that he regards that superiority as being a
moral superiority.141 The question arises here as to what, if any, guide Gray offers
from a pluralist perspective as to the criteria against which regimes may be judged
and how this differs from a Popperian approach.
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Standards forAssessing Regimes
The standard of assessment that Gray employs to evaluate political regimes is a
Hobbesian one, and he finds much of the philosophy ofHobbes to be applicable in
pluralistic circumstance. Where its subjects can 'coexist in a Hobbesian peace while
renewing their distinctive forms of common life' a regime carries legitimacy in
Gray's view and performs a valuable function on behalf of those subject to it.142
There is a slight ambiguity in this definition however. It is not clear ifGray is
referring to a variety of distinctive forms of common life that are peaceably
coexisting or whether individuals are to coexist in a state that permits and supports
the renewal of the distinctive commonalties that the community, conceived as a
singular entity, shares. In either case though the implication is that any conflict
between distinctive forms of common life is to be resolved on the basis of the
likelihood of peace being achieved as a result of the particular compromise or
settlement implemented.
Popper frequently endorsed a commitment to peace, a commitment to the removal of
violence from politics, but the concern with Gray's approach here from a Popperian
perspective would be the degree and scope of power he invests in the state to
determine the terms of peaceful coexistence.143 Popper shares Gray's conviction that
the state is a necessary guarantor of security, not least with regard to freedom, but
argues that only a state which is controlled by free citizens can offer those citizens
any sort of reasonable security.144 Popper's adherence to individualism sees him
conclude that 'the morality of states (if there is any such thing) tends to be
considerably lower than that of the average citizen' and thus the morality of the state
should be controlled by citizens to a far greater extent than the other way round.143
Both Popper and Gray are concerned to ensure peaceful coexistence but Popper
recognises that the institution of a mighty state is almost as grave a threat to such
peace as the absence of a state.
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Gray concurs with what he perceives to be the Hobbesian view of the rationale of
politics as being the avoidance ofwar and Popper, as has been discussed, has
considerable sympathy with this perspective. Gray also suggests however that his
own pluralist perspective is Machiavellian, and thus devoid of'Enlightenment
illusions' which he attributes to Hobbes's thought, in recognising that success in
pursuing such a rationale of politics 'can always be only partial, temporary, and in
part a gift of fortune'.146 Popperian philosophy, to some extent, accords with the
humility and caution exhibited by Gray here; Popper considers hypotheses to be of a
generally partial and temporary nature, subject to revision or indeed replacement as a
result of testing. The success of that approach however, for Popper, is no gift of
fortune but rather the outcome of applying a rational methodology to the realm of
politics. In the case of the open society Popper is clear that it can offer, as a
framework, a complete, permanent and consciously designed solution to the question
of how to provide individuals with both security and freedom. Popper goes so far as
to say that if humans are to avoid shrinking from the task of carrying the cross of
humaneness, reason and responsibility then there 'is only one way, the way into the
open society'.147 Individuals may have a plurality of aims, perspectives and values
but, animated by his normative individualism, Popper does not conceive of a
plurality of regimes conducive to human flourishing, he recognises only one - the
open society.
The contrasting standards of regime assessment employed by Gray and Popper are
particularly illuminating when addressed to the political regime that is the nation
state. From Gray's pluralist perspective a nation state can be deemed a success, and
legitimate, if it facilitates a Hobbesian peace amongst its citizens or subjects. He
alludes to an enduring significance of the nation by suggesting that in the modern
world 'common cultures are typically those of nations, common ways of life
recognized by themselves and others as constituting distinct peoples'.148 As we have
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seen, the ability to renew distinctive forms of common life is the other standard of
assessment that Gray utilises to assess political regimes and here it is apparent that
national common cultures are to be regarded as qualifying for such renewal. Gray
contends that the variety of value pluralism that is most salient in today's world is
not individualistic but 'arises from the plurality of whole ways of life, with their
associated moralities and often exclusionary allegiances'.149 There is nothing, on
this basis, to prevent Gray endorsing a political world composed of nation states with
distinctive and separate ways of life culturally and institutionally embedded within
each. Such a framework could be regarded as a world order of pluralist nationalism
whereby a plurality of national ways of life can coexist peacefully with each other.
The criterion by which Popper judges a political regime is that of openness.
Regimes can be assessed along a continuum with open society at one end and closed
society at the other. In practice, despite Popper regarding nationalism as a tribal and
primitive form of association it remains 'an ever-present reality within every state in
the world, in fact, it is given virtual international status in terminology such as self-
determination'.130 The implication of this, Vincent contends, is that viewed through
the lens of the theory of open society then every society for Popper is, by definition,
an 'unusual mix of the open and closed', probably more closed than open.151 Nation
states, judged by the standards of open society, can be assessed as to their openness.
This means that nation states, as a form of political regime, can be more or less
compatible with open society. A particular nation state, such as France for example,
can be regarded as at least approximating the open society ideal insofar that it
pursues political reform via democratic institutions, accords rights and liberties to
individuals and continually holds itself open to improvement. The next chapter will
explore the question of the compatibility of open society and the nation state in
greater detail but for now it suffices to acknowledge the potential openness, in
Popperian terms, which a nation state may exhibit in a general sense.
149 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake p. 136.
150 Andrew Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism", in Jarvie, Milford & Miller (eds), Karl Popper- A
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151 Ibid, p.173.
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For all that Popper conceived of open society as a practical framework that could be
implemented and instituted within political communities he retained a sense that it
must inevitably be, to some extent, a regulative ideal that real world societies could
only hope to approximate. For Popper, no dream of heaven can be realised on earth,
even an inherently modest one such as open society represents. Indeed, once
individuals start to employ critical rationalism, and hear the call of personal
responsibilities that accompany it, then there can be no 'return to a state of implicit
submission to tribal magic'.152 To bite of the tree of critical rationalist knowledge is
to render paradise lost. Nationalism is to be considered a form of tribal magic in
Popper's view owing to the emphasis placed upon the collective at the expense of the
individual.153 It is with the development of the critical rational powers of individuals
that the transition from closed to open society is facilitated. With his political
philosophy, Popper seeks to lead individuals out of collective bondage toward
personal freedom and responsibility in the open society but, perhaps to his surprise,
such things can be found without leaving the nation state.
Gray's pluralism is somewhat vague in that it is not clear what he means by common
or whole ways of life. Nonetheless he does provide a tentative guide as to what he
considers to be the pivotal task of politics, 'that of devising institutions in which
communities and cultural traditions are given recognition and shelter, and in which
their often conflicting claims are mediated and moderated'.154 As mentioned earlier,
the implicit understanding behind this task that Gray sets of politics is that it is an
international one, in terms of devising an international institutional order that
accommodates and tolerates a plurality of communities and the traditions that sustain
them. Gray does make clear his view that 'liberal states must learn to live with non-
liberal states, liberal cultural forms with non-liberal ones, in peace and harmony'.155
This can be seen as the transference of the Hobbesian task from the domestic to the
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p.200
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international arena. Compromise is forced upon liberal states that must come to
accept that history did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and that liberalism,
particularly in its global free market guise, has displayed manifest flaws and
shortcomings.156
For advocates of open society there can be no sense of history having come to an end
with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall as many societies in the world remain far
from open.157 Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, George Soros bemoans
what he perceived to be the collective failure ofwestern liberal democratic states to
seize the opportunity provided by the Soviet collapse to spread the principles of open
society more widely. Fostering open societies is the goal of Soros' Open Society
Institutes and Programmes. John Gray's pluralist theorising offers a useful critique
of at least some forms of liberalism and the grander ambitions of such ideology but
he provides little by way of an alternative framework to structure political
community and international relations between communities.
Gray's tolerance of non-liberal regimes goes well beyond anything that Popper could
endorse but the significance ofGray's work in the context of this thesis is to be
found primarily in the obstacles he highlights as standing in the way of any liberal
project that seeks to transform the world and its order. A world comprised of open
societies would be transformative and it is the transformation that Popper sought and
that Soros continues to seek in his philanthropic efforts. Gray's pluralism takes its
cue from the endurance of the nation state as the predominant form of political
community and the next chapter will build the case further that such an insight
should also serve as the foundation for Popperian attempts to extend and entrench
the concept of open society across the globe.
"6 John Gray, The era of globalisation is over, in The New Statesman, 24 September 2001.
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3.5 Conclusion - Bounded Open Societies
Despite his attack on nationalism and the nation state Popper actually had
surprisingly little to say on the nature of political community and the possibilities for
its development. This thesis is to some extent an attempt to address that deficiency
in terms of the concept of open society. Whilst Popper does view the development
of political community along a collectivist tribal - individual rationalist continuum
his concern is more with the structure of the state, and the freedom it affords
individuals, rather than with the boundaries of the state that demarcate particular
political communities.138 It is possibly for this reason that Popper fails to set out
exactly where he intends the boundaries of open society to lie.
This has implications for attempts to apply his theory, not least in terms of the extent
to which he envisaged open society as heralding a cosmopolitan form ofpolitical
community in contrast to the nation state. The potential cosmopolitanism of
Popper's political philosophy is explored further in the next two chapters. The task
of this chapter has been to outline and assess Popper's general conception of open
society along with some of the institutional aspects necessary to support it. The
question of community was posed in this chapter, firstly with reference to a
communitarian critique of liberalism and secondly by drawing upon John Gray's
pluralist philosophy. The intention throughout has been to show that attempts to
implement open society cannot avoid confronting questions of boundaries and
community. The next chapter looks at the particular boundaries and communities
that are nation states whilst the ground has been paved for that discussion here with
the focus on the nature ofpolitical community more broadly.
In drawing Part I of the thesis to a close however it is useful at this juncture to reflect
briefly on the manner in which the issues of critical rationalism discussed in relation
to Popper's philosophy of science carry forward to his political philosophy. To some
extent the move from the first to the second part of the thesis is an attempt to apply a
158
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Popperian understanding of community to the political domain, the outlines ofwhich
have been glimpsed in the scientific sphere. As noted at the outset of the chapter,
scientific enquiry and democratic politics can be regarded as alternative expressions
of open society from a Popperian perspective.159 Exploring the concept of open
society in relation to the nation state as a form of political community is helpful in
gaining a fuller understanding of communal boundaries as envisaged by Popper as
well as demonstrating the relevance of his philosophy to moral general debates about
the nature and limits ofpolitical community. Whilst it's clear that democratic
politics are an expression, or at least a fundamental aspect, of open society, how
bounded can such politics be and still remain open? Are national democratic polities
also expressions of open society? This initial discussion of boundaries is concluded
here with an initial sketch of a notion of bounded rationality and community that
need not be incompatible with open society.
Bounded Rationality and Community
In considering questions of the boundaries of rationality and community it is
instructive to begin by drawing upon the work of Imre Lakatos and what he
describes as the 'methodology of scientific research programmes'.160 In describing
and explaining his proposed scientific methodology Lakatos seeks to defend a
position of'sophisticated falsificationsim' which 'shifts the problem of how to
appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise series oftheories' .'6I On this
basis, series of theories can be considered scientific or unscientific rather than an
isolated theory; Lakatos thus suggests that to apply the term scientific to a single
theory is to make a 'category mistake'.162 Lakatos is very much building on
Popper's falsificationist foundations in the philosophy of science and this thesis
seeks to do likewise in terms of Popper's political philosophy, taking open society as
the starting point and extending its range of application.
159 Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p.26.
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Interestingly, Lakatos suggests that the clash in the philosophy of science between
Popper and Kuhn is not merely one of technical epistemology but concerns 'central
intellectual values' and as such has implications for the social sciences as well as
moral and political philosophy.163 Chapter two of this thesis began to highlight that
and the nature of community takes on even greater significance in the second part of
the work. In defending a version of Popper's scientific philosophy against Kuhn,
Lakatos develops what he refers to as 'the framework of a methodology ofresearch
programmes' m As outlined above, the key to this conception is the replacement of
single theories or theoretical statements as the objects of falsification with broader
research programmes, or series of theories, that can be evaluated as to their ability to
produce either progressive or degenerative problem shifts.165 Although Lakatos
notes that science as a whole can be regarded as a huge research programme he has
primarily in mind particular research programmes, such as Cartesian metaphysics for
example. The concept of the research programme thus takes us back to universalism
versus particularism in terms of rationality.
Popper takes this matter up in a paper entitled "The Myth of the Framework" in
which he criticises the proposition that 'a rational and fruitful discussion is
impossible unless the participants share a common framework of basic
assumptions'.166 This is, broadly, the position taken by Kuhn in relation to scientific
community and practice. The question of great interest in this thesis is whether or
not the nation state represents a political 'framework' of this sort and if so, does this
render it mythical and indeed irrational as Popper would seem to suggest?
Popper argues that different groups of humans do have much in common, not least
the problem of survival for example. His concern is with opportunities for different
groups to learn from each other and success in that will largely depend 'on our
163 Lakatos, "Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", p.93.
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goodwill, and to some extent also on our historical situation, and on our problem
situation'.167 These variables take us on to intriguing territory for examining the
nation state and open society because they concede an important role to history and
invite interpretation as to what contemporary problems consist in and how they
might be resolved. This is crucial when thinking about the nation state as a potential
framework: do problems such as international terrorism and climate change, amongst
many others, require a new framework of politics, perhaps a politics that is more
cosmopolitan and less reliant on varied and particular frameworks?
One very significant aspect of Popper's discussion of frameworks is that he does not
seek their eradication but rather to stress that they do not represent barriers to
dialogue and, specifically, critical rational debate.168 In describing frameworks as
mythical a question is raised as to why they should therefore represent such a
potential danger from Popper's perspective. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophies
of both science and politics, he is concerned at the prospect of the 'unity of mankind'
being undermined and a subsequent increase in the likelihood of violence and war.169
In prosecuting a case against the myth of the framework however Popper does not
suggest that the existence of frameworks (sets of basic assumptions or fundamental
principles)170 need be a cause of damaging conflicts and disputes. Indeed Popper
goes as far as to put forward the thesis that 'Western civilization is the result of the
clash, or confrontation, of different cultures, and therefore of the clash, or
confrontation, of different frameworks'.171 This is a revealing view and has
significant implications for the line of argument developed in the thesis presented
here.
If frameworks can be cultures on Popper's account then it's possible that they could
be national cultures. It's worth noting that Popper refers to both frameworks and
nation states as being in some way mythical but goes on to engage theoretically with
167
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these concepts regardless.172 Popper's perception of clash and confrontation is
striking in this context because he conceives of a battle of ideas, 'fought' on the basis
of critical rationalism in which all parties to the confrontation can potentially benefit
from participating in it. In fact, such clash may 'lead men to think critically' which
for Popper, is key to the rational scientific method and to rational projects of political
reform.173
Lakatos, in developing Popper's philosophy, concludes that the history of science
has been and should be 'a history of competing research programmes ... but it has
not been and must not become a succession of periods of normal science: the sooner
competition starts, the better for progress'.174 For Popperians, science makes
progress on the basis of competing hypotheses, inter-subjectively tested. Lakatos
modifies this slightly to suggest that it is wider programmes of research that need to
be conjectured and then tested rather than specific and more limited theoretical
statements. The crucial factor in both cases however is that there be a range of
competing alternatives to be discussed, debated and tested. In political matters such
competing alternative frameworks can also serve a useful purpose.
Popper is explicit that this can apply to the frameworks that we recognise as
countries.
'Some countries and their laws respect freedom while others do so less, or not at all.
These differences are most important, and they must not be dismissed or shrugged
off by a cultural relativism, or by the claim that different laws and customs are due to
different standards, or different ways of thinking, or different conceptual
frameworks, and that they are therefore incommensurable or incomparable. On the
contrary, we should try to understand and to compare. We should try to find out who
has the better institutions. And we should try to learn from them'.175
The basis for learning that Popper sets out here is underpinned by a rational critical
attitude that is universal in the sense of being able make comparisons against varied
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frameworks and make judgements against a common standard. The argument
presented in this thesis is that Popperian liberalism, and the concept of open society
in particular, can serve as that standard for assessing nation states as specific political
frameworks. In this way, the concept of national politics does not need to be
jettisoned from a Popperian perspective but rather assessed in terms of the
contribution that it can make to the development and indeed preservation of open
societies across the world.
The learning opportunities that can be derived from having a plurality of options to
explore, discuss and critique suggest that significant caution toward cosmopolitan
projects - particularly where concentrations of power may result - is an appropriate
position for Popperians to adopt. Popper goes on to suggest that cultural relativism
and the doctrine of the 'closed framework' are serious obstacles to the readiness to
learn from others. He argues that these represent 'obstacles to the method of
accepting some institutions, modifying others, and rejecting what is bad'.176
Applying this approach to the nation state as a form of political community would
indicate that the concept should not be rejected as a system but rather some nation
states can be endorsed as open societies, others modified where possible to make
them more open, and those that remain stubbornly closed would be rejected by other
states. What form such rejection would take in practice is of course very difficult to
determine but some thought is given to this question in subsequent chapters.
To evaluate political regimes such as nation states in a manner consistent with
Popper's theorising requires the adoption of his method of science, the 'method of
critical discussion', which makes the transcendence of culturally acquired
frameworks possible.177 Rather than dismiss the concept of the nation state out of
hand we can instead consider from the perspective of critical rationality and try and
learn what is to be valued and what is not valuable in the nation state, both
conceptually and specific instances. To an extent then, this thesis is an attempt to
hold Popper to that approach when contemplating nationalism, something that he did
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not do consistently or systematically.
In some senses Popper's critical rationalism is a universal concept in that it can take
us towards 'objectivity' in terms of the transcending of particular frameworks; thus
Popper describes scientific objectivity as the 'inter-subjectivity of scientific
method'.178 Here Popper is referring to the 'friendly-hostile co-operation' ofmany
scientists rather than individual scientists working in isolation.179 Those cooperative
scientists may be working within different frameworks and traditions however and
the point that Popper makes in his essay on frameworks is that the frameworks need
not be a barrier to scientific practice and progress so long as the inter-subjective
methodology can be applied across frameworks. There are parallels in this for a
political philosophy of liberal nationalism whereby the frameworks of particular
nation states need not constrain individuals from a Popperian perspective because
they may still a) adopt inter-subjective critical rationality within the bounds of their
own framework but also b) adopt that approach in evaluating between frameworks
against some other criterion such as open society.
Although Popper was dismissive of the nation state as a form of political community,
and of nationalism on account of its appeal to tribal instincts,180 he endorsed western
liberal democratic states as instances of open society.181 These states were, and are,
also nation states. I have argued earlier in this chapter that the ideas of open society
and critical rationalism are capable in themselves of providing a limited form of
communal solidarity and the important point is that Popper did not seek to defend
open societies in a social vacuum.
The world we inhabit is already divided into distinct sovereign political
communities, mostly taking the form of nation states. The question posed of
Popperians in this thesis is how to render that framework more accommodating of
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the principles and values of open society. Promoting open societies is not mutually
exclusive with defending nation states. Bearing in mind Popper's caution with
regard to revolutionary political reform it makes sense to start from the reality of a
world comprised of nation states and seek to make that form of political community
increasingly correspond with the philosophy of open society. How that might be
done forms part of the work of the next chapter.
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Open Society and the Nation State
4.11ntroduction - Opening the Nation State
In the previous chapter the nature of Popper's open society, as he outlined it, was
considered in some detail along with its relationship to potential boundaries of
political community. This chapter shifts the focus to concentrate explicitly on
national boundaries to political community and the compatibility of those boundaries
with the philosophy of open society. It should be reiterated at this point that
attempting to find an accommodation between open society and the nation state is to
attempt quite a radical reconfiguration of Popperian political philosophy. This is
particularly so given 'Popper's indictment of nationalism. There are no distinctions
in his work between acceptable and unacceptable nationalisms. All nationalist
beliefs are considered absurd'.1 This thesis does not dispute Vincent's
characterisation of Popper's attitude to nationalism but rather seeks to question that
attitude as well as explore the extent to which Popper unwittingly accommodated the
structure and framework of the nation state in much of his theorising.
If Popperians choose to engage with the political community that is the nation state
instead of ignoring it then what form should that engagement take? How suspicious
should Popperians be that the nation state represents an impediment to the spread of
open society values and principles? This chapter addresses these questions and seeks
to allay some potential concerns. Whilst a crisis of the nation state is often
hypothesised it is difficult to deny the nation states continued endurance as a
communal political form into the twenty-first century.2 It has been argued by
1 Andrew Vincent, Popper and Nationalism, in Karl Popper —A Centenary Assessment, Jarvie,
Milford & Miller (eds), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p. 158.
2 See Philip Bobbit, The Shield ofAchilles, London: Penguin Books, 2003; John Dunn, Contemporary
Crisis ofthe Nation State?, Oxford; Blackwell, 1995; Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End ofthe Nation
State, Minneapolis: Univesrity of Minnesota Press, 1995; and Martin van Creveld, The Rise and
Decline ofthe State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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Hurrell that 'popular understandings of globalization have vastly exaggerated the
alleged demise of the nation-state and its degree of powerlessness'.3 If the nation
state is set to remain a political reality then advocates of open society cannot avoid
the influence of the national framework on both domestic and international politics.
That being so, a more sustained exploration than that undertaken by Popper is
required of the ways in which open societies can be instituted, including within the
context of nation states. Tan suggests that the post-Cold War years have seen a
resurgence in interest among liberal thinkers on the topic of nationalism and liberals
have found themselves 'having seriously to confront a problem that they had hitherto
largely ignored in contemporary debates'.4 My thesis endeavours to remedy this
liberal blind spot by looking afresh at the nation state as a potential locus and host of
open society and thereby demonstrating the contribution that Popper's philosophy
can make to such debates.
The starting point in such a task is a consideration of the work of several theorists of
liberal forms of nationalism: David Miller, Joseph Raz, and in particular, Yael Tamir.
This is important because in viewing nationalism as an enemy of open society
Popper implies that nationalism and liberalism cannot comfortably coexist in a single
coherent theory or ideology. The theorists mentioned above beg to differ and each
provides an account of a liberal, what might be deemed open, version of nationalism
that can be distinguished from the conception of nationalism to which Popper was so
hostile. Although it is unfortunate that Tamir specifically elects not to confront
Popper's critique of nationalism directly, having pointed to its potency, she
nevertheless sets out a detailed position that merits scrutiny in terms of its potential
affinity with open society. The account of liberal nationalism outlined by Tamir is
comprehensive in scope and seeks to address the question of openness in a
framework that combines liberalism and nationalism and thus warrants significant
attention here.
3 Andrew Hurrell, "Global Inequality and International Institutions", in T. Pogge (ed) Global Justice,
Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, p.35.
4 Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders — Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 13.
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Having taken a theoretical perspective of liberal nationalism the chapter goes on to
consider the practical application of a liberal worldview that remains predicated on
the nation state. That view is provided by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
in a speech he gave in Chicago in 1999 entitled The Doctrine of the International
Community. In his speech, Blair sets out a vision of liberal internationalism and
interventionism that seeks to promote the principles of democracy and individualism
that are central to Popper's political philosophy. Tony Blair is in effect proposing a
doctrine to assist the international community in trying to open up societies that are
in some way closed. An assessment of the Blair doctrine is a very useful in
examining the potential utility of open society as a principle of foreign policy. The
question can thus be considered as to the extent to which national governments can
play a role in developing open societies internationally.
That question is extended through an analysis of both the theoretical and practical
work ofGeorge Soros in trying to promote open societies around the word. His
Open Society Institute is based on Popper's philosophy and is an interesting example
of philanthropy with a clear political philosophical aim, to open up closed societies.5
What we discover with Soros is something akin to a neo-Popperianism that is far less
hostile to the nation state than Popper was. Soros is far from a nationalist however
and so the work of his institute offers a valuable template for trying to strengthen
international cooperation whilst simultaneously promoting open societies within the
framework of a world comprised of nation states.
The chapter concludes by pointing to a distinction between positive and negative
forms of nationalism and suggesting that Popper's dismissal of the nation state was
unduly hasty in part because he failed to appreciate or accept any such distinction.
My work here aims to show that the nation state is not inherently hostile terrain for
attempts to develop open societies. Popper's lack of sustained engagement with the




political communities are structured that was his prime concern. The suggestion of
this chapter and thesis more broadly, is that Popperian attention should focus where
possible on translating existing political communities into open societies rather than
re-engineer the predominant nature and boundaries of political community with all
the risks and uncertainties implied by that enterprise. The initial focus of that
attention is on Tamir's liberal nationalism.
Liberal Nationalism: Autonomy and Membership
One of the most systematic attempts to develop a liberal theory of nationalism is that
produced by Yael Tamir in her book that has as its title, simply, 'Liberal
Nationalism'. In it she sets out to 'capture what is essential to both schools of
thought, drawing from liberalism a commitment to personal autonomy and
individual rights, and from nationalism an appreciation of the importance of
membership in human communities in general, and in national communities in
particular'.6 The success or otherwise of that endeavour will be examined here. A
consideration of Tamir's work affords the opportunity not just to explore further the
compatibility of Popper's open society and liberal nationalist thought but also to
understand more fully what Popper means by the concept of open society and how it
might be applied in the context of twenty-first century politics.
Tamir's concern is to situate individual autonomy within national communities; to
embed the citizen as simultaneously an autonomous individual and a member of a
substantive community of identification. In seeking to do so she argues that:
'individuals wish to be ruled by institutions informed by a culture they find
understandable and meaningful, and which allows a certain degree of transparency
that facilitates their participation in public affairs. When they are able to identify
their own culture in the political framework, when the political institutions reflect
familiar traditions, historical interpretations, and norms of behaviour, individuals
come to perceive themselves as the creators, or at least the carriers, of a valuable set
of beliefs'.7




This characterisation of individual preference for comprehensible culturally
informed institutions is actually rather conservative in nature. Firstly it speaks to a
communal, socially conceived notion of authority and to the participation rather than
to the rights of individual citizens. Secondly it refers to the familiarity of traditions
and reflected historical interpretations that are distinctive aspects of the conservative
disposition and theoretical understanding.
Popper, as has been discussed above, is an opponent ofwhat he terms the philosophy
and politics of identity, believing these approaches to merely serve and justify the
existing order. Popper's open society is susceptible to a similar challenge however
in that 'the idea of piecemeal social engineering seems to presuppose that the general
aims of a society and its institutions are both broadly agreed on by the members of
that society and are already embryonically embodied in its institutions'.9 The
question of Popper's conservatism resurfaces here and his aversion to large scale or
radical change does at least imply a toleration of prevailing circumstance, the
prevailing political order. Insofar as Popper is tolerant of such it is due to the fear
with which he holds all grand and comprehensive plans to remake society in
accordance with some preconceived plan or blueprint. The particular danger of
doing so as far as Popper is concerned is that individuals risk being treated as means
to particular social or communal ends.10
This argument has a significant resonance in the context of the nation state and
nationalism. The political system should serve individuals and not the other way
round in Popper's view and this would apply to the political system that is the nation
state as much as any other. What's interesting here is that ifwe apply Popper's
theoretical approach to the nation state, his position does not diverge widely from
g
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that of Tamir's. The distinction that's worth observing at this stage is one of degree
with regard to normative individualism. For Popper, the community or state is to be
judged solely on the contribution or otherwise that it makes to individual well being
whilst Tamir is more content to proclaim the eminence of 'cultural membership' and
the shared experiences that an individual can access via participation in (national)
communal life."
David Miller makes a similar point to Tamir by reference to what he terms a
'common public culture'. Such a culture, Miller argues, is central to national
identity and 'may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group of people is
12 •
to conduct its life together'. Joseph Raz also points to the common character and
culture of peoples that can be considered 'serious candidates for the right to self-
13.determination'. Popper himself would not dispute the potential benefit to be
derived from some sort of common public culture for after all his conception of open
society rests upon a notion of the public sphere that is predicated on an underlying
critical rationality and openness to reform. Indeed, Popper remarks upon the
'socially conditioned atmosphere' within which scientific and political thought is
developed.14 Popper's open society is to some extent an attempt to promote and
defend a liberal public culture which he holds to be conducive to the practice of
science and piecemeal social reform. With that in mind as the primary value of
liberal public cultures, it makes sense for contemporary Popperians to defend such
cultures where they are to be found, including within national boundaries.
The extent to which a common public culture can be deemed to serve the interests of
individuals who live the public aspects of their lives in relation to it is of significance
here. Tamir makes mention of the individual's ability to be a part-creator of valuable
beliefs but this is quickly qualified, with individuals deemed to carry such belief
without necessarily having created them. This again suggests an element of
"
Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.79.
12 David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p.26.
Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination", in Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994, p.l 14.
14
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.213.
148
conservatism to Tamir's thought in that there is a recognition that human beings are
perhaps more likely to inherent their particular set of circumstances - in terms of
identities, attachments, political practices - than be the authors or conscious
designers, social engineers from a Popperian perspective, of them. This point is
stressed by Miller who suggests that the past constrains the present and that 'present
identities are built out of the materials that are handed down'.15 Raz notes that
people growing up in a particular national culture are likely to acquire the group
culture to some extent and be marked by its character.16 It warrants noting again that
particular individuals may not perceive 'their own' culture in the political framework
of which they are a part but that does not necessarily detract from the broader point
Tamir is making to suggest that in order to value something of the nature of a set of
beliefs, an individual must feel an attachment to them and preferably a substantive
attachment that encompasses their identity and sense of self.
For his part, Popper is generally more interested in the notion of individuals as
creators of valuable beliefs rather than just carriers of them. This is the case in both
his philosophies of science and politics. Popper regards the human species as an
intrinsically creative one and refers to the new worlds created by humankind -
worlds of language, music, poetry, science and most importantly, moral demands.17
The moral demands that Popper considers to be most urgent and significant are those
for equality, freedom and extending help to the weak.18 These moral convictions,
Popper contends, were rediscovered in the French Revolution and served to animate
it; furthermore these convictions are deemed to be 'perennial ideas' that have a
universality founded on their Christian origins.19 By referencing the French
Revolution as a positive step in pursuit of the moral world that underpins his
conception of open society Popper demonstrates that such a cause can be pursued in
the context of what we would now regard as a nation state and also suggests he does
15 Miller, On Nationality, p. 175.
16
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not share the conservative concerns, expressed most fully by Burke, regarding the
violent disruptions and radical alterations that were component parts of the
• • 90 •
revolution in France. The extent to which Popper is prepared to support revolution
as a means of bringing about open society in the first place, as opposed to pursuing
political reform within it, is an interesting question to which we shall return later in
this chapter when looking at liberal interventionism from a Popperian perspective.
Tamir defines the main characteristic of liberal nationalism as being that of fostering
national ideals without losing sight of other values against which such ideals should
• 21be weighed and of which account ought to be taken. Thus, she contends, liberal
nationalism 'celebrates the particularity of culture together with the universality of
human rights, the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals together with their
personal autonomy. In this sense it differs radically from organic interpretations of
nationalism, which assume that the identity of individuals is totally constituted by
their national membership'. 2 It would appear from this description that the
theoretical foundations of liberal nationalism have quite a lot of weight that they are
required to support.
Popperians would likely be alarmed that on this description individualism is but one
amongst many values of which sight should not be lost amidst the process of
fostering national ideals. Indeed for Popper, the very notion of a national ideal is a
peculiar and dangerous one.
'Even if anyone knew what he meant when he spoke of nationality, it would be not at
all clear why nationality should be accepted as a fundamental political category,
more important for instance than religion, or birth within a certain geographical
region, or loyalty to a dynasty, or a political creed like democracy (which forms, one
might say, the uniting factor ofmulti-lingual Switzerland). But while religion,
territory or a political creed can be more or less clearly determined, nobody has ever
been able to explain what he means by a nation, in a way that could be used as a
• • 23basis for practical polities'.
20 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
21
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22 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.79.
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Popper is raising two separate objections to nationalism here, one philosophical and
one political. Firstly, he can find no basis for according nationality the status of a
fundamental political category even if it may form a part of the complex array of
elements that coalesce into individual identities. Popper's normative individualism
is such that individuals are the fundamental political category that matter but he
accepts that realising individual welfare and opportunity requires cooperation and a
collective effort, in the inter-subjective practice of science for example, and thus
there is a need for the state. The state must be servant rather than master of the
individual however. That a particular state is national in character however, does not
rule out this possibility.
Miller argues that to see one's own welfare as bound up with the community to
which one belongs facilitates an attitude that contributing to the communal good is
itself a form of individual goal-fulfilment.24 Popperians can appreciate that idea: an
individual accomplishment in science for example can be regarded as a contribution
to the common good and of the scientific enterprise more generally. Raz suggests
that 'group interests cannot be reduced to individual interests. It makes sense to talk
of a group's prospering or declining ... without having to cash this in terms of
25 • • i • • J i •individual interests'. Popper places a greater emphasis on individual interests and
the need for communal structures to serve individual interests and be judged in light
of them. Nationality represents a somewhat arbitrary, even irrational, category for
Popper but Tamir makes clear that her liberal theory of nationalism is 'structured in
line with the assumptions of ethical individualism' in that it can only be justified by
reference to the interests of those individuals affected by it.26
In theory at least then, Tamir's account of liberal nationalism has a defence against
Popperian claims that nationalism, as a normative approach, either neglects
individuals as a fundamental political category or fails to adjudicate the (nation) state
24 Miller, On Nationality, p.67.
25
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on the basis of the contribution it makes to individual welfare and wellbeing. Tamir
argues that liberal nationalism is not only pluralistic and open but also a product of
human will as much as of history.27 Popper does insist that 'whatever authority we
28 •
may accept, it is we who accept it'. Tamir's point in theorising a liberal form of
nationalism is that individuals are free to accept the authority of nation states in the
form of national governments on account of the recognition that 'national rights can
only be consistently justified on universal grounds by referring to the value
90
individuals find in the existence of nations'. If the people of Switzerland can
choose to accept the unifying authority of democracy as the basis of their state then it
is not obvious why individuals should be unable to choose nationality or the nation
to perform a similarly unifying role. It is quite possible to agree with Popper
regarding the inherent difficulties ofproviding a comprehensive definition of
nationality but dispute his claims that this debars nationality from serving as a
fundamental political category and that such difficulties are easily avoided in
deploying a concept such as democracy. This brings us to Popper's second
objection, that of the practicality, or a lack thereof, pertaining to the concept of
nationality.
Popper's rejection of nationalism runs far deeper than is conveyed by an objection
on practical grounds but it is nevertheless interesting that he should bring up such an
issue as a way of seeking to dismiss the notion of national politics. Popper's
argument is that the difficulty of defining nationality renders it an unsuitable
candidate to serve as a political category and as a basis for practical politics.
Popper's hypothesis here appears to have been decisively refuted given that
nationality, however loosely or imprecisely it may be defined, is serving as a
practical basis for politics in many, arguably most parts of the world. This situation
has become more pronounced over the past two decades following the collapse of
communism. The countries of the Balkans for example have (re)established
themselves as nation states, as national polities, following the dissolution of
27
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Yugoslavia.
The situation in the Balkans as recently as ten years ago can be argued from a
Popperian perspective to illustrate the dangers of extreme forms of ethnic
nationalism and the risk of violence stemming from the separation of human beings
into groups of others, unable often to identify with each other on a level of common
humanity. All that may be so without undermining the case that Tamir builds for
liberal variants of nationalism thoroughly opposed to more cultural variants of the
concept that she describes as verging on the pathological.30 Miller argues that there
is nothing inherent to particularism to preclude the recognition that any individual
stands in some relationship to all other human beings on account of physically
sharing a single world. The problem however is to identity 'what ethical demands
31
stem from this relationship, and to weigh it against other more specific loyalties'.
By refusing to recognise that nationalism can exist in a moderate form, such as
outlined by Tamir, indeed in a form that accords with Popper's own commitment to
ethical individualism Popper undermines the case that he prosecutes against
nationalism. Some individuals drive dangerously and recklessly and in doing so
cause death but it would be a rather strange argument to suggest that cars should be
outlawed on the basis that in the wrong hands they can be dangerous. Those found
responsible for dangerous driving are dealt with as criminals. So too with
nationalism, that it can be perverted, violent and dangerous is not reason to dismiss it
as a political concept or animating feature of politics. Rather, those individuals that
act violently and dangerously in the name of nationalism can be dealt with as
criminals. Such an approach is respectful of the principle of individual responsibility
to which Popper is committed and upon which his theorising of open society is
based.
Particularity and Universality
As outlined above, Tamir's liberal nationalism seeks to celebrate simultaneously
both the particularity of culture and the universality of human rights. It is not clear
,0 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.83.
31 Miller, On Nationality, p.53.
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however on Tamir's account how much particularity can be tolerated without
violating the universality of human rights. Presumably she must have in mind a
conception of human rights to be applied universally that each national political
community must adhere to. Such a conception is implied but not explicated. The
liberal desire to universalise rights is invariably likely to present a barrier to the
expression of some aspects of particular cultures. Even in circumstances of strong
cultural convergence as is to be found between Britain and the United States of
America for example, it is difficult to determine what perspective liberal nationalist
theory would take on an issue such as the death penalty as practiced in the U.S. but
not in Britain. Should a universal declaration of human rights include the outlawing
of the death penalty or is the death penalty a matter that can reasonably be
determined by particular national communities on the basis of their own particular
cultures and traditions? In this example the universalism inherent to aspects of
liberalism does not easily accompany the particularist implications of self-governing
national communities.
Popper's concept of open society in many respects faces a similar sort of challenge
as that posed to liberal nationalism in the attempt to balance the universalism of
human rights and the particularity of different cultural forms and ways of life. In
conceptualising open society Popper does not directly address the potential tensions
between universalism, as applied to human rights and particularities that may emerge
from distinct communities taking democratic decisions and undertaking distinctive
cultural practices. As Miller puts it, The universalist sees in particularism a failure of
rationality; the particularist sees in universalism a commitment to abstract rationality
32that exceeds the capacities of ordinary human beings'. By failing to adequately
address this tension in his writings Popper leaves a significant degree of ambiguity at
the heart of his open society concept. Specifically, the question remains open as to
whether his preference was for some sort of cosmopolitan form of a universal open
society or, as 1 argue is more likely, he was content to promote the notion of open
societies as separate but nevertheless cooperative republics. Popper does offer just
j2 Miller, On Nationality, p.58.
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enough of a guide as to the nature of open society though to mitigate some of the
tension arising out of attempts to find a form of political community that can
successfully balance the universal and the particular. This issue will be taken up at
greater length later in the chapter with an examination of George Soros' bid to
actually institute open societies across the world but for now two initial observations
can be made.
The first is that Popper's concept of open society can serve as a template or
framework against which actual states or political communities could be assessed.
States that fulfil a range of criteria in terms of democratic institutions, the rule of law,
respect for individual freedoms and rights, the existence of a free press and
compliance with international law and agreements could in doing so be recognised as
open societies whilst those that do not meet such criteria would be regarded as closed
societies, to varying degrees, from a Popperian perspective. Such a framework could
act as a useful buttress, and indeed alternative, to the characteristics of a liberal
national entity as laid out by Tamir.
'This entity will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and outwards; its
political system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will be free
to practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-plans and conceptions of the
good. The political entity described here differs from the traditional liberal entity in
33that it introduces culture as a crucial dimension ofpolitical life'.
This description has points of both convergence and divergence with Popper's open
society concept. The freedom to practice different cultures and pursue various life-
plans would be central to the openness of a society as advocated by Popper. Beyond
the recognition of a freedom underpinning plurality however it would be difficult to
endorse the reflecting of a particular national culture as a central aim of the state on
Popperian terms. This is due to the limits that Popper thinks it necessary to place
upon the power of the state so as to protect individual liberty.34
Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.163.
j4 Limitations of this sort are also endorsed by Oakeshott in theorising civil association. Michael
Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 174.
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What is striking about Tamir's summation of the characteristics that make up the
liberal national entity is the rather vague manner in which they are formulated.
'Liberal principles of distribution' for example are open to a very wide range of
interpretations ofwhich Popper's liberal 'humanitarian theory ofjustice' would be
but one.35 Similarly it is not clear how a state is to be recognised as reflecting a
particular national culture or how such a notion is to be defined. To say as much is
not to suggest that cultural forms do not find reflection in political structures and
institutions nor does it deny at least the potential for something resembling a national
culture to exist but rather it is to question on what basis a liberal national state is to
be distinguished by virtue of its perceived cultural reflectivity. For his part, Miller
argues that national public cultures are products of political debate which are
transmitted via mass media.36 Whilst Popper disputes the utility of the nation as a
political category it is clear that Tamir regards the nation as a possible locus for the
practice of something closely approximating open politics of a Popperian
conception.
Tamir does in fact make explicit reference to what she describes as one of the best
known attacks on nationalism, that put forward by Popper in claiming that
nationalism is 'akin to a revolt against reason' and an ever present danger to
37
Popper's own theoretical notion of the open society. Popper attacks nationalism
for its appeal 'to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic
desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility which it attempts to
replace by a collective or group responsibility'.38 Rather than defend her theory
against the Popperian critique however, Tamir opts instead to dismiss it. In the
following manner she simply asserts that 'this attack notwithstanding, this book
attempts to describe an interpretation of nationalism that cherishes reason and the
open society, rests on a systematic view of human nature and the world order, and on
a coherent set of universally applicable values'.39 Popper's attack does warrant the
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sort and level of scrutiny applied here though for it reveals that he struggles to
provide a convincing and systematic argument that his open society is incompatible
with the liberal nation state. It also serves to highlight the enduring relevance of
Popper's political philosophy to debates concerning the status and future of the
nation state.
Popper contends that Hegel developed a historical and totalitarian theory of
nationalism and in doing so clearly foresaw the 'psychological possibilities' of the
concept.40 In particular. Popper suggests that Hegel 'saw that nationalism answers a
need - the desire ofmen to find and to know their definite place in the world, and to
belong to a powerful collective body'.41 Unfortunately Popper does not expand on
this claim to reveal, for example, whether or not he thinks that humankind have a
legitimate and reasonable desire to know their place in the world and belong to some
form of powerful collective. Such a debate is reminiscent of the one introduced by
Fuller regarding Popper and Kuhn's respective philosophies of science in terms of
individuals being uprooted in the former case and rooted in the latter. On this basis it
can be argued that the 'shock" to which Popper refers regarding the birth of open
societies, and the transition from tribal or closed society entailed by this, derives
from the loss of a certain and definite place in the world encountered by
individuals.42 Being uprooted in this way is to take on the 'strain of civilization' to
use Popper's term.43
What is interesting is the fact that in the account of liberal nationalism provided by
Tamir it is made absolutely explicit that she 'attempts to describe an interpretation of
nationalism that cherishes reason and the open society'.44 Tamir contrasts her
interpretation of nationalism as differing radically from 'organic' interpretations
which assume that individual identities are totally constituted by national
membership and, invoking Rousseau, that personal will is free only when submerged
40
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in the general one.45 By drawing such a contrast, and doing so in this way, it can be
argued that Tamir considers liberal nationalism to be an open version of the concept
in opposition to the closed version represented by organic nationalism. Popper, it is
worth recalling, described a closed society as a 'semi-organic unit'46 and Tamir
shares with him an aversion to organic forms of political community.
Tamir goes on to describe liberal nationalism as 'pluralistic and open', that it 'sees
national groups as not only a product of history, but also of human will, and broadly
follows humanistic tradition'.47 The open society of Popper's philosophy can be
described in very similar terms and Popper does make clear that he holds the
pluralism of open society in high regard. Furthermore he considers the creation and
maintenance of open societies to require acts of human will and not mere historical
fortune whilst also seeking to situate open society within the humanistic tradition.48
Indeed, he considers the move from closed to open society to be a 'step from
tribalism to humanitarianism'.49 Popper's overriding concern with Tamir's account
of liberal nationalism here would likely focus on the use of the word broadly to
indicate the extent of liberal nationalism's adherence to humanitarian principles.
For Popper, as we have seen, the fundamental purpose of the state is to be regarded
as a humanitarian one, that of ensuring an equal protection of freedom for all
citizens.30 The open society cannot merely follow humanitarianism in a broad sense
rather it must be founded and anchored in humanitarian principles. Popper however
offers only the broadest guidance as to how such principles should be instituted
when he says that 'the protection of that freedom which does not harm other citizens'
should be the fundamental purpose of the humanitarian, open state.31 Not only does
he leave open the question of how the scope of such freedom is to be defined but he
45 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.79.
46
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also offers little by way of explanation regarding the integration of this fundamental
purpose with the considerable interventionism that he elsewhere posits as appropriate
on the part of the state.52 The important point that emerges from this is that Popper's
argument with Tamir on the question of humanitarianism is one of scope and
interpretation, not over the principle itself or the need for it to underpin state
conduct. The liberalism that Popper and Tamir share appears to be stronger than the
differences that arise out of her sympathy toward a particular form of nationalism.
A further question that highlights both convergence and divergence in the work of
Popper and Tamir, between open society and liberal nationalism, is that of continuity
and in particular the continuity of communities and communal membership. Tamir
argues, again in a somewhat conservative vein, that continuity is a benefit provided
to individuals by the existence of nation states.
'The respect for continuity inherent in national membership enables individuals to
place themselves in a continuum of human life and creativity, connecting them to
their ancestors as well as to future generations and lessening the solitude and
53alienation characteristic of modern life'.
Tamir does not make clear why the ability to place oneself in a continuum of human
life is to be viewed as particularly beneficial or advantageous to individuals nor does
she provide evidence as to the solitude and alienation that she perceives to
characterise modern life. Nevertheless, this can be understood as a claim that
individuals have socio-historical aspects to their identity and that they may seek to
preserve and draw upon the cultural communities that could be deemed to have
contributed to their identities.
The issue of continuity that Tamir raises in relation to liberal nationalism brings us to
Popper's view of history. For Popper, continuity is far from as straight forward as
Tamir would appear to assume, at least when viewed from the perspective of ethical
individualism.
52
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'There is no history of mankind, there is only an indefinite number of histories of all
kinds of aspects of human life. And one of these is the history of political power.
This is elevated into the history of the world. But this, I hold, is an offence against
every decent conception ofmankind. It is hardly better to treat the history of
embezzlement or of robbery or of poisoning as the history of mankind. For the
history of power politics is nothing but the history of international crime and mass
murder'.54
The nation state and national membership, as Tamir puts it, would come under the
history of political power as outlined by Popper here in that political power is, and
has been, held at a national level. Popper rather narrowly and unfairly writes power
politics off as involving nothing but crime and mass murder but then it is not entirely
clear what he means by power politics since he concedes that the open society itself
must harness the 'power' of the state even if only to guarantee protection for the
weak. His more general point however, is to question the notion of history, or indeed
continuity, as being represented and interpreted as the various incarnations and
developments of political power. Popper's objection to Tamir's continuity of
national membership would be that it elevates one aspect of human life into a
comprehensive history of the world that it does not particularly merit. It is not
obvious from a Popperian perspective why nationality should be accorded special
status as a locus of continuity since the continuums of human life and creativity that
individuals may wish to place themselves in will be so varied and diverse. That
national membership provides one continuum of continuity for individuals is not a
reason in itself to value that form ofmembership above others in Popper's view.
Popper suggests that attempts to record history actually require to some extent a
negation of the individual and the abstraction of various groups. He argues that a
concrete history of humankind would have to be a history of all humans since no one
is more important than any other. It would have to be, Popper contends, 'the history
of all human hopes, struggles and sufferings' and 'clearly this concrete history
cannot be written'.33 Instead, historians must neglect and select in order to make
^
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their task feasible and manageable.36 Two observations can be made on the approach
that Popper takes to history and historical analysis.
The first is to question his claim that no one individual is more important than any
other in a historical sense. The moral equality of all human beings is an ethical
proposition that Popper supports but this does not imply a corresponding equality of
historical significance for all human individuals. In the history of political thought
for example Popper clearly regards some thinkers as more important than others.
Plato, Hegel and Marx are identified as opponents of the open society and whilst
Popper seeks to argue against their respective philosophical positions he does this on
the basis of a belief that these thinkers have had a significant historical role, more
significant than that of other individuals, in impeding the development of open
society.
The second observation on Popper's account of history that warrants mention is his
concession that selections are necessary and that at least a degree of abstraction is
required if historical study is to be made comprehensible. In accepting that the
history of all human individuals cannot be written Popper alludes to abstractions that
either aggregate or collectivise individuals. The history of the nation state could be
an example of an abstracted historical account from this perspective but then so too
could an attempt to trace the history of open society or even the idea of open society.
Popper suggests that the only rational attitude 'towards the history of freedom is that
we are ourselves responsible for it'.57 Ifwe permit the possibility that the history of
nationalism can be interpreted as one version of a history of freedom then the nation
state can become the responsibility of individuals in the same way that the open
society can. In recognising that both the nation state and open society are to some
extent abstractions they are both capable of being adjudicated on the basis of the
contribution that they make to individual wellbeing.
Popper would be inclined to dispute this conclusion however and it is because he
56
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denies that the nation state is capable of being applicably formulated even in the
abstract.
'None of the theories which maintain that a nation is united by a common origin, or
common language, or a common history, is acceptable, or applicable in practice. The
principle of the national state is not only inapplicable but it has never been clearly
conceived. It is a myth. It is an irrational, a romantic and Utopian dream, a dream of
58naturalism and of tribal collectivism'.
For Popper then the nation state is but a myth, a naturalist and collectivist dream.
But if this is so then it raises several questions of Popper's own theory. The first
question is why the nation state should be deemed to pose such a threat to freedom
and open society if it is mythical and never been clearly conceived. Popper does not
provide an answer to this. Another question concerns the abstractness of open
society as a concept and it has been argued that it was not clearly conceived in
Popper's theorising. Bryan Magee for example, an avowed Popperian and champion
of open society, argues that 'our task is not the impossible one of establishing and
preserving a particular form of society: it is to maximise our control over the actual
changes that occur in a process of change which is never-ending - and to use that
control wisely'.59 This description of open society is no more clearly conceived than
the various theories of the nation that Popper dismisses. My argument however, is
that the abstract and at times opaque nature of open society is not a reason to reject it
and Popperians should not reject the nation state on such a basis either.
There are a key set of principles that underlie Popperian liberalism: normative
individualism, a concern to avoid concentrations of power, a presumption against
holistic and radical political reform, a determination to relieve avoidable suffering,
alertness to the perceived dangers of bureaucratisation, and a commitment to
democratic principles. A society structured and governed in accordance with these
principles could reasonably be described as open from Popper's perspective. It is
interesting to note that there is absolutely no reason why these principles cannot be
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adopted and instituted within the political framework that is the nation state. The
extent to which this is practically taken for granted will be revealed later in the
chapter when consideration is given to the work ofGeorge Soros and his Open
Society Institute. Soros has for many years now spent substantial time and money
seeking to promote the concept of open society around the world and in particular
has sought to help institute open societies in various nation states, usually those
undergoing some form of post-Communist transition.
It has been highlighted in the discussion above that Popper perceives and attacks a
single conception of nationalism, one that is organic, ethnically based and deemed to
be incompatible with liberal principles and values. Tamir seeks to argue that
nationalism can indeed be rendered compatible with liberalism and thus it is a more
complex phenomenon than Popper may assume. Miller stresses, like Popper, the
value of democracy whereby 'all citizens are at some level involved in discussion of
public issues' but unlike Popper, suggests that 'only a common nationality can
provide the sense of solidarity that makes this possible'.60 Thus, a nation state can
be liberal, or otherwise, in the same way that a city state, an empire, or even a
supranational or cosmopolitan entity could be. Popper builds a convincing case that
an open society cannot be governed by Platonic Philosopher Kings nor can it
subscribe to the historicism that he finds in Marx's theorising but he fails to show
what is intrinsic to the nation which means that it, as a form of political community,
cannot be made open.61 Further evidence can be found of the compatibility of open
society and the nation state by looking at the issues of distributive justice and the
welfare state and it is to these that we now turn.
Welfare in the Open Society and the Nation State
Tamir notes that questions of distributive justice have become increasingly central to
liberal theory. She argues that it is often overlooked that 'the liberal welfare state
is necessarily predicated on certain national beliefs' and goes on to claim that the
60 Miller, On Nationality, p.98.
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liberal conception of distributive justice is 'only meaningful in states that do not see
themselves as voluntary associations but as ongoing and relatively closed
communities whose members share a common fate'.63 The critique that Tamir offers
of the liberal account of distributive justice follows the same lines as the
communitarian objections that were discussed in the previous chapter, in particular
that the individualistic values of liberalism are unable to sustain the substantive
commitments and mutual obligations required for a 'caring' welfare state to
function.64
In the context of this thesis the use of the term 'closed communities' by Tamir with
reference to the welfare state is particularly noteworthy. This bears a close
resemblance to the argument that John Gray makes that social democracy
'presupposed a closed economy'. He suggests that deficit-financed full employment
policies and the extensive welfare provision of the post-war period were predicated
on a conception of political community and economy that was far from open, as are
egalitarian theories such as those of John Rawls.65 It is true that the welfare state has
come to be established within national boundaries and the extent to which it may yet
come to transcend them remains an open question, international aid transfers
notwithstanding. Chauvier notes that the situation of the world as a whole does 'fall
within the purview of global justice; however, the appropriate conception ofjustice
at the global level cannot simply replicate the conception that is suited to the
domestic level'.66 It is significant however, as Tamir claims that liberal philosophers
have seldom made serious attempt to justify the restricting of distributive policies to
members of particular (often national) communities.67
Instead of justifying the restriction of distributive policies liberal theorists, with
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Rawls a paradigmatic example, start from what is and grope towards ought. The 'is',
in this case, being 'a world divided into nation states'.68 Tamir argues that 'a
coherent liberal theory should either endorse this world order and explain its virtues,
or reject it and suggest ways of changing it. Accepting it without explaining it seems
unjustified'.69 Forst makes the point in this context that when thinking about issues
of justice that transcend state boundaries it is important to distinguish between
international and global justice with the former taking political communities as the
main agents of justice with the latter taking persons as the primary focus of justice.7"
Popper's philosophy has a degree of incoherence to it on this basis in that he
professes to reject nationalism but speaks only of controlling or harnessing the
power of the state as is, he does not seek in any sustained or systematic way to build
a case for a cosmopolitan state for example. When Popper refers to the need for
social institutions that protect the economically weak to be 'enforced by the power of
the state' he does not elaborate on what he means by the state.71 In declining to
elaborate on the concept of the state it can be assumed that Popper meant states as
constituted at the time of his writing. Whilst by no means all of these were nation
states, many were and so it would appear that Popper's chief concern is with
protecting the weak and utilising state power to this end rather than with the
particular form, national or otherwise, that the state may take. Pogge argues that
these questions require further thought from a liberal perspective in that support for
the current global order and the national policies that sustain it cannot be divorced
from the 'harms they foreseeably produce', those harms being severe poverty and
72associated problems in many parts of the world.
Popper was absolutely clear that the avoidance of preventable harm should be a
guiding political principle.73 Popper's philosophy can play a role in addressing
questions of international harm and it need not be irreconcilable with the nation state
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as a form of political community in doing so. Popper believed, and argued, that
nationalism was inherently hostile to liberalism74 but Tamir sets out a vision of
nationalism that need not be and her theory provides grounds for establishing a
degree of common accord between the concept of open society and that of the nation
state. In terms of welfare and distributive justice it can be seen that Popper's
approach can be accommodated within the nation state. Recalling his 'humanitarian
theory ofjustice' which demands (i) that attempt be made to eliminate natural
privileges, (ii) adherence to the general principle of individualism, and (iii) that the
purpose of the state should be the protection of the freedom of its citizens, it is
apparent that the nation state is not intrinsically or structurally incompatible with the
realisation of these demands.75
It is demand two of the humanitarian theory of justice, adherence to the principle of
individualism that Popper thinks is most at risk of being undermined or neglected
where the politics of nationalism are pursued. His fundamental rejection of
nationalism is based upon his perception that it 'appeals to our tribal instincts, to
passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of
individual responsibility which it attempts to replace by a collective or group
responsibility'.76 The depiction of nationalism provided by Popper here is of a
particular and arguably extreme kind. It is extreme for denying the capacity of
nationalist theories and narratives to appeal beyond tribal instinct and prejudice, and
for assuming that the invocation of some form of collective responsibility need be a
negation of individualism. Tamir is no more an advocate of the type of nationalism
envisaged by Popper than he himself is and Tamir bemoans what she regards as
hidden assumptions that grant validity only to extreme versions of nationalism and
identify it with 'fanaticism, violent struggle, and disaster'.77
Tamir argues that 'moderate nationalism' offers a coherent theoretical position,
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indeed, offers markedly greater coherence than its more extreme 'relatives'.78 She
asks why liberal nationalism, 'which places reflection, choice, and internal criticism
at its centre' and rejects the notion that exaltation of the idea of the nation should
define nationalism, seems so often not to be distinguished from the extremities of
79 ...nationalist theory. This is a particularly apt question to ask of Popper, and of
Popperians, because reflection, choice and internal criticism are exactly what Popper
hopes will guide and underpin the state and the conduct of politics in his conception
80of open society. One central aim of this chapter is not only to establish, with
Tamir, that liberal nationalism represents a coherent theoretical position but
moreover and more importantly that it represents a coherent theoretical position for
Popperians seeking to advance the cause of open society and see open societies
instituted across the world. A further aim is to show that the concept of open society,
and thinking about the ways in which it can be realised, has the potential to
illuminate contemporary questions as to the nature of political community and the
prospects for the nation state.
It is interesting to note Popper's apparent aversion to collective responsibility in his
broader attack on nationalism, especially in the context of distributive justice and the
welfare state. Tamir contends that 'the "others" whose welfare we ought to consider
are those who we care about, those who are relevant to our associative identity'.81
Welfare, on this account, is a form of collective responsibility extending beyond the
individual but a responsibility that is bounded and demarcated by associative
identities. The use of the term 'those who we care about' would likely prompt
concern from Popper in that he takes issue with the very boundaries that Tamir sets
up as delineating separate spheres of welfare.
By invoking passion and emotion, for those for whom we care, Popper fears the
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'We cannot really love in the abstract; we can love only those whom we know. Thus
the appeal to even our best emotions, love and compassion, can only tend to divide
mankind into different categories. And this will be more true if the appeal is made to
lesser emotions and passions. Our 'natural' reaction will be to divide mankind into
friend and foe; into those who belong to our tribe, to our emotional community, and
those who stand outside it; into believers and unbelievers; into compatriots and
aliens'.83
Popper is justified in pointing to the potential dangers of passion and emotion
coming to dominate politics but here again he is perhaps incapable of seeing beyond
extremities. Emotion in politics may cause division among humans but that is not
necessarily a reason to banish it from the political arena, indeed it is doubtful that
such banishment would be possible. Furthermore, the pursuit of 'rational' politics is
no guarantee against division since it may be deemed rational to administer welfare
on a sub-global basis for example and this would require the creation of at least
administrative boundaries. Nowhere does Popper make the case for a world
government or even for a global regime of distributive justice so in practice he
appears content to tolerate a degree of division in providing for individual welfare.
The world is already divided into compatriots and aliens but that does not render
appeals to love and compassion redundant nor does it preclude the prospect of
creating open societies that temper emotion with critical and rational reflection.
Popper seems to suggest, in contrast to Tamir, that emotional communities should be
the basis neither of politics nor welfare. Miller follows Tamir's line of reasoning in
arguing that a 'shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases
84 •confidence that others will reciprocate one's own co-operative behaviour". It is
clear that Popper regards nation states as particularly perverse forms of emotional
community which appeal, in his view, to lesser human emotions and passions. The
logic of avoiding separate emotional communities would require the creation of a
single emotional community of humankind with no individual left standing outside
it. This both poses and expresses a dilemma at the heart of Popperian political
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philosophy and the concept of open society. Popper avoids confronting the choice
that his theory prompts: that between advocating a single, global, cosmopolitan open
society and advocating a variety of separate republics across the globe each
constituted as open societies. This perhaps leaves him unable to appreciate the
opportunities that exist to moderate nationalism by means of the theory of open
society and at least whilst a world comprised of nation states continues to exist, seek
to render it more liberal.
It is an oversimplification on Tamir's part to suggest or imply that the welfare of
those beyond an individual's associative identity is irrelevant to them and the fact
that people donate to international charities and expect their governments to provide
international aid is evidence of such. Tamir continues that 'communal solidarity
creates a feeling, or an illusion, of closeness and shared fate, which is a precondition
85of distributive justice'. For Popper, the notion of illusion here is to be feared for
the possibility that it may perpetuate division and opposed as irrational for
facilitating a belief in emotion and passion as the mainspring of human action at the
expense of reason.86 Popper however does not deny that emotion and passion
animate human action and therefore that they play a part in the human activity that is
politics. His goal is to marginalise them and pave the way for a conception of
rational politics whereby it is the thought rather than the person of the thinker that is
on
considered, debated and acted upon. Once more the dichotomy that he sets up
between rational politics and emotional politics is overblown and this clouds the
important issue of how to make politics more rational and minimise the dangers of
extreme emotions and passions being unleashed in the political arena. This holds in
relation to matters of welfare as well as broader political structures and
arrangements.
Tamir concludes her discussion ofwelfare by making the claim that 'the community¬
like nature of the nation-state is particularly well suited and perhaps even necessary,
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to the notion of the liberal welfare state'. In the creation of a sense of community,
however illusory or 'imagined'89 it may be, Tamir takes the view that some form of
communal solidarity is a precursor to the operation of liberal principles of
(re)distributive justice. For his part, Popper states simply that 'it is our duty to help
those who need our help; but it cannot be our duty to make others happy, since this
does not depend on us'.90 What Popper does not make clear is who is meant by 'us'.
The duty that he imposes to help those in need is couched in terms of his
commitment to alleviate avoidable suffering and as a caution against attempts 'to
make others happy' since that he regards as a privilege for friends and not a political
task for the state.91 Popper does not tell us to whom the duty is addressed nor does
he explicate any boundaries that may be entailed by it. His silence on this matter can
be interpreted as a belief that no boundaries should entail in relation to distributive
justice but it would be rather strange to hold this view and the radical departure from
present circumstance that it demands, without being explicit about it. Alternatively,
and more likely in my view. Popper's ambiguous approach to the boundaries of
justice and the welfare state stem from a more or less taken for granted acceptance of
those boundaries and structures already in place: predominantly those of the nation
state. Popper's overriding concern was not to alter those boundaries but instead to
alter the welfare provision contained therein.
Tamir suggests an explanation for the position of Popper here and it is a position that
she regards as common to many liberal theorists. In her view liberalism has
absorbed national concepts and this has enabled it 'to take for granted the existence
of states inhabited by specific populations' and discuss notions such as distributive
.. . . ..... 92
justice, as well as consent, obligations and participation, in this context. Such a
position, Tamir contends, has allowed liberals to circumvent thorny issues of
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membership and immigration and also more general questions of group structure.93
This assessment is harsh and rather sweeping of liberalism as a whole, as a body of
political thought and ideas, but it is not an unfair critique to pose of Popperian
liberalism which does indeed circumvent the issues that Tamir points to. In
correspondingly strong terms Tamir concludes by claiming that liberal theory has
become 'dependent on national ideals and a national world order, thus leaving
liberals little choice. Except for some cosmopolitans and radical anarchists,
nowadays most liberals are liberal nationalists'.94 It is not so much that liberal
theory exhibits a dependency on national ideals or even a national world order but
there does appear in Popper's case to be an acceptance of the national world order,
be it consciously or otherwise. By declining to define or distinguish himself as a
cosmopolitan theorist Popper leaves himself open to the charge, as he would see it,
of being a liberal nationalist on the terms set by Tamir.
That ethnocentric nationalism is dangerous and needs to be confronted by liberals is
a point on which both Tamir and Popper could agree. Her approach to this
confrontation however is to argue that national interests should not be denied
altogether, as Popper would submit, but rather it is incumbent upon liberals to offer
an alternative national view.95 To Tamir it seems clear that 'nationalism will simply
not go away, and the question that remains open is whether its guise will be some
form of virulent ethnocentrism or a sober vision, guided by respect for liberal
values'.96 Popper, in arguing the necessity of recognising the principle ofwhat he
calls an 'unprejudiced view of polities', that 'everything is possible in human affairs'
would likely be inclined to dispute Tamir's claim that the only open question remains
as to the variant of nationalism that persists and not of the concept itself.97 Just as
previous forms and bases of political community, such as the city state, have by and
large ceased to be the locus of political authority and foundations of world order so
too in all likelihood will the nation state eventually come to be replaced by
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alternatives. For the moment however, that scenario does not appear close at hand,
the world order is still predominantly structured around nation states and so Tamir is
correct to at least suggest that one of the most pressing political questions remains
that ofwhat form the nation state should take and what principles should guide it.
For twenty-first century Popperians such a scenario can be regarded as either a threat
or an opportunity. The persistence of the nation state, and of nationalism as an
animating ideology, can be seen as a threat to open society and more particularly to
the 'rational unity' of humankind.98 Two points may be made however in response
to the view of the nation state as a threat to rational unity. The first is that Popper
conceived such a unity in terms of adherence to the 'scientific outlook' and it is not
obvious that the existence or preservation of nation states as a political form is an
impediment to the development and maintenance of such an outlook. Indeed Popper
speaks of the rationalism of 'Western civilization', a civilization that has nation
states as constituent political parts but still warrants commendation from a Popperian
perspective on account of its commitment to rationality.99 Secondly, we can observe
that for Popper the rational unity of human beings rests on the twin pillars of science
and open society. Western civilization is 'rational' because it is composed, broadly
speaking, of open societies that value science. If the entire world were similarly
constituted then presumably Popper would be content to refer to the rationalism of
such a world order. The task for contemporary Popperians can reasonably be
adjudged to be that of spreading open society, and its liberal principles, across the
globe. This has similarities, although not I would suggest in terms of method, with
American neoconservative ambitions to spread democracy to those parts of the world
where it is absent or severely lacking.
The parallel that I draw with neo-conservatism I do so with the utmost caution.
Soros, as we shall see later in the chapter, does view his mission as being to foster
open societies across the world and promoting democracy is of course a very
important part of that task. He was however thoroughly opposed to the US-led
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invasion of Iraq and considers it neither feasible nor desirable to promote open
society via the point of a gun. That said, it should be remembered that one of the
fundamental principles of Popper's political philosophy is that avoidable suffering
should be alleviated and where possible prevented. Moreover much of that suffering
can be inflicted by the state, and this Popper judges to be more likely in closed
societies governed by totalitarian regimes. Whatever it may be now, Iraq was far
from an open society under Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party. This raises an
important question for Popperians: on what basis, if any, can liberal interventionism
be justified? Popper did not consider this question explicitly but he did have some
interesting and relevant things to say on issues of national self-determination, the
nature of political reform and the role of international institutions. The discussion
that follows here seeks to assess Popper's approach in the light of one of the most
significant attempts of recent times to set out and defend a concept of liberal
interventionism, that provided by Tony Blair in his 'Doctrine of the International
Community' speech delivered in Chicago in April 1999.
Applying Philosophy to the Social World
In this work of political theory it is important to explain why I devote time and effort
to conducting a Popperian analysis ofTony Blair's doctrine and the significance of
this in terms of attempts to apply Popper's political philosophy. It is worth reflecting
at this point on what Popper considers to be the purpose and function of social
science.
'It is the task of social theory to explain how the unintended consequences of our
intentions and actions arise, and what kind of consequences arise if people do this
that or the other in a certain social situation. And it is, especially, the task of the
social sciences to analyse in this way the existence and the functioning of institutions
(such as police forces or insurance companies or schools or governments) and of
social collectives (such as states or nations or classes or other social groups).100
For Popper then, it is clear that theory is designed to serve a very practical purpose.
It can, and should, be concerned with the practical effects of social actions and
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intentions. The emphasis on collectives such as nations or states is of particular
importance here and Popper is suggesting that such collectives should be the subject
of social study. In one sense, Blair is a reasonable subject of Popperian study as the
ex-leader of a social collective, the United Kingdom. Moreover however, Blair's
Chicago speech set out a guide for social collectives - other (liberal) nations - on
when and how to act in certain social situations.
Popper takes a problem-solving approach to philosophy: what are the key problems
to be solved and what light can social theory shed on them? He refers to trying to
identify and tackle the problem situations of the day.101 That is just what Blair
attempts to do in his speech; he is seeking to set out what he anticipates the
international problems of the twenty-first century to be and how states might address
them. Tony Blair, as we shall see, firmly advocates the normative desirability of
liberal states and the ability of those states to influence the creation of a more liberal
world order.102 This should be of considerable interest to contemporary Popperians
not least because ofPopper's assertion that despite its troubles, our social world (that
of liberal democratic states) is 'by far the best society which has come into existence
during the course of human history'.103 Blair was not only in a position to advance
and defend such a conception of society but actually undertook interventions that had
the defence of such society as a central aim.
Popper's interest in the work of Plato, Hegel and Marx was in the practical effects he
contended were the results of pursuing the philosophical schematics of those
thinkers: effects that, in Popper's view, tended to close rather than open societies.
Now I am not suggesting that Blair sets out a philosophical position that bears
comparison with Plato, Hegel or Marx. Popper does however seek to advance the
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thesis that 'the world is ruled by ideas: ideas both good and bad'.104 It need not
necessarily be philosophers that outline those ideas and rarely will it be philosophers
who are charged with implementing those ideas. In his position as Prime Minister,
Blair was well placed not only to espouse ideas on the international stage but put
ideas into action backed, on occasion, by military force.
In critiquing the Platonic idea of the philosopher king, Popper contrasts it with what
he regards as the 'simplicity and humaneness of Socrates, who warned the statesman
against the danger of being dazzled by his own power, excellence, and wisdom'.105
The extent to which Blair was so dazzled during his time in office is a matter for
debate beyond this thesis but the important point for present purposes is that
statesmen represent crucial subjects of study from a Popperian perspective. Let us
remember that the overriding concern of Popper's political philosophy is power and
how it is wielded.106 As a powerful political leader Blair had, and took, the
opportunity to wield political power on the international stage. Understanding the
bases on which he did so is useful ifwe want to pursue a Popperian approach
whereby philosophy addresses itself to current problem situations, to social
collectives and to practical applications that can guide statesmen and through them,
their states.
4.2 Promoting and Defending Open Society: The Doctrine of the
International Community
Blair dedicated his Chicago speech 'to the cause of internationalism and against
isolationism'.107 His appeal was of course to national governments not to isolate
themselves in the face of international and global challenges that he argued require
international cooperation if they were to be dealt with successfully. The speech was
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set against the backdrop of Kosovo and NATO military action there and he sought to
108
place events in the Balkans in a wider context - economic, political and security.
Blair refers to the NATO intervention as constituting a 'just war' and one based 'not
on any territorial ambitions but on values'. As far as the former Prime Minister was
concerned at stake was the nature of the world order and the extent to which it was,
or could be, a liberal one.
Popper's philosophical war against those that he deemed to be enemies of open
society also had values at its heart and he too was motivated by a desire to bring
about a more liberal world order. Popper held with Marx, to whom he was
sympathetic despite identifying his work overall as antagonistic to open society, that
'our responsibility extends to the system, to the institutions which we allow to
persist'.109 This is a responsibility that Blair appears to have accepted in relation to
Kosovo; in his speech he sets out a vision of a liberal world order and offers a set of
criteria for assessing potential cases of liberal or humanitarian intervention. Popper
does not specify the precise system or institutions that we are to be responsible for
but he does make clear that whether or not to defend liberal values and principles is a
choice for individuals to make. As he puts it, humans may not be equal 'but we can
decide to fight for equal rights. Human institutions such as the state are not rational,
but we can decide to fight to make them more rational'.110 This argument was
framed by Popper in a domestic context and thus it is a matter of some speculation as
to how he intended it to apply internationally but even so one of the central tenets of
Popper's thought is that institutions should be judged on the contribution that they
make to the welfare of individuals. Viewed from this perspective, Popperian
philosophy does at least hold open the prospect of some form of liberal intervention
where the state is inflicting severe harm on individuals.
According to Blair these issues have become more acute in the period since the end
of the Cold War as the world has become at once more fragmented, in not being split
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into two hostile Superpower blocs, and also more integrated through technological
advances and transformed economic and working practices as a consequence of
globalisation.1" Central to Blair's argument is that globalisation is not merely an
economic phenomenon but that it also has important political and security
components. Instability in one part of the world is likely to have ramifications
elsewhere and on this basis Blair proclaims that 'we are all internationalists now,
whether we like it or not'.112 Vincent is one theorist that discerns a strong
internationalist element to Popper's thought, indeed a cosmopolitan strand, although
he concedes that Popper 'did not really work this idea out in any detail'.113
According to Vincent, Popper's cosmopolitan instincts envisaged the finding of
substantive common ground among liberal states to create an international moral and
legal structure alongside a shared concern for rationalism and science.114 The
interpretation of Popper's thought on international politics provided by Vincent hints
at its close familial resemblance to Kant's notion of perpetual peace and also
indicates that Popper did not pose a fundamental challenge to the concept of the
nation state as the building block of international order.115 Blair, in the
internationalist mode of his Chicago speech, proceeds on the basis of a similar
assumption regarding inter-state cooperation. Tamir may be inclined to modify his
'we are all internationalists now' claim to 'we are all internationalist liberal
nationalists' now since Blair stresses repeatedly both the opportunities to engage and
collaborate with other countries as well as the international scope of threats that can
emanate from within national borders.116
Tony Blair speaks of mutual dependence and 'that national interest is to a significant
extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent
debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international
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endeavour'.117 Popper's philosophy of open society can make a contribution to such
a debate but is best placed to do so by accepting, with Blair, the concept of the nation
state as a starting premise. For all that Blair's speech references and seeks to
promote international cooperation and the recognition of 'global' issues it remains
predicated on an understanding of the prevalence and endurance of national interests.
Popper may have regarded the very concept of national interest to be something of
an absurdity118 but that does not mean that Popperians following in his wake need
necessarily adopt the same approach to this particular question. Popper's
philosophical dismissal of nationalism and the nation state is somewhat at odds with
his general acceptance of the status quo in international politics whereby he viewed
the prospects of progress in broadly similar terms to Blair: that of attending to the
internal nature of political units (states) and hoping that the growth of liberal states
would enhance cooperation and strengthen the international rule of law. Although
Popper could see no reason for the nation state to occupy its place as a 'fundamental
political category' he did not in effect make any systematic attempt to reformulate
the state as a post-national category.119 Blair's speech also refrains from any such
attempt and the term international in the title indicates at the very outset that his
primary objective is to set out a vision for nations to come together and work
together in the creation of a refined world order; a world order based still on nation
states and created by them acting in concert, at least those who share the
international values that Blair espouses.
Liberal Interventionism and the Continuation ofHistory
Blair's optimism regarding the 'principles of international community' is tempered
120
to some extent by the 'decade of experience since the end of the Cold War'. In a
disavowal of the neo-conservative view made famous by Fukuyama he states that 'it
has certainly been a less easy time than many hoped in the euphoria that followed the
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Fukuyama concluded that history had reached its end with the Berlin Wall's collapse
and that liberal democracy had won an ultimate triumph George Soros saw that the
battle for liberty, democracy and open society was just beginning. Soros concluded
that the collapse of communism provided a critical opportunity to fight for the cause
of open society where it had been absent or suppressed and realised that it would not
simply appear automatically out of the rubble of the Wall or the vacuum left by the
communist demise.
For his part Blair accepts that despite the triumph that was the end of the Cold War it
also brought to an end a degree of clarity and simplicity in international affairs.122
Blair notes that in the post-Cold War period Britain's armed forces have been busier
than ever, tasked with delivering humanitarian aid, deterring attacks on defenceless
people, enforcing UN resolutions and engaging in wars such as in the Gulf and in the
Balkans.123 Blair is clear as to what must be done to render the post-Cold War world
less disorderly and based on what he calls 'our values' by which he presumably
means the Western values that he deems himself to share with his American
audience.
'Now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our existence as states
under threat. Now are actions are guided by a more subtle blend ofmutual self
interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and
interests merge. Ifwe can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law,
human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The
spread of our values makes us safer'.124
Blair's argument starts out by implying that the end of the Cold War removed a
framework of international politics and that the opportunity exists to utilise the
changed circumstances to construct, or to use a more Popperian term, re-engineer, a
new one.
The subtleties that Blair perceives of greater mutual interest blended with clarity of
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moral purpose to defend shared values represent for him a merger that opens up a
path toward greater security that can be paved by the spread of those values. The
fact that Blair uses the term 'open society' is noteworthy and suggests the broad
outlines of a merging of his liberal internationalism and the promotion of the
particular form of liberalism that Popper advocated. The safety that Popper sought
to ensure was that of the individual and he argues that for this purpose 'protective
institutions are necessary, both on a regional and on a world-wide scale'.12:1 The
manner in which Popper reaches this conclusion is particularly interesting and
revealing.
Popper contends that the protection of the individual can be enhanced and extended
internationally but clearly recognises that in many states individuals are already very
well protected at the domestic level.
'From the protectionist point of view, the existing democratic states, though far from
perfect, represent a very considerable achievement in social engineering of the right
kind. Many forms of crime, of attack on the rights of human individuals by other
individuals, have been practically suppressed or very considerably reduced, and
courts of law administer justice fairly successfully in difficult conflicts of interest.
There are many who think that the extension of these methods to international crime
and international conflict is only a Utopian dream; but it is not so long since the
institution of an effective executive for upholding civil peace appeared Utopian to
those who suffered under the threats of criminals, in countries where at present civil
peace is quite successfully maintained'.126
Here Popper reveals a number of aspects to his thought that highlight the potential
compatibility of open society and the nation state.
Firstly, and most significantly of all. Popper endorses 'existing democratic states' as
representing a considerable and valuable achievement of social engineering which he
describes as being of the correct sort. This endorsement has far reaching
implications: it highlights that Popper is comfortable in supporting and promoting
open societies in the plural so long as they are democratically constituted;
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furthermore, many of the existing democratic states to which Popper refers are
nation states and thus his endorsement, albeit indirectly, includes democratic nation
states. A democratic nation state that applies the rule of law equally and impartially,
and that upholds human rights within its jurisdiction is to be regarded as a positive
piece of social engineering on this account. By referring to existing states and
suggesting that they have already made considerable progress, Popper hints once
more at a conservative element to his political philosophy. This is fundamentally
important to any attempt to apply Popperian principles today because it holds out the
prospect of preserving existing institutions and structures in circumstances where
they can be demonstrated to offer protection to individuals as well as having their
foundations in the principles of open society. Liberal democratic nation states do
offer institutional protection to individuals and can, as Blair suggests in his speech,
function as open societies domestically and supporters of such a concept beyond
their borders.
Popper's use of the word 'countries' is further evidence of his acceptance of a range
of political states with defined borders as a basis for the establishment and continued
provision of protective institutions. The above passage is a clear example of a case
in which Popper ends up a supporter of particular types of nation states on account of
the liberties that they permit and the democratic nature of the politics conducted
within them. He does not say that liberal democratic countries have been poorly
engineered because they remain nations but rather he prefers to focus on their liberal,
democratic and open qualities.
One further point of interest that merits noting here is Popper's respect for those
states that are able to successfully maintain civil peace. This brings Popper's notion
of the state, and its primary function, much closer to that set out by both Oakeshott
and Gray. Indeed Gray argues that the most urgent engineering task is that of
rehabilitating the state in those parts of the world that can be characterised by 'the
absence of effective government of any kind'.127 Where Popper and Gray disagree is
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that for the former such rehabilitation need not necessarily be liberal in nature but for
the latter the maintenance of civil peace requires liberal institutions.128 Blair's
doctrine of the international community more closely resembles Popperian liberalism
than Gray's pluralism as the values of liberty and open society are stressed by Blair
as key component parts of bringing about enhanced global security, or to put it
slightly differently, a more international civil peace.
Tony Blair states that identifying the appropriate circumstances that would justify
intervention in the affairs of any particular sovereign state is 'the most pressing
foreign policy problem' facing the international community.129 Blair's Chicago
speech was of course given several years prior to the events of September 11th 2001
and also the subsequent US-led, and Blair government supported, invasions of both
Afghanistan and Iraq. It is at least arguable that the acuteness of the problem
regarding the justification of overruling the principle of non-interference has grown
in the period since the intervention in Iraq. Humanitarian intervention is defined by
Caney as intervention that has as one of its primary aims the protection and welfare
of the members of another political regime.130 In Chicago in 1999 Blair set out 'five
major considerations' that he held must be borne in mind in circumstances whereby
the international community sought to decide when and whether to instigate an
intervention, humanitarian or otherwise.
These five considerations are (1) the sureness of the case, Blair accepts that war is
but an 'imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress' but concludes that it
can sometimes be the 'only means' of dealing with dictators; (2) that all diplomatic
options have been exhausted prior to embarking upon military intervention; (3) that
practical assessment is undertaken of the situation in order to determine that there are
sensible, prudent and viable military operations that can be executed; (4) that
preparation and commitment is made for the long term where necessary and Blair
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suggests that it is not credible or helpful to 'simply walk away when the fight is
over'; and finally (5), in my view rather peculiarly, that national interests are
involved. Blair accepts that these are not 'absolute tests' but are the kind of issues
that need to be considered in debating and deciding questions of intervention.131
A Popperian Assessment of Blair's Criteria for Intervention
To examine from a Popperian perspective the five considerations which make up
Blair's case for liberal or humanitarian intervention it is first necessary to determine
Popper's general attitude and approach to interventions and, more broadly, the use of
violence to advance a political cause. Whilst this is another instance whereby
Popper does not develop anything so comprehensive as a 'doctrine", such as that
espoused by Blair, Popper does give several key indications of the sorts of
considerations that he regards as pertinent to such questions. It is in dismissing what
he perceives to be Marx's 'prophecy of a possibly violent revolution' that Popper
admits to not being against violent revolution 'in all cases and under all
1 ^9
circumstances'.
Now it must be mentioned that Popper talks here primarily in a domestic context and
the 'revolution' to which he refers is that of citizens rising up against their own
government under certain circumstances. For our purposes however that need not
detract from Popper's wider point on the use of violence which is that it 'is justified
only under a tyranny which makes reform without violence impossible, and it should
have only one aim, that is, to bring about a state of affairs which makes reform
without violence possible'.133 This, Popper contends, is the limit of achievement that
should be attempted by violent means.134 He does however consider one further use
of violence to be justified: that is 'resistance, once democracy has been attained, to
any attack (whether from within or without the state) against the democratic
constitution and the use of democratic methods'.135 Popper's justification for the
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employment of violent means highlights that he takes a more restrictive view of what
can and should be achieved by violence than that argued by Blair. Specifically, it is
democracy that is the overriding and fundamental criterion that could justify
interventionist violence from a Popperian perspective rather than the wider range of
criteria, including humanitarian distress, which Blair sets out. Popper's stance also
suggests that he would be supportive of international efforts to support democrats in
particular countries who may be engaged in a struggle for democracy, violently or
otherwise.
The second general Popperian point that merits scrutiny in this context is the
thoroughly dismissive approach that Popper takes regarding the principle of national
self-determination, a principle that he considers to be inapplicable.136 It was, Popper
believes, Woodrow Wilson's profound error, despite being a 'sincere democrat', to
introduce the principle of national self-determination so firmly into international
politics and allow it to constitute the foundation ofworld order.137 In his notes
Popper describes national self-determination as a 'reactionary' principle and one that
is at odds with open society.
Furthermore, Popper suggests that national self-determination is particularly
inapplicable in Europe 'where the nations (i.e. linguistic groups) are so densely
packed that it is quite impossible to disentangle them'.138 The claim that Popper
makes here is significant because not only does he accept that there is a conception
of nationhood that has been applied in practice, in contrast to his earlier contention
that the national state is inapplicable and has never been clearly conceived, but he
also declines the opportunity to develop a systematic alternative. Popper is left to
conclude his chapter on 'Hegel and the new tribalism' by endorsing Schopenhauer's
disdain for Hegelianism and asserting that to forcefully combat the influence of
Hegel's nationalism is a duty incumbent upon all those who seek to defend liberty.139
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Popper does not offer an explanation as to why the density of nations in Europe
precludes the application of national self-determination and history suggests that it
has not.
The crucial outcome of Popper's attack here however is that it reveals his
recognition of the reality and existence of the nation state as a form ofpolitical
community. He does so perhaps unwittingly, perhaps self-consciously but
grudgingly; either way, he does recognise the nation in attacking it. In light of this it
is particularly ironic that Popper should caution a very striking warning that the
nation state is a concept that can all too often seep virtually unnoticed into political
thought and provide its backdrop and its agenda.
'It is so widely accepted in our day that it is usually taken for granted, and very often
unconsciously so. It now forms, as it were, an implicit assumption of popular
political thought. It is even considered by many to be the basic postulate of political
ethics'.140
The problem for Popper is that he fails to consistently heed his own warning and
thus struggles to defend himself against Tamir's charge that most liberals are liberal
nationalists, however unconsciously they may find themselves adopting such a
position. In my thesis the concern is not only to demonstrate that Popper is
vulnerable to being labelled a liberal nationalist on Tamir's terms but more
importantly to argue that this need not be a negative outcome in that it does not
fundamentally undermine the philosophy of open society.
Tony Blair appears to assume the concept of the nation state, more or less take it for
granted and also postulate it as the basis for an international political ethics. Thus
Blair has little qualms over using the language of'national interests' and seeks only
to qualify the principle of non-interference that underpins national self-determination
and not 'jettison' it.141 Popper on the other hand proceeds to dismiss national self-
determination, as indeed the very concept of the nation, as inapplicable whilst
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simultaneously granting the notion of a linguistic community variant of the nation
and more remarkably still, as we saw earlier, referring to the success of democratic
countries as approximating the ideals of his philosophy in resembling open societies.
Blair thus starts from the premise that intervention concerns instances of the
international community of nations deciding to intervene in the internal affairs of a
particular state and we have already encountered the criteria that he argues must be
met if any such intervention is to be legitimate, justified, and also carry a likelihood
of success in terms of achieving liberal or humanitarian aims.
Popper's own philosophy is rather more ambiguous on the question of intervention
and that can in large part be explained by the ambiguities and inconsistencies that
surround Popper's account and treatment of the nation state. Nevertheless, the
humanitarian and individualistic principles that underpin Popper's philosophy hold
open the prospect of developing a Popperian doctrine of the international
community, or at least of international politics. The question remains as to how
close Blair's doctrine, with its explicit commitment to open society, comes to
accommodating Popperian principles and serving as a template for international
efforts to both promote and defend open societies. Can Popperians find common
ground with Blair on the basis of the former Prime Minister's claim that 'we cannot
turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if
we want still to be secure'?142 The crucial consideration from the perspective of
Popper's philosophy concerns the circumstances in which violence can be employed
in defence or support of democracy in order to create the conditions necessary for
open society.
Popper's approach to international politics and Blair's doctrine of the international
community bear comparison because both seek to advance a liberal agenda that
assumes and implies the primacy of the West and both take as a starting point a
world comprised of nation states, albeit with Blair being far more positively disposed
to such a starting point. Blair's thesis is that the interdependence of states means that
142 Blair, Doctrine Speech, 1999
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non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state as a governing principle
of international order must be qualified in circumstances whereby actions of a
particular state can have serious security implications for neighbouring states or the
wider international community. Blair cites the example of oppression causing
massive refugee flows that may destabilise neighbours and constitute a threat to
international peace and security.143 Blair speaks the language of national interest,
and frames his argument in that general context, but the adoption of his doctrine
would have the potential to protect individuals threatened by oppressive and
totalitarian states. This potential effect of Blair's doctrine would accord with
Popper's overriding commitment to humanitarianism and individualism.
To return to Blair's five major considerations then, we can assess them from a
Popperian perspective in terms of the extent to which they would help establish
humanitarian individualism as a principle of international politics as well as the
contribution they would make to extending and entrenching democracy as a
foundation of open societies. Blair's first consideration is the acknowledgement that
war, or military intervention, is an imperfect means of advancing a humanitarian
cause but nevertheless may be the most appropriate means of dealing with dictators.
By identifying dictators as a threat to international peace and security Blair adopts a
position of close proximity to Popperian philosophy.
Recalling Popper's claim that totalitarianism is to be resisted as the 'morality of the
closed society'144 alongside his acceptance that violence has a legitimate role in the
opening up of democratic spaces there is little reason to suppose that Popper would
raise a major objection to Blair's view that armed force may on occasion be required
to confront dictators. Whilst Blair sees the confrontation primarily through the lens
of collaborative national interest, Popper would more likely contemplate such
confrontation on the basis of protecting individuals. Ifwe think of Blair's decision
to support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, he took the decision on a national
security prospectus with the focus being the alleged Weapons ofMass Destruction
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programme of the Iraqi regime. Had he argued the case from a more Popperian point
of view he would have placed greater emphasis on the moral case to prevent harm
done to individuals by a brutal dictator and also to create the opportunity for future
reform without the need for violence by establishing democratic conditions.
The second doctrinal consideration that Blair mentions is that all diplomatic options
must be exhausted prior to embarking on military intervention. Again, there is no
reason for Popper to dissent from this criterion especially as he places such a great
stress on the avoidance of violence where possible. His support for democratic
principles and institutions emphasises democracy as 'an invaluable battle-ground for
any reasonable reform, since it permits reform without violence'.145 Non-violent
reform is one of the key principles ofPopper's political philosophy and this would
include reform of a kind that sought to establish democracy where it is lacking. If
this can be achieved non-violently by diplomatic methods then such interventions
should be prioritised by Popperians over military ones.
Blair's third and fourth considerations are more strategic and tactical
recommendations than they are principles underlying a political doctrine. He
cautions that practical assessment must be made as to the availability of 'prudent'
military options and also that commitment be made for the long term if necessary
when undertaking an intervention. The first point is uncontroversial since imprudent
military options are hardly likely to attract much support. The point about long term
commitment and exit strategies is more debatable however, including from a
Popperian perspective. This is due to Popper's contention that the use of violence
should have but a single aim, that of establishing democracy.146 A long term
intervention that sought to go beyond the sole objective of democratisation would
therefore lack legitimacy when examined in light of Popper's political philosophy. It
could be accepted however that establishing democratic conditions may represent a
long term task in itself and in practical terms it is unlikely that democratisation could
or should be divorced from broader interventionist objectives such as the provision
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of physical security or the control of dangerous weapons.
The final consideration that Blair sets out is whether or not national interests are
involved with the suggestion being that they should be if an intervention is to be
seriously contemplated on the part of a particular nation state. For Popperians, this
would be perhaps the most contentious consideration as the invocation of national
interest could be construed as being at odds with the principle of humanitarianism, at
least in relation to the manner in which the humanitarian principle is set out by
Popper. He perceives the existence of a very close relationship between
humanitarianism and rationalism and this leads him to define a particular conception
of the humanitarian principle.
'A direct emotional attitude towards the abstract whole of mankind seems to me
hardly possible. We can love mankind only in certain concrete individuals. But by
the use of thought and imagination, we may become ready to help all who need our
help'.147
Humankind as a whole, as an entity, is deemed by Popper to be too abstract a notion
to provoke strong emotional attachment to it on the part of individuals. In particular,
he argues that so strong an emotion as love does not extend to a concept as
abstracted as humanity. Rather, Popper supposes, human individuals love other
concrete, specific individuals that are known to them. Reason however permits and
facilitates a wider recognition of need and sympathy; thus we can identify those who
may require assistance from us and feel sufficiently for their plight to grant it. It is
not surprising that Popper refers to the use of imagination since he regards reasoning
as a creative activity. One of the important implications of the account that Popper
gives of humanitarianism is to reinforce his position on the nation state as fellow
nationals would also be regarded as too abstract to be bound to us by strong
emotional bonds.
This raises two very significant issues that Popper's philosophy takes very little heed
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of. The first is that his explanation of the humanitarian principle suggests that
humanitarianism as a political and moral concept relies on reason to a far greater
extent than emotion. It should be reiterated in this context that for Popper an appeal
to reason is itself a moral appeal. If Popper is correct on this point then it is to be
wondered why charity appeals, and international appeals especially, tend to feature
strong emotional content. This also returns us to the question of welfare and the
communal bonds, if any, needed to support and sustain it. If reason demands a
readiness to recognise and aid all who need our help then it is curious that Popper
seemed to so readily accept the existence of national welfare states and that he did
not make a far greater attempt to argue the case for international or global
distributive justice. Indeed, as we saw earlier, the humanitarian demands that Popper
makes of justice - equalitarianism, individualism and the protection of the freedom
of citizens - can all be realised within the nation state.148
The second implication of Popper's characterisation of humanity as an abstract
concept is that it is not radically differentiated from the qualified 'humanistic
tradition' that Tamir invokes in her defence of liberal nationalism.149 The issue at
stake in this debate is the degree of abstractedness that the respective theorists are
prepared to recognise. For Popper there appears to exist a fairly simple
philosophical dichotomy for any particular individual between concrete and known
other individuals who can inspire the emotion of love and abstract and unknown
other individuals to whom little emotional connection may be felt but with whom a
sympathetic and rational understanding can be shared.
Tamir, by contrast, regards the nation state as providing something of an intermediate
position between love amongst known individuals and the abstract recognition of
humanity as a whole. Thus she describes, and defends, nations as associative
communities rather than as strictly voluntary associations.150 Tamir would not
dispute that nations retain an abstract quality but the crucial argument is that the
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degree of abstractedness is sufficiently constrained, by a shared language for
example in many cases, to produce feelings of communal identity.151 Popper, as we
know, rejects the politics of identity but he does so without going to any great
lengths in seeking to understand the possibility of its enduring appeal. The only
mention that Popper makes of national interests comes towards the end of his second
volume on open society and it is to dismiss them as leading to irrationalism.152 He
explains his problem with national interests as being that they divide humankind
'into the few who stand near and the many who stand far; into those who speak the
untranslatable language of our own emotions and passions and those whose tongue is
not our tongue'.153 Where such divides are created Popper takes the view that
'political equalitarianism becomes practically impossible'.154 Popper does not
explain why the division of humanity, along national lines or any other, in itself rules
out the practical application of equalitarianism in politics.
It has already been pointed out that his humanitarian theory ofjustice, and the
equalitarian principle at the centre of it, is not invalidated by the existence of the
nation state as a form ofpolitical community. Equalitarianism need not be
abandoned in making the case for a world comprised of national open societies. In
this scenario equalitarianism can be championed by the insistence that all
individuals, on account of being human, are entitled to a set of fundamental rights
and liberties, including that of democratic participation. The practical task then
becomes that of seeking to ensure that all states are structured and governed in a way
so as to grant those rights and liberties. A national form of the state is one plausible
means of achieving this, a fact that Popper implicitly concedes with his praise for
Western democratic states.155
As far as Tony Blair is concerned national interests do not represent major
impediments to the pursuit and achievement of either humanitarian or equalitarian
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goals. In fact Blair argues that national interests should be taken into consideration
when contemplating interventions; that is to say that where national interests are at
stake the case for intervention is strengthened. By including a national interest
criterion in his doctrine Blair not only signals his intent that nation states should
remain entrenched as the foundations of world order and major actors of
international politics but also implies that strictly humanitarian principles can be
qualified to some extent by national interests. Blair's doctrine shows him to be a
liberal (inter)nationalist in that he seeks to combine the primacy of the nation state
with a broader commitment to humanitarianism. This brings his doctrine close to the
sort of approach advocated by Tamir. She argues for example that 'it is justified for
a nation to seek homogeneity by restricting immigration only if it has fulfilled its
global obligation to assure equality among all nations' in terms of efforts to reduce
disparities in standards of living.156 Whilst Popper conceives of providing help to
individuals purely as individuals both Tamir and Blair seek to aid individuals but
also the communities, often national communities, of which they are a part.
For all that Blair's national interest criterion may be a practical consideration and an
attempt to capture the likelihood of sovereign national governments deciding to
intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state, it does carry the potential to
detract from the aim of intervention that Blair himself sets at the outset - that of
dealing with dictators and righting humanitarian distress. This aim presumably holds
irrespective of national interests being at stake. From a Popperian point of view, the
Blair doctrine does not require major adaptation in order to be adopted as a
framework for the promotion and defence of open societies around the world. To do
so however, twenty-first century Popperians have to be prepared to find a greater
accommodation with the nation state than Popper did, even although he, as has been
argued, was less hostile to the concept in practice than he supposed himself to be.
Tony Blair perceives a world of nation states and national interests and asks how the
impulse towards interdependence, driven in his view by globalisation, can be
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harnessed in the cause of internationalism and humanitarianism.157 F°r those
committed to the principles of open society and the liberties that Popper held to be
most fundamental, Blair's is a sensible question to be asking. A neo-Popperian
philosophy can answer it: one that takes nation states as a starting point and seeks to
encourage them to become open societies; a philosophy that recognises, as Popper
did, that democracy can on occasion have to be defended or even established by
force; and a philosophical position that can seek the protection of individuals whilst
accepting that does not require the elimination of national states and national
political communities.
Blair's speech sought to argue for the qualification of the principle of national self-
determination and he made his argument on liberal grounds; Popper refused to
recognise such a principle but declined to make a systematic case for a more
cosmopolitan alternative. Instead, he accepted the nation state, or at least western
liberal democratic versions of it, almost by default. It is possible to argue that every
state should be structured and governed as an open society and so universalise the
concept in this way. Neo-Popperians have the option of making this their aim,
allying themselves with Blair's doctrine of the international community, and
recognising nation states as potential vehicles for instituting open societies.
The next section of the chapter looks at what can be regarded as a neo-Popperian
philosophy - that which has been adopted by the billionaire financier and
philanthropist George Soros in his attempts to promote and support open societies
across the globe. Soros makes for an interesting object of study here because not
only does he expressly commit to furthering and implementing Popper's political
philosophy, he also has the financial means and international influence to have made
a significant contribution to doing so. With the establishment of his Open Society
Institute, Soros has funded a range of initiatives designed to spread open societies
internationally, particularly in former communist states and spent vast sums in the
process. It is worth considering the ways in which Soros has gone about his task
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along with the interpretation of Popper's philosophy that he employs in order to
learn lessons as to the prospects of furthering the cause of open society in a world
comprised of nation states.
Instituting Open Societies
George Soros describes his book entitled "Open Society: Reforming Global
Capitalism' as a work of 'practical philosophy' that aims to provide the 'guiding
principles for a global open society'.158 It is crucial to note however what Soros
means by a global open society or at least the path toward achieving it. He states
that he is advocating 'that the democracies of the world ought to form an alliance
with the dual purpose of, first, promoting the development of open societies within
individual countries and, second, strengthening international law and the institutions
needed for a global open society'.159 The possible tension between a global open
society and a multitude of open societies across the globe has already been raised in
this thesis and it also features in Soros' thinking on the subject. It is clear however
that Soros views the two positions as complimentary since he argues for the
promotion of open societies 'within' countries alongside taking steps to strengthen
both international institutions and law to facilitate the creation of a global society
that is more open than at present.
I use the term creation in relation to global society because Soros perceives that the
development of a global economy has not resulted in a corresponding development
of a global society and further, that 'the basic unit for political and social life remains
the nation state'.160 This highlights one of the main reasons why I think it important
to consider the work of Soros here because he seeks the implementation of a
practical Popperian philosophy that operates with the existing structure of a world
shaped by nation states and national interests. It is clear, as we shall see, that Soros
has his own doctrine for the international community that raises similar issues to
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Blair's in terms of the appropriate limits of national self-determination. Whilst
Blair's doctrine takes account of open society, and makes mention of it, that
elucidated by Soros has the development of open societies as its overriding aim and
ambition. Before looking in more detail at the Open Society Alliance that Soros
proposes it is useful to examine the manner in which he conceptualises open society,
not least because he does so in a more detailed way than Popper.
Promoting Open Society as an Ideal
Whilst Popper defined open society primarily in relation to its enemies Soros
attempts to go beyond this and give thought to the positive purposes that open
societies can acquire in order to command allegiance although he accepts that there
are difficulties inherent in such a task.161 Soros argues, in Popperian fashion, that a
perfect society is not possible and so we must content ourselves with 'an imperfect
society that holds itself open to, and strives for, improvement'.162 Soros is endorsing
here the critical rationalism of Popper by suggesting both that improvement must be
actively sought and that it is not a simple by-product of historical forces. Soros
distinguishes between closed and open societies with the claim that 'closed society
offers the certainty and permanence that is lacking in open society, and open society
offers the freedom that is denied to the individual in closed society'.163 He also
suggests that the closed/open distinction provides a better insight into what was at
stake in the Cold War than the distinction between capitalism and communism.164 In
his broad definition of open society Soros echoes Popper's commitment to the
freedom of the individual and it is such liberty that open societies must seek to
protect.
Where Soros begins to gradually develop and extend Popper's philosophy is with the
introduction of a 'tripartite division similar to water, ice and steam: open society
(near-equilibrium), closed society (static disequilibrium), and chaos or revolution
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(dynamic disequilibrium)'.165 This goes beyond the simple open/closed dichotomy
that Popper generally based his analysis on. Soros perceives open society as
occupying a 'precarious middle ground' between closed society and revolution and
that the 'analogy with water, ice and steam is apt because open society is fluid,
closed society rigid, and revolution chaotic'.166 This not only introduces revolution
as an additional enemy of the open society it also highlights a reaffirmation by Soros
of the conservative strand of Popperian philosophy. In suggesting that chaotic
circumstances pose a threat to open societies Soros aligns himself with Gray who
perceives instability arising from the absence of effective government167 as well as
with Tony Blair who notes that 'we have learnt that big government doesn't work,
but no government works even less'.168
The tripartite distinction drawn by Soros could also be used to distinguish between
liberal nationalism, organic nationalism (as Tamir terms it), and laissez faire
liberalism (what Gray calls the 'global free market'169 and Soros describes as
170 • • p'market fundamentalism' ). The depiction of liberal nationalism provided by
Tamir is of a fluid form of political community that is 'pluralistic and open'171 as
well as placing 'strong emphasis on the possibility and the importance of choice'.172
Organic, or cultural, nationalism by contrast favours 'authoritarian uniformity' and
'preaches the establishment of closed societies' in Tamir's view.173 What's
particularly interesting here is that in distinguishing between two variants of
nationalism Tamir is drawing an open/closed distinction in a manner similar to the
competing Cold War blocs identified by Soros. This highlights that Tamir conceives
liberal nation states as a form of open society and suggests that the nationalism that
Popper decried could well have been of the cultural variant rather than the liberal
alternative. The complexities and variances of types of nationalism that Tamir points
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to were largely overlooked and ignored by Popper. Soros, in accepting the basic
tenet of the nation state, is less susceptible to such a charge and shows that
Popperianism has the potential to reach an accommodation with the nation state in
seeking to further the cause of open society.
Soros concurs to some extent with the distinction between cultural and liberal
nationalism drawn by Tamir. He notes that 'morality can have two sources: tribal
belonging and the universal human condition. It is in the latter that open society
must be anchored'.174 Tamir's point in her defence of the nation state is that liberal
nationalism is indeed anchored in the universal human condition and that being so
does not mean that it cannot simultaneously recognise that individuals are socially
and culturally embedded to a significant degree.175 Both Tamir and Soros are
opposed to tribal belonging; it is as incompatible with liberal nationalism as it is with
open society. In this argument, proponents of liberal nation states and those of open
societies find themselves on the same side.
The issue of social values features prominently in the analysis that Soros conducts.
He suggests that social values are 'rooted in the family, community, background, and
tradition to which the individual belongs, and they evolve in a reflexive fashion'.176
This is actually quite a conservative account of the roots of social values although it
is also one that would likely find agreement with a liberal nationalist such as Tamir.
For his part, Popper does not dispute the notion that values derive from social
contexts and interactions but his concern is to ensure that humans can choose the
values that they wish to guide their conduct and so also be granted the possibility to
choose the sorts of contexts and interactions that make up the social environment.
It is on this basis, as we have seen, that Popper calls for studies of the social
institutions 'through which ideas may spread and captivate individuals' along with
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the ways in which social traditions are created, work, and break down.177 Popper's
overarching goal is to have individuals take on the 'strain of civilization' and choose
1 78
not only the conditions of open society but also the values that underpin it. A lot
of the vagueness that pertains to Popper's political philosophy can be traced back to
the lack of an unambiguous declaration ofwhat is to be understood by taking on the
strain of civilisation. Fortunately, the writings of Soros can be of some help to us
here.
Soros declares firstly that the establishment of a set of fundamental values applicable
to a largely transactional, global society is the supreme challenge of our time.179
Recalling the doubt that Soros casts on the very existence of global society the
challenge that he sets can be regarded as somewhat contradictory. As it turns out
however, his aim is the simultaneous creation of a self-confessedly modest form of
global society with a set of attendant social values. The set of arguments that he
makes in relation to this provide a form of philosophical scaffolding designed to
support a civilisational conception of open society - that which Popper recognises
can place a strain upon individuals.
The starting point in the analysis offered by Soros is to take several steps back from
notions of global society and accept the communitarian account of the encumbered
individual.180 Soros suggests that individuals generate a sense of themselves to a
degree in relation to their social setting, family and culture which in turn can have an
influence on their thinking.181 Flaving encumbered the individual and denoted the
importance of community to individual wellbeing, Soros contends that a globalised
society would be incapable of satisfying encumbered individuals' need to belong and
further, that such a society could never become a community. It would be, he claims,
'just too big and variegated for that, with too many different cultures and traditions'
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so 'those who want to belong to a community must look for it elsewhere'.182 On this
point Soros could not be clearer, whatever global society may become it cannot and
will not be a community. It is destined therefore to remain an abstraction, what
i 0-3
Soros calls 'a universal idea'.
It is with global society being conceptualised ideationally rather than as a concrete
form of community that Soros posits the need for the idea to retain a modesty of
ambition and awareness of its limitations given that it cannot satisfy a need for
belonging.184 He pours particular scorn on the notion of a global state by saying that
this would carry the idea of a global society too far. In doing so he removes from his
philosophy any doubt as to whether he's theorising (the prospect of) a single open
society or a plurality of separate open societies. This is a clearer position than that
adopted by Popper and one that is potentially far more sympathetic to the concept of
the nation state. Soros suggests that all 'open society as a universal idea could do is
to serve as a basis for the rules and institutions that are necessary for the coexistence
of the plethora of individuals and the multiplicity of communities that make up a
global society'.185 The pluralistic stance that Soros adopts here demonstrates his
comfort with a variety of different states cooperating within international institutions
to agree international rules to govern the conduct of international relations and
politics. Whilst the current world order, with states enmeshed in a multitude of
different relationships including within institutions such as the United Nations, may
be fairly far removed from the vision of global society conceived by Soros that order
does not need to be radically re-engineered in terms of the structure of its component
parts (nation states) for reality to brought into closer proximity with the vision.
What, if anything, however, is to bind this prospective society and make it at least
cohesive even if it cannot be rendered a community? For Soros, the answer is to be
found in what he identifies as a 'minimal brotherhood of humanity based on our
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common fallibility, mortality, and ... selfishness'. Although it might be granted
that such things are shared by humanity it is not self-evident that they would be
capable of unifying the plethora and multitudes to which Soros referred into anything
resembling a society on a global basis. In a way, Soros neglects here his own
advocacy ofmodesty for the concept of a global society. It is not strictly necessary
to spell out in advance which qualities possessed by individuals should contribute to
the uniting of humanity. Even if individuals were to recognise such qualities
amongst each other that does not mean that they would conceive of themselves as
forming a global society, however loosely configured, especially given the enduring
cultural and communal difference that Soros anticipates and respects.
Soros is perhaps on surer ground in this respect where he follows Popper's lead and
introduces the idea of enemies to his own conception of open society as universal
idea. There is recognition on Soros' part that a quandary is posed in seeking to
create a global open society because whilst communities are built on the exclusion of
the other, open society aims to be inclusive on a global scale.187 He concludes that
fortunately there are global problems to fight against such as poverty, disease and
188 i •
environmental dangers and therefore 'the enemy need not be a rival state'. This
manner of thinking also informs Blair's doctrine of the international community.
The key objective that Soros sets is to find a common enemy to unite against in order
189
to avoid a 'divided world in which nation states will fight against one another'. In
putting together the case for global open society as a guiding idea Soros effects a
profound alteration ofPopperian philosophy. Whilst Popper sought to avoid a world
divided into nation states altogether, believing nationalism to be an ideology of
closed society, Soros seeks merely to avoid nation states coming into conflict.
History suggests that even Soros's more modest aim remains an ambitious one but is
more clearly conceived than that of Popper's and requires a less fundamental
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transformation of the international system. It strikes a note of conservatism and in
doing so suggests Soros to be a more consistent adherent to the conservative
tradition of thought than Popper.
It has been discussed earlier that conservatism exerted a not inconsiderable influence
on Popper's philosophy but he rather abandons conservative principles in his
analysis of nationalism and the nation state. Popper seems to assume that the nation
state will all but wither away in a world that is increasingly scientific and rational.
Insofar as he acknowledges it at all he regards it as a concept with historical and
tribal roots but does not offer a clear vision of open society as an alternative form of
community, however potentially universal, to take its place.190 Soros does not see an
intrinsic need to theorise open society in opposition to the nation state. Instead, he
accepts the nation as a viable locus of community, and acknowledges that individuals
appreciate a sense of communal belonging, and sets out to render the nation more
open, more liberal, as a form of political community. For him, there is no reason
why the two concepts cannot be brought together, open society need not be pursued
at the expense of the nation state.
As we have encountered, in the view ofGeorge Soros open society as an idea on a
global scale is concerned with the need for international law and international
institutions. The world of course already has both international law and institutions
so it is not a question of creating these from scratch but rather attempting to
(re)engineer them in such a way as to have them encourage the principles of open
society. Soros argues that the overriding need for international law and institutions is
to subordinate national sovereignty to the international common good.191 Fie does
not argue that international institutions should have as their purpose to render
national sovereignty redundant or indeed replace it. Instead, Soros is content to
work with national sovereignty as a component part of the international system and
his ambition is to tame rather than eliminate it. Such an approach, Soros argues,
leads to the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity whereby decisions regarding the
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common good are made at the lowest possible level. In the account of open society
put forward by Soros, nation states retain a position as major and significant actors in
the international system.
Open Society and the Architecture of Global Politics
Soros, like Blair in his international doctrine speech, considers the issue of national
sovereignty and the circumstances in which intervention may be justified. Soros is
concerned that many conflicts arise from relations within sovereign states as well as
that unless or until they spill over borders 'they can fester under the protective
umbrella of national sovereignty'.192 Moreover, there is a greater prospect of states
abusing their power in relation to their own citizens than in relation to other states
because they are subject to fewer constraints in terms of their domestic actions.193
Soros obviously shares Popper's concern to protect individuals, from the power of
the state in particular, and appears to recognise more fully than Popper did that such
protection may have to be externally provided.
In terms of determining legitimate interventions however Soros offers only a vague
framework which includes a presumption against 'punitive intervention'194 - and this
applies to military action, peacekeeping and economic sanctions - and a plea that
'crisis prevention cannot start early enough';195 if prevention is initiated in time then
Soros maintains a hope that diplomatic or economic pressure, as opposed to military
intervention, will in most cases be sufficient.196 These might be sensible principles
to be kept in mind ahead of any prospective intervention but their adoption would
hardly constitute a dramatic shift in the conduct of international politics.
Furthermore a problem remains for Soros with regard to convincing states to engage
in intervention to protect individuals from abuse by their state in circumstances in
which national interests are not directly at stake. After all, in his Chicago speech,
despite seeking to build a broadly humanitarian case for intervention Tony Blair
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nevertheless opted to retain the involvement of national interest as a criterion for
assessing potential interventions.197
As we shall see below Soros, like Blair, produces a doctrine for the international
community to follow. He does so despite reservations that open society is not very
susceptible to being expressed in doctrinal form and thus focuses attention on the
structure of the international community and whether that serves or impedes the
cause of open society.198 He observes that there are various systems generally
recognised as ways of preserving peace and stability with a balance of powers, such
as occurred during the Cold War, being one; the hegemony of an imperial power
representing another; and, Soros suggests, 'an international organisation capable of
effective peacemaking could be a third'.199 There is an implication in this contention
that the UN, as currently constituted, is not an effective peacemaking organisation.
Irrespective of the view taken of the UN, by addressing himself to preserving peace
and stability, Soros risks obscuring his case for the protection of individuals because
peace and stability could ensue between states without much, if any, attempt to
tackle individual suffering within states at the hands of abusive regimes.
An Open Society Alliance
The main task that Soros sets himself in relation to international politics is to
consider the nature of the global political architecture and how that could be
amended so as to enhance the fostering of open societies along with international
rules of conduct. Soros envisages two distinct but related tasks as being necessary to
create a global open society: furthering the development of open societies across the
world and establishing institutions that would 'govern the behaviour of states toward
their citizens and one another'.200 The UN attempts to be such an institution and
whilst Soros maintains considerable doubts over its effectiveness he does still regard
it as an institution of 'great potential'.201 Soros is far from the first to characterise
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the main flaw of the UN as being 'that the goals outlined in the Preamble of its
Charter are couched in terms of "people" whilst the organization itself is structured
in terms of states'.202 Having recognised this flaw in the UN system it is all the more
curious that Soros himself is not slightly more careful to avoid a similar flaw in his
own theorising of international relations and his call for peace and stability.
That said, the vision of a global open society that Soros conceives does indicate a
greater preoccupation with the nature and structure of the states that make up the
international system than is to be found in simple adherence to the principle of
national sovereignty. It might be asked in this context how Soros' view is to be
distinguished from that of neo-conservatives who advocate the forceful spread of
democracy. Firstly, Soros identifies value-pluralism as a facet of his approach and
he rejects as 'fundamentalist belief' positions that rely upon black-and-white, either-
or judgements.203 Soros also refers to the US as 'the greatest open society in the
world' but bemoans its failure to accept the limitations implied by the concept of
open society and its consequent assuming of'the right to impose its own standards
of human rights and democratic values on other countries'.204 In a way, the question
of the limitations implied by the concept of open society gets to the heart of what is
at stake here.
Surely Soros' own purpose, as that of Popper, is to impose or at least encourage
some standard of human rights and democratic values on countries where they are
deemed to be lacking or insufficient. Such concepts may indeed be malleable and
open to a range of interpretation and application but not infinitely so. The value
pluralism that Soros recognises and endorses is actually of quite a narrow and
constrained form; far narrower and subject to much greater constraint than that
advocated by John Gray for example. Soros makes clear his belief that 'there is no
single design for open society. Countries have different traditions, with different
levels of development. What makes a society open is that its citizens are free to
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decide how society should be organized'.205 He does not say how far traditions can
reasonably diverge and still be bracketed together as open nor does he outline the
level of development below which concessions should be permitted, that being the
implication of the claim that the level of development of a particular country will
influence the open society design options available to it.
The Soros Doctrine: Bursting the Bubble ofAmerican Supremacy
In developing something akin to a doctrine of his own, George Soros has taken
particular issue with the policies pursued by the Bush administration and the neo-
conservative philosophy that he regards as underpinning the former President's
approach to foreign policy and international relations.206 In his book 'The Bubble of
American Supremacy', Soros both critiques the neo-conservative approach of
George Bush and elaborates on his own vision for a more constructive and open
international order. In critiquing neo-conservatism Soros draws what he sees to be a
parallel between 'the pursuit ofAmerican supremacy and the boom-bust pattern that
can be observed from time to time in the stock market' 207 To understand this
parallel it is important to note the view that Soros takes of stock market fluctuations,
particularly the more severe fluctuations that prompt either booms or busts.
Economic booms and busts, Soros suggests, stem from misconceptions that come to
distort reality, causing a discrepancy between what people think and the actual state
of affairs.208 Often, such misconceptions and distortions (such as expectations
regarding future property prices for example) are limited by 'self-correcting
processes' whereby if outcomes fail to correspond to expectations then expectations
themselves are adjusted; these circumstances are described by Soros as 'near-
equilibrium conditions'.209 On occasion however, a trend manifested in reality is
reinforced by a market bias or misconception, or indeed vice versa. This can unleash
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a boom-bust process in which 'both the prevailing interpretation and reality itselfare
propelled into far-from-equilibrium territory'.210 Soros gives the example of the
performance of technology stocks at the beginning of this decade as conforming to
this model and property prices in the UK and elsewhere over recent years would be
another example. The interesting point as far as Soros is concerned is that very
similar processes to these boom-bust bubbles can also be found in politics.
The argument that Soros makes is that the Bush administration's 'quest for American
supremacy qualifies as a bubble'.211 Soros explains the bubble ofAmerican
supremacy as follows: there did exist an underlying reality of the US occupying a
dominant role in the world and there also existed a prevailing bias within the Bush
administration, that a competitive and unilateral foreign policy would serve US
interests, and preserve its hegemonic status, much better than a cooperative and
multilateral foreign policy. The pursuit of self-interest was carried too far, Soros
claims, with the neo-conservative belief in maintaining and enhancing American
supremacy primarily by military means. With the terrorist attacks of September 11th,
the administration, at least in the early stages, was able to carry enough of the nation
behind them in support of their doctrine and with the eventual invasion of Iraq, far-
from equilibrium territory was entered.212
Before examining in more detail the alternative options that Soros sketches for
America, and indeed other democratic states, to follow it is helpful to pause and
consider the effectiveness of the bubble analogy and some of the possible
implications of it in terms of theorising international politics. The first thing to note
is that Soros himself accepts that the analogy is imperfect but nevertheless thinks
that it has a degree of utility in shedding light on the predicament created by
intervention in Iraq.213 John Gray considers the parallel between the pursuit of
American supremacy and the boom-bust pattern that is periodically characteristic of
210
Ibid, p. 178.
211 Ibid, p. 179.
212 Soros, Bubble, p. 179.
2lj
Soros, Bubble, p. 177.
206
stock markets to have merit but suggests that Soros underplays the extent to which
religious fundamentalism infused the Bush doctrine.214 Gray may be correct in this
claim but in a sense it does not detract from the general argument that Soros makes
which is in essence about the dangers of pursuing fundamentalist doctrines of any
kind, be they religious, economic, or politico-military. Insofar as neo-conservatism
is either a fundamentalist philosophy/doctrine, or came to be pursued in a
fundamentalist way by the Bush administration, it represents an enemy to open
society because 'it claims possession of an ultimate truth', the truth of the ideology
ofAmerican supremacy.215
Soros is not simply disdainful of claims to ultimate truth; he is especially scornful of
neo-conservative truth claims. By way of example he cites the opening sentence of
the Bush administration's national security strategy; 'The great struggles of the
twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory
for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success:
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise'. Soros contends this statement to be false
on two counts: firstly, that there is, he suggests, no single, sustainable model for
national success, and secondly that America's success is owed to its dominant
position at the centre of the global capitalist system, a position that is thus denied to
other states.216 It is the first charge of falsehood here that is more relevant and more
interesting.
Once again Soros appears torn between pluralism and making a robust defence of the
particular form of liberalism, as defined by the concept of open society, which he
advocates. It is rather strange that Soros is so reluctant to endorse a single model for
national success because that is what he is proposing in general terms with his
support for the adoption of the principles of open society in every country. Let us
recall that 'fostering the development of open societies throughout the world' is one
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of the two key tasks that Soros envisages as necessary to embed the concept of open
917
society on a global scale. Moreover, Soros does not refrain from setting out a
series of conditions, developed by the President of his foundation, which should be
satisfied in order for a society to qualify as open. These include free and fair
elections, a free and pluralistic media, an independent judiciary, constitutional
protection for minority rights, a market economy that respects property rights, a
*i* • 218commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, and anti-corruption laws.
This list is far more precise than any offered by Popper but having proposed it Soros
immediately retreats from it by producing caveats such as that 'fallibility allows for a
broad range of cultural divergences' and that the 'Western intellectual tradition ought
not to be imposed indiscriminately on the rest of the world in the name of universal
values'.219 More surprising still is the conclusion that Soros draws in claiming that
'the Western form of representative democracy may not be the only form of
government compatible with an open society'.220 Leaving aside whether or not
representative democracy is a peculiarly Western electoral device, and indeed the
merits of other democratic compositions such as more direct forms of democracy, it
is obvious that an undemocratic society cannot be regarded as open in a Popperian
sense. The ambiguity of the claim made by Soros here obscures the case that he is
seeking to build. By employing the term 'form of government' rather than form of
democracy he leaves this claim open to the interpretation that undemocratic forms of
government may not be entirely incompatible with the concept of open society.
I do not think that Soros intends to concede the prospect of open societies that are
not democratically constituted but if he does he puts himself at odds with Popper. As
we have seen, Popper was considerably less hesitant in proclaiming what he
regarded as the superiority ofwestern democracies on account of them being more
favourably disposed to reform.221 It appears somewhat as though Soros is overly
217
Soros, Open Society, p.308.
218
Soros, Open Society, p.133.
219
Soros, Open Society, p. 134.
220
Soros, Open Society, p. 134.
221
Popper, In Search ofa Better World, p.13.
208
cautious out of a concern not to appear to be advocating any kind of fundamentalist
doctrine in order to distance himself from neo-conservatism. In fact Soros admits
that his vision 'is not diametrically opposed to the policies adopted by the advocates
ofAmerican supremacy' since there is agreement that the United States cannot, and
should not, avoid intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.222 The
difference between the Soros and Bush doctrines concerns the grounds on which
intervention is legitimated and also the extent to which it is multilaterally oriented.
Exploration of the differences between these two positions reveals the importance of
the concept of sovereignty to both and the manner in which the concept is
interpreted. It also reveals that both philosophies, the Popperian liberalism of Soros
and the neo-conservatism of the Bush administration, continue to subscribe to the
centrality of the nation state as a framework of international politics.
Sovereignty, Intervention and World Order
Like many before him Soros considers the Treaty ofWestphalia of 1648 to be the
point at which sovereignty became the cornerstone of international relations and that
is has remained as such ever since. He also suggests that despite the attempt to take
sovereignty by the people that was the French Revolution, in practice sovereignty
has come to be exercised by governments with a dynastic concept of sovereignty
being superseded by a national one.223 More importantly, Soros regards it as Utopian
to think that sovereignty will cease to be the basis ofworld order any time soon.224
This has significant implications for attempts to institute open society as a concept
across the world and helps to further explain the accommodation that Soros appears
to have reached with the nation state as a form ofpolitical community. The
endurance of state sovereignty as the foundation of world order poses two challenges
according to Soros for those who do not wish to see repressive regimes protected
from external interference: firstly, who has the authority to intervene in the internal
affairs of sovereign states, and secondly, on what grounds?225
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Interestingly, an almost identical dilemma is posited by Francis Fukuyama who
contends that the central project of contemporary international politics has become
that of determining how to promote governance ofweak states, improve their
democratic legitimacy, and strengthen self-sustaining institutions.226 Such a project
accords with Popper's concern that freedom is absent where it is not secured by the
state and further that 'only a state which is controlled by free citizens can offer them
any reasonable security at all'.227 States which do not permit their citizens control of
them, via opportunity for democratic participation, are illegitimate from a Popperian
perspective and intervention to rectify such a situation can be justified within the
framework of Popper's philosophy.228 What is crucial to reiterate is that Popper's
chief concern in relation to the state is the extent of the power it wields and the
ability of citizens to control and direct that power by democratic means rather than
whether or not a particular state is a nation state. The project identified by
Fukuyama also has affinity with Soros' proposition that open society is threatened or
undermined in chaotic circumstances as well as by the rigidity of closed society.229
Fukuyama argues that the state building project he advocates is attractive on a series
of grounds - humanitarian, security and economic.230 It is possible and reasonable to
add the promotion of open societies to his list.
The convergences and divergences that emerge from a comparison of the views and
approaches of Soros and Fukuyama merit exposition and analysis for the light that
they shed on the nature of the international system, the prospects of reforming it and
the role that the concept of open society as well as that of the nation state may play
in any prospective reform. Both Soros and Fukuyama recognise that sovereignty
should and does have its limits and thus Fukuyama claims that few people are now
willing to defend the principle of sovereignty in a pure form. Fie suggests that 'not
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all sovereignties are created equal and that poor governance contributes directly to
downgrading of the international community's respect for a country's sovereignty'
and moreover that this position has not occurred as a result of September 11th 2001
but rather was developed in relation to humanitarian interventions in the 1990s.231
He concurs with Soros that the question remains as to who gets to decide on whose
sovereignty to violate, and on what grounds. More specifically he raises the issue of
'to what extent does it remain the prerogative of sovereign nation states, and to what
degree must such decisions be constrained by international law or norms?'232 The
question of the degree of international constraint to which nation states should be
subject is central to what is at stake in this debate.
Fukuyama shares some of the concern expressed by Soros at the preventive war
against Iraq launched by the Bush administration. Fukuyama notes that this kind of
action cannot serve as a good principle of international relations, and that the US
would surely object to Russia or China asserting such a right.233 With this Soros and
Popper would surely agree. More debatable however is whether the modest
alternative that Fukuyama proposes can be deemed acceptable by those whose goal
is the fostering of open societies throughout the world.
By distancing himself from the Bush doctrine Fukuyama takes steps towards
repudiating, to some extent, the neo-conservative philosophy that he once espoused
as a signatory to the Statement ofPrinciples for the Project for the New American
Century.234 Fie does however retain a considerable scepticism regarding the efficacy
of international institutions as well as believing the notion of international
community to be 'a fiction insofar as any enforcement capability depends entirely on
the action of individual nation states'.235 Fukuyama does not offer much by way of a
solution to the crippling collective action problems that he identifies as afflicting
international organisations other than to suggest that decisive collective action is still
231 Fukuyama, State Building, p. 141.
232
Fukuyama, State Building, p. 142.
2jj
Fukuyama, State Building, p. 147.
2,4 See http://www.newamericancentury.org
235 Francis Fukuyama, State Building, p. 157.
211
most likely to be achieved where and when the US is prepared to take on a
leadership position.
Soros, as we shall see, does not dispute the desirability ofAmerican leadership on
the international stage but wants to see it more specifically focused on the
development of open societies and international rules to govern relationships
between those societies. The most telling conclusion that Fukuyama draws however
is that in seeking to preserve international order 'we have no choice but to turn back
to the sovereign nation state and to try to understand once again how to make it
strong and effective'.236 In addition, he contends that those who have argued for the
'twilight of sovereignty'237 bear the burden of proof 'to explain what will replace the
power of sovereign nation states in the contemporary world'.238 In his discussion of
sovereignty, Popper regards the concept as dangerously ambiguous in that he views
it as having the potential to obscure the fundamental question as to the powers
accrued by state rulers and the extent to which institutional controls are established
to check that power to prevent its abuse.239 Popper's preference, as we saw in
chapter in two, is for what he describes as 'the principle of a democratic policy'240,
that is, the creation, development, and protection of political institutions for the
avoidance of tyranny.
A Community ofDemocracies
Such a goal would appear to be shared by both Soros and Fukuyama. Soros argues
that the principle and policy of tyranny avoidance can be encapsulated in a doctrine
that seeks to promote open societies.241 Moreover, he identifies steps that have
already been taken in this direction, beyond the work of his own institute and
foundations, via the Warsaw Declaration.242 The declaration was signed in June
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2000 by 107 states at a conference in Warsaw hosted by the US State Department.
The signatories, meeting in this particular forum, term themselves the Community of
Democracies and seek to 'collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing
international and regional institutions, forming coalitions and caucuses to support
resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic
governance'.243 Soros sees great potential in the Community of Democracies but
expresses a disappointment that hitherto it has remained something of an 'empty
shell' that has yet to fully establish itself in practical pursuit of its stated cause.244
Democracy Promotion and the Question of Sovereignty
Promoting democracy around the world can be considered a shared objective of the
Blair, Fukuyama and Soros doctrines respectively. All three are interested in the
question of sovereignty, its evolution, and limits and more specifically in the
question of the possible bases for intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign
states. Soros contends that the Warsaw Declaration is deserving of attention
precisely because it establishes, in his view, a valid basis for intervention.243 The
faith that Soros professes in this particular document appears somewhat optimistic
given that it does not spell out any principle of intervention. Indeed, it includes the
commitment that signatories 'will cooperate to consolidate and strengthen
democratic institutions, with due respect for sovereignty and the principle of non¬
interference in internal affairs'.246 With the inclusion of this caveat, the Community
of Democracies make clear that the Warsaw Declaration is not a radical attempt to
rewrite or even influence the interpretation of the rules concerning sovereignty and
non-interference in international politics. Soros is mistaken if he thinks he has found
a basis for intervention set out in the declaration.
That said, the signatories do 'resolve jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the
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246 Community of Democracies, Warsaw Declaration, June 27th 2000.
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threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected
governments'.247 Whilst this resolution is rather opaque, in that it does not set out
particular institutional mechanisms to be activated in resistance or discouragement of
democratic overthrow, it does at least provide a starting point for the consideration of
such scenarios. There could be scope to expand such a commitment to suggest that
an attack on the democracy of one member is to be regarded as an attack on the
democratic principles of all members. The ambiguous wording of the text does
suggests however a reluctance to countenance a collective security arrangement of
this sort. Of greater concern to a Popperian such as Soros should be the narrowness
of the protection that the Community of Democracies purports to offer. By
restricting themselves to resisting the overthrow of constitutionally elected
governments they make no commitment to individuals living under tyrannical rule in
circumstances where elected government is entirely absent. As an institution then, it
would seem that the Community of Democracies is ill-prepared to address the
problem that 'many states are not democratic, and many inhabitants do not have the
status of citizens' which Soros identifies.248
He critiques the UN as institutionally hampered in terms of resolving its own
ambiguities between protecting individuals and upholding the sovereignty of
member states249 but it is not at all clear that the Community of Democracies, as
currently constituted, is any better equipped to resolve such tensions. Having drawn
attention to the limitations of the UN as a body made up of sovereign states it is
difficult to see why Soros holds out considerably more hope for the Community of
Democracies given that it too is a membership organisation comprised of sovereign
states. More peculiar in this regard is the proposal that Soros makes for members of
the Community of Democracies to arrange themselves into a faction or bloc within
the UN.250
247 Community of Democracies, Warsaw Declaration, June 27lh 2000
248 Soros, Bubble, p. 115.
249 Soros, Bubble, p.l 15.
250 Soros, Bubble, p.l 19, my italics.
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On this basis he concludes that repressive regimes could be excluded from active
decision making and that failed states could be put under UN protection.231 Whilst
there may be some prospect of this, and it is neither particularly controversial nor
farfetched to suggest that benefit could be derived from democracies cooperating
within international institutions, it is rendered less likely by the supremacy that Soros
himself attributes to the Security Council and the frequent 'unwillingness of
sovereign states to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of the common
interest'.252 Whatever the merits or otherwise of the proposals that Soros makes to
try and overcome this situation it is clear that he perceives an international system
that remains dominated and shaped by the concept of national interest.
Indeed the most productive route that Soros charts is that of harnessing national
interests to the cause of promoting both democracy and open society more broadly.
Soros suggests that an increasing interdependence between states, made even more
evident since September 11, increases the likelihood of intervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign states where national security interests are deemed to be at
stake.253 Whilst Soros would undoubtedly prefer the establishment and utilisation of
an international policy of humanitarian intervention, which sought to uphold and
protect the principles of open society, he is pragmatic in enlisting the concept of
national interest to this cause. He argues that 'it is in the common interest of all
democratic, open societies to foster the development of open societies all over the
world' because failed states, repressive regimes and internal conflicts pose dangers
beyond the borders of the countries concerned.254 The internationalism that Soros
displays here is cognisant of the enduring significance of the nation state and
national interests.
Although Soros concurs with the view expressed by Popper that 'protective
institutions are necessary, both on a regional and on a world-wide scale' he does
251 Soros, Bubble, pi20.
252 Soros, Bubble, p.l 16.
253 Soros, Bubble, p.l 12.
254 Soros, Bubble, p. 113.
255 popper, Open Society Volume I, p.l 13.
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so whilst simultaneously acknowledging the influence that nation states continue to
exert over the nature and conduct of international politics.256 Popper was never
prepared to make such an acknowledgement and so ended up at once implicitly
predicating the nation state as the framework for his theorising of open society and at
the same time assuming that the irrationality, as he saw it, of nationalism would be
increasingly exposed as societies became more open. Among Popper's most crucial
oversights in this regard was a failure to lay out a clear and comprehensive
cosmopolitan theory of open society. In the absence of such a theory the tensions
and ambiguities between the concept of open societies, instituted in separate and
particular countries, and that of open society as a supranational or even global form
of political community remain unresolved in his philosophy. Soros largely avoids
this problem by being considerably more explicit that his aim is the establishment of
open societies in countries across the world rather than to subsume, to any significant
degree, those countries into a broader, post-national open society. Evidence of this
approach is to be found in his endorsement of a community of democracies and in
the activities of his Open Society Institute with its various branches working
domestically within many countries exhibiting varying degrees of openness.
4.3 Conclusion - Two Types of Nationalism and the Open Society
In bringing this chapter to a close it is useful to turn attention to a distinction
between two types of nationalism drawn by the philosopher John Ralston Saul. Saul
distinguishes between negative nationalism on the one hand and positive nationalism
on the other as part of a broader consideration of what he terms the 'collapse of
globalism'.257 He suggests that all nationalism is concerned with belonging, place
and imagining the other.258
'It can take a positive, civic form, one in which belonging brings the obligation to
256 Soros, Bubble, p.l 14.
257 John Ralston Saul, The Collapse ofGlobalism, London: Atlantic Books, 2005.
258 Ibid, p.245.
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reach out and to imagine the other in an inclusive, multiple way. It can also take a
negative form, above all ethnic, dedicated to belonging as an expression of privilege
and exclusion'.239
Interestingly, Saul conceives of positive nationalism as tied to self-confidence and
openness. Saul's contention is that the new era ushered in by the collapse of the
Soviet Union looks set to be nationalist of one form or other; whether it is positive or
negative remains to be seen but the opportunity exists to shape the direction of the
era.260 This point is echoed by Holton who contends that 'the historical dynamic of
the nation-state is very far from being played out' whilst also recognising that the
world inhabited by nation states is changing.261
From a Popperian perspective such insights are relevant in terms of thinking about
the future development of open society as a concept and form of political
community. More importantly, it can aid our understanding of Popper's view on
nationalism. Popper conceived of open society in opposition to nationalism, as
individualistic rather than collectivism as rational rather than traditional, and as
outward looking rather than insular. In doing so however, Popper neglected to
consider the possibility of different variants of nationalism and the nation state.
Perhaps he did so unconsciously with his endorsement ofwestern liberal
democracies but his general treatment of nationalism is to dismiss it as a singular and
straightforward phenomenon.262 With the recognition of at least the potential for a
more positive form of nationalism comes the opportunity for Popperians to look
again at the nation state as a vehicle for advancing the cause of open society.
What is particularly intriguing for Popperians about Saul's conception of positive
nationalism is the centrality he accords to what he terms 'the democratic reality of
choice'. Achieving such a reality is Popper's overriding concern in theorising open
society.263 Saul though refers not just to choices for citizens but also choices for
259 Ibid, p.245.
260 Ibid, p.245.
261 Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State, London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 106.
262 Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.49.
263 Popper, Open Society Volume 2 p. 127.
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countries as well as choices for coalitions of countries.264 He describes positive
nationalism as 'a belief in the positive tension of uncertainty and the central
importance of choice. It is not wedded to narrow absolutes'.265 A belief in the
positive tension of uncertainty seems to be an excellent description of Popper's
philosophies of both science and politics. The combination of positive nationalism
and open society merits exploration by Popperians at this particular historical
juncture in a bid to ensure that democratic communities can continue to draw upon
such positive tension in making collective choices. To advocate open society today
does not require a dismissal of the nation state as Popper thought. Instead of
planning to replace the nation state, a project of such grand scale and scope that
Popper would surely caution against it, reform can be considered. There is no reason
why positive nationalism cannot be harnessed to support open society.
264 Saul, Collapse ofGlobalism, p.270.
265 Saul, Collapse ofGlobalism, p.271.
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5
Open Society and the European Union
5.1 Introduction - European Integration and the Nation State
European nation states currently cooperate to a hitherto unprecedented degree within
common institutions and a common framework of law that takes precedence over
national law. There is much to admire in the process of European integration and its
achievements have been quite spectacular. A continent ravaged by war and conflict
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, has now enjoyed over half a
century of peace (apart from the Balkan conflict of the nineties) and generally
increasing prosperity. This prompts some significant questions in the context of this
thesis. Has the process of developing the European Union involved the transcending
of the nation state? Has peace and prosperity flourished only with the eclipsing of
nationalism by a supranational process of integration? What opportunities and
threats are presented to the concept of open society by the development of the EU?
This chapter seeks to address these questions as well as the nature of the European
integration process and the extent to which it has been and remains state-driven.
This is vitally important since 'a central political and philosophical issue regarding
the future of Europe is the legitimate role of the member states', especially given that
'unlike the USA, the EU developed and develops from pre-existing independent,
legally equal, de jure sovereign nation states'.' The EU has not merely developed
from sovereign nation states but it has been developed by sovereign nation states and
it is sovereign nation states, I will argue, that continue to steer its direction.
The European Union has expanded from humble beginnings, in terms of both
' Follesdal. A, 'Democracy, Legitimacy andMajority Rule in the European Union', in Nentwich. M
& Weale. A, 'Political Theory and the European Union', Routledge: London, 1997, p.43.
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membership and scope, to the enormous organisation that it is today encompassing
some twenty seven states following its most recent enlargement, and bearing
responsibility for a vast range of policy areas. The extent of economic integration
and cooperation in Europe today has reached a level that includes the adoption and
use of a single currency, the Euro, by most EU member states with monetary policy
directed by a European Central Bank (ECB) based in Frankfurt. Interest rates in
France are thus now decided by a panel of European bankers situated in Germany
and it is possible to travel across most of the continent without the need for any
currency exchange.
Politically too, the European Union has hugely developed its scope and the range of
policy issues that fall under its jurisdiction. The 'Three Pillar' approach (conceived
at Maastricht in 1991) includes Justice and Home Affairs, as well as moves towards
a Common Foreign and Security Policy alongside the central economic aims of
constructing and regulating the Common Market. It is in Pillar 1, that of economic
policy, that integration has gone furthest and fastest. Justice and Home Affairs, Pillar
2, has gathered momentum of late and intricate cooperation is to be found here.
Pillar 3 however has proved problematic and despite initiatives aplenty and much
hopeful rhetoric there has not emerged anything that could be described as a
consistent or sustained Common Foreign and Security Policy in Europe.2 The
difficulties of trying to create or cultivate one were vividly demonstrated in the run
up to the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Governance in the EU is a somewhat complicated matter that involves member states
themselves and their representatives - acting as the European Council, the European
Commission made up ofmember state appointees who are placed in charge of
ministerial departments (External Relations, Transport, the Environment and so on)
and is the institution that most closely mirrors that of a government at nation state
2 This is something that Soros notes disappointedly and, as will be discussed later in the chapter, he
conceives of considerable scope for the EU to become a more active and vocal advocate for open
society as a foreign policy principle. George Soros, Open Society, Reforming Global Capitalism,
London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000, p.340.
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level, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that can de facto create EU law as well as
interpret it through its rulings, and the European parliament that is primarily charged
with an oversight role.
The only elected institution of the EU is the Parliament and even these elections are
conducted on a national rather than a pan-European basis; Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) are elected by national constituencies with the number ofMEPs
per member state being determined by population size. It has been claimed that 'the
dynamics of reform will be governed by the continuing desire of European political
elites to manage the processes of institutional reform, so that in consequence it will
be difficult for a trans-national European demos to emerge'.3 The political elites of
national governments, to varying degrees, wield power over the processes of
institutional reform within the EU although that power can be checked at a national
level via referenda on particular treaties for example.
Nation states within the European Union arguably face an important choice and one
that has thus far largely been put off and ignored; either the trans-national polity that
is served by the institutions of the EU should begin to become a genuine demos or
else it is likely that the case will grow for some of the functions currently performed
by the European institutions to be returned to national parliaments and governments.
This is, in short, the much debated democratic deficit that faces the European Union.
It is not simply the case that European institutions are subject to insufficient scrutiny
and democratic parliamentary control but that the governments ofmember states
themselves can evade democratic accountability and responsibility for decisions
taken at the EU level.
'It is the member state governments which are the main legislators in the community.
Add to this the continuous expansion of community legislative powers vis-a-vis the
member states and you see EU member countries gradually return to a pre-
democratic polity where the executive regains a monopoly of legislation, no longer
' Nentwich. M & Weale. A, 'Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy Constitutional
Choice and Citizenship', Routledge: London, 1997, p.5.
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bound by the representatives of the people'.4
This is an issue of the power of the executive, here European institutions established
and dominated by member states, versus that of the legislature both at the national
(member state) and trans-national (EU) level. Any prospect of a return to pre-
democratic polities should be of great concern to Popperians and brings into focus
the question of the contribution made by European integration to the cause of
developing and supporting open societies.
European nation-states have grown steadily more cooperative over the course of the
last fifty years and Europe is now the location of the most advanced experiment in
supranational governance anywhere in the world. Indeed, Soros regards the
experiment as being one of piecemeal social engineering and so methodologically
appropriate to an open society.5 Relations between states within the EU have been
placed on a firm legal footing; the prospect ofwar between member states is
virtually unthinkable with negotiation and dialogue now the entrenched form of
interaction.6 That negotiation and dialogue has been most significant in the creation
of the Treaties that have underpinned the development of the EU, serving as guiding
frameworks, regulatory agreements and quasi-constitutional foundations. From the
Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 member states have sought to
increase the competencies, powers and responsibilities of supranational institutions.
As a result of this national sovereignty has undoubtedly changed.
The next section of this chapter takes a closer look at sovereignty in a European
context as well as the nature of governance that has evolved with the development of
the EU. From a Popperian perspective there is a particular interest here in the
question of checking political power and holding it to account. The extent to which
those tasks are made more difficult at the level of the EU is one focus of attention in
4 Abromeit. H, 'Democracy in Europe: Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity \ Berghahn Books,
1998, p.22.
3
George Soros speech, Europe as a Prototype for a Global Open Society, Brussels, November 20
2006.
6 Frank Vibert, Europe Simple - Europe Strong, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p.2.
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the chapter. The issue of social justice is also important in that Popper regarded open
society as a framework within which economic as well as political power could be
controlled by citizens with a firm emphasis on ensuring a degree of protection for the
economically weak.7 Does the EU provide or facilitate such a framework?
Answering this question is relevant to an assessment of the EU from the point of
view of open society.
The chapter then proceeds to consider the work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermasian
philosophy takes a place here for two key reasons. The first is that there are a
number of parallels between Habermas's theorising and that ofPopper's, and this is
most readily apparent in the manner that they deal with the concept of rationality.
Secondly, Habermas takes a clear position on the nation state and its future. He
argues that it is no longer fit for purpose as a form of political community and that
moreover a post-national constellation can already be glimpsed that is signalling the
end of national political predominance. In this chapter the Habermasian philosophy
of political community is explored via reference to the notion of the post-national
constellation and its implications in terms of open society.
Thereafter, an examination is undertaken ofGeorge Soros' reflections on the
European Union as a potential prototype for a global open society. He set out his
vision in a speech delivered in 2006 and whilst it may initially appear as though
Soros is advocating the pursuit of a decidedly cosmopolitan project it turns out that
he is actually articulating a reconfigured national constellation that can bear
significant contrast to the post-national position defended by Habermas. Soros sets
out his expectations of what the EU can and cannot hope to achieve as a potential
advocate and guardian of open society and it is striking the extent to which he
continues to think and act in the context of a national framework as the basis for
politics.
7
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies Volume 2- Hegel and Marx, London: Routledge,
1986, p.125.
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The chapter concludes with an overview of the prospects for the development of
open societies alongside and within the process of European integration. Of
particular note here is the question of whether the EU has either secured or
threatened open societies over the course of its development. Furthermore, what
risks do the acknowledged democratic deficits of the EU pose to the concept of open
society? Such risks cannot be ignored by open society advocates but neither need
they be deemed intractable. One thing that open societies and the European Union
have in common is that they have both developed in close relation to the nation state.
As they have done so conceptions of sovereignty have altered and it is to that issue
which we now turn.
5.2 Sovereignty and the European Union
The concept of sovereignty, as explored in the previous chapter, was itself brought
into being by the state. Sovereignty has become inter-twined with the nation state
and exists pre-eminently in the form of national sovereignty. Elave the nation states
of Europe ceded this sovereignty to the European Union? Has national sovereignty
been made redundant in a globalised world? These two questions are linked in terms
of how the relationship between European integration and globalisation may be
interpreted. To put it differently, has globalisation prompted and accelerated the
drive towards ever closer union in Europe, or has the integration of European states
itself been a part of the process of globalisation? We live in a world of global
financial markets and huge multi-national corporations that wield great economic
power. Globalisation has put pressure on the nation state and on national
sovereignty. Regional integration and cooperation can be viewed as a prudent
response to this as a way of insulating the national state from some of the disruptions
and dislocations wrought by global capital flexibility and manoeuvrability.8
Despite the challenges of globalisation national sovereignty has survived intact. The
8
Popper, Open Society Volume 2, p.6.
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process of European integration has seen a re-conceptualisation of sovereignty but
not the dissolving of the national variant. 'National sovereignty is a concept rather
than a fact, and one which has been deliberately reconfigured in the EU context'.9
Sovereignty is conceptual and there is no theoretical reason that it need remain tied
to the nation state but the existence of national sovereignty is nevertheless a fact;
however much the world may have changed in the last half century or so, after the
Second World War, after the Cold War, after the more recent events of September
112001, it is still a world comprised of sovereign nation states. The grand
engineering project of an integrated union in Europe has radically altered the
continent and relationships amongst its states but it has not displaced sovereignty
from its national habitat. Sovereignty of the people is currently and necessarily a
national sovereignty; the (national) peoples of Europe have their national
sovereignties and since there is no recognisable concept of a people of Europe as a
whole there is no corresponding supranational sovereignty that a European
government might claim on its citizens behalf.
It is significant that Warleigh should refer to the deliberate reconfiguration of
sovereignty in the context of the European Union and this indicates the extent to
which nation states have maintained (control of) sovereignty, pooling or sharing it
only in those areas that they wish to and developing it in a manner that is intended to
serve the national interest. It is notable that 'in practice, sovereignty is being
rearticulated and contested, rather than forgotten or transcended'.10 The process of
European integration has been accompanied by a re-articulation of sovereignty so
that national governments can turn to international institutions such as those of the
EU for the provision of governance in certain areas where cooperation beyond the
state is deemed useful and worthwhile. It is not altogether clear as to the manner in
which sovereignty is being contested.
National sovereignty has neither been forgotten nor transcended because the effect of
9 Alex Warleigh, 'Democracy in the European Union: Theory, Practice and Reform', Sage
Publications, London, 2003, p.58.
10
Warleigh. 'Democracy in the European Union', p.63.
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European integration and the development of the European Union has not been the
transcending of the nation state. Perhaps one day this shall be the result and national
sovereignty will be of interest primarily to historians but such an eventuality does
not appear immanent. It has been concluded that 'large-scale constitutional
engineering, far from leading to a diffusion of state sovereignty, maintains the ability
ofmember governments to manage the process of building trans-national bodies'.11
The European Union as a trans-national organisation is dependent upon the support
and finance of the member states that created it. The manner of its creation, an
evolving series of Treaty agreements between increasing numbers ofmember states,
has allowed those states to place limits on the organisation in order that their own
sovereignty does not come to be unduly diffused by the supranational institutions
that they themselves have established and maintained.
Among the successes of the European Union has been to entrench liberal democracy
across the continent and all twenty seven of its members are functioning liberal
democracies. The entrenchment of liberal democracy in Europe has been at the
national level however; Europe is a continent comprised of liberal democratic nation
states. 'Historically, the establishment of liberal democracy came to be tied to, first,
popular sovereignty and, later, national self-determination' and 'these two principles
have been fused in the powerful combination of ideas and values that is the nation
state'.12 This historic construction has proved to be durable and robust. It is possible
that European integration has managed to travel as far as it has, as quickly as it has,
because it has not attempted to fundamentally undermine either of these principles.
One of the key challenges facing the European Union today, and its future
development, is to find a way of preserving liberty and democracy alongside the
operation of supranational institutions and governance. This is particularly important
from a Popperian perspective. Since liberal democracy is already in place at the
11 Tsinisizelis. M and Chryssochoou. D, 'The European Union - Trends in Theory and Reform', in
Nentwich and Weale (eds), 'Political Theory and the European Union', Routledge: London, 1997, p.
83
1 Christiansen. T, 'Legitimacy dilemmas ofsupranational governmentp. 103. in Nentwich and
Weale (eds), 'Political Theory and the European Union', Routledge: London. 1997
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national level the burden of proof rests at the supranational level to show that it is
either capable of greater democratisation or that decisions taken there will have a
particular utility that compensates for any potential democratic deficit. It is
reasonable to suggest that 'as the powers of the EU have increased, so it can no
longer rely upon the principle that its normative justifiability can be wholly
derivative from the authority of the nation states who established it as an
international organisation'.13 This is a challenge faced by all international
organisations but it is its pervasiveness in the everyday lives of the citizens of
Europe that make it a particularly pressing and acute issue for the European Union.
As Popper consistently argued, power unchecked is dangerous.14 What Popper
underestimated is the extent to which the nation state contains democratic safety
valves that are tried and tested, and accessible to citizens. The governance balance
in the EU between national governments and supranational institutions warrants
exploration from a Popperian viewpoint in order to assess how best to check
supranational power and ensure democratic accountability.
The European Union - Governance and Government
More explicit attempts at identity creation within the EU as a whole have proved to
be less than successful. Europeans still 'tend to emphasise their diversity rather than
what they have in common, and have failed to be persuaded otherwise by the
adoption of EU symbols of common identity such as the flag, hymn and passport'.15
As often as not communities define their identities by what, or who, they are not as
much as what, or who, they are. National and sub-national communities have many
similar 'other' communities against whom they can define themselves. This process
is far more difficult at the supranational level where others are far scarcer and often
less clearly defined in many cases. The EU has no genuine regional equivalent
elsewhere in the world but does counter pose itself, at least in matters of economics,
to huge nation states across the globe such as the U.S.A, China, India and Russia. It
is not impossible therefore for attempts to create a European identity to make use of
1 Nentwich. M and Weale. A, 'Political Theory and the European Union', p.3.
14
Popper, Open Society Volume I, p. 125.
15
Warleigh. Democracy in the European Union, p.l 1.
227
a process of othering, it is just that the opportunity to 'other' presents itself only
infrequently.
It has been observed that 'the lack of a common culture and language makes the
creation of a public discourse within which political accountability is discharged an
inherently precarious exercise'.16 Europe lacks a common language and without this
there is little or no prospect for the emergence of a genuine public discourse.
Citizens of the European Union do not have a European-wide public discourse that is
open to them and few means of participating in one. Democratic politics requires
public debate so that citizens understand the decisions being taken on their behalf
and in order to make informed decisions when called upon to do so whether that is
voting in an election or referendum, joining a political party or campaign, or taking
part in other forms ofpolitical activity.
Individuals acquire political information and education from a variety of sources:
family, peers, party literature, official documents, schools, colleges and universities,
and perhaps most significantly of all today, from the media.
'So far, there are only very limited attempts to launch Europe-wide or at least trans-
border media. The only newspaper is The European along with the TV channel
Euro-News operating on a large scale. The obvious reasons for this are the
difficulties met by such enterprises by the diversity of languages and media
17traditions in Europe'.
This indicates the almost total lack of trans-continental media currently in existence
18in Europe. It is a reflexive problematic for the EU because the lack of Euro-wide
media is a reflection of the absence of a Euro-wide discourse and the lack of such
16
Lehning. P and Weale. A, 'Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe', Routledge:
London, 1997, p.8.
17 Nentwich. M, 'Opportunity Structuresfor Citizens ' Participationin Nentwich and Weale (eds),
'Political Theory and the European Union', p. 132.
18 It is worth noting however, as Nentwich does, that European public forums are somewhat more in
evidence for a small elite such as Financial Times readers for example. Those who regularly read the
FT will often have transnational business interests, associations and networks. They may well be
frequent travelers within the continent and take a more active interest in the development of the Single
Market than most.
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pan-continental media is simultaneously a barrier to the development of any such
discourse.
A particular problematic is evident whereby citizens fail to identify with the EU and
thus turn-out in small numbers for European elections which causes legitimation
issues for the EU that are hard to overcome.
'Lack of interest, infonnation and identification in European citizens are, in common
with the low turnout, both an indication of lacking democratic legitimacy and a cause
of the prolongation and even widening of the EU's legitimatory gap, which in its turn
originates from the lack of proper democratic accountability'.19
In failing to identify strongly with the European Union citizens interest is limited and
this makes the job of disseminating information about the EU all the more difficult.
The combination of these factors is a significant hindrance to attempts to develop
democratic accountability for the EU.
Even were a method of democratic accountability found that was applicable to the
European Union it is unclear as to who exactly would, or should, be held to account.
The complex governance procedures are an impediment to clear and simple
accountability.
'Given that legislative powers are shared between the Council of Ministers, the
Commission and the European Parliament, there is no 'government' to be identified
and held accountable, nor any opposition able to constitute a rival government to
20which electors could turn'.
With a government, such as those of nation states, there is a relatively unambiguous
source of power to be held to account. Oppositions provide potential alternative
governments and also play an important part themselves in the job of holding
government to account. The replacement of government by governance makes
accountability difficult to obtain and practice in an EU context.
19 Heidrun Abromeit. 'Democracy in Europe — Legitimising Politics in a Non-stale Polity', Berghahn
Books, New York, 1998, p. 167.
20
Warleigh. Democracy in the European Union, p.8.
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The European Union not only lacks a government and opposition but also European-
wide political parties. Parties facilitate ideological contestation within political
systems, allow the expression of ideological identity and contribute to public
discourse and debate. Currently, elections to the European Parliament are held on a
national basis with national parties competing to be elected by national electorates
and once elected, national parties join loose trans-national coalitions within the
parliament. It is hard to envisage the transformation of this system into one of truly
European political parties competing trans-nationally. It has been suggested that 'in
order to promote the evolution of a genuine European party system instead of the
present party federations without any direct relationship to the European citizenry,
21
trans-European parties should be founded and individual membership allowed'.
No detail is given as to who should found these parties and on what basis. To
imagine that they could simply be conjured into existence is rather Utopian. Even if
European parties could be established they would then need a political system in
which to operate. A European Parliament made up of European political parties
would not take the political system much closer to that of nation states since as the
EU currently operates the parties would still not be competing electorally for the
privilege of governing.
It is clear that the European Union, as currently constituted, does not and cannot
function as a state. This is fine up to a point and there is no reason why the EU need
necessarily aspire to the status of a state but the essential problem that lies beneath
the democratic deficit, the lack of accountability and the legitimatory gap remains
power unchecked. Democracy is a safeguard against such a danger and the EU has
become enormously powerful without being adequately democratised. The
congruence between those who participate in decision-making and those whom such
decisions affect is a pivotal feature of democracy and one that is by and large
missing at the level of the EU.22
21 Nentwich. Opportunity Structures, p. 136
22 Abromeit. Democracy in Europe, p.96.
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It is not simply that EU institutions are unaccountable for the most part to EU
citizens but also, as discussed above, that member states, acting in the Council of
Ministers for example, can also to some extent evade being held to account for their
decisions and actions. Democracy it must be acknowledged is an imperfect device
for checking power and holding political officials to account. Within nation states
citizens do not necessarily have much say or influence over the decisions taken by
government but they do at least have an opportunity to remove that government
come the next election should they so wish. It is worth recalling at this juncture that
for Popper, 'democracy, the right of the people to judge and to dismiss their
government, is the only known device by which we can try to protect ourselves
against the misuse of political power'.23 This right is available to citizens at the
national level within the EU but not at the supranational level. The existence of
national public discourses is a further insurance against the abuse of power.
To ask if the EU may be emerging as an alternative to, or replacement of, national
forms ofpolitical community is instructive in that the nature of this organisation can
be explored and compared to that of the nation state along with the boundaries that it
may aspire both to surmount and entail. A couple of questions are consequently
prompted on this basis. Firstly, 'are we to think of European political identity as
something to be made or found?' Secondly, 'can we reason ourselves out of the
bounded identities that we have inherited from the past, and, if so, what sort of
relationship is thereby presupposed about the relation between individuals and the
political communities of which they are a part?'24 European political identity insofar
as it can be thought to exist at a supranational level is a complex phenomenon, not
least because attempts to construct it are undertaken in the context of pre-existing
national identities.
The questions posed here do raise matters at stake in the broader debate covered by
this thesis: whether a universal concept such as open society is compatible with
23
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bounded forms of political community such as the nation state. From a Popperian
perspective however, a more fundamental question may be considered to underlie
those posed above. Just as Popper sought to replace the question of who should rule
with that of how can bad rulers be prevented from doing too much harm, so here it is
reasonable to ask whether the politics of identity, albeit at a supranational level in
this case, offers a viable route to strengthening and spreading the principles of open
society globally?25 Popper, as has been discussed, was unimpressed by identity
politics and philosophy.26
The nation state places a boundary around a people who, however loosely, form
some kind of community in terms of living, working, debating and taking collective
decisions together. Bound in this way, communities have shown themselves to be
capable of governing themselves, that is to say democratically. The construction and
reinforcement of national identity continues in a myriad of subtle ways each and
every day, via the media, political parties and elites and other national institutions
such as those of education and sport. 'The fact that 'national democracy' is a social
construction does not mean that it is easily toppled by secular processes such as
27 •
globalisation or integration'. Social construction though it may be, national
democracy has proved reasonably durable and has neither ceased to exist nor
function in the face of processes of globalisation and integration. To a Popperian
concerned with addressing democratic deficits, this is an important point to consider
when examining supranational entities such as the EU.
The benefits of European integration have already been acknowledged and the EU
can and should continue to play a major role in European political life but the nature
of that role requires consideration and reflection from a Popperian perspective in
order to enhance the prospects of the European Union shrinking its democratic
deficit and becoming a more powerful defender and promoter of democracy globally.
In defending the nation state the arguments developed here are offered
23
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simultaneously to protect democratic politics, the locus of which is at the national
level, from being subverted by supranational processes that can potentially threaten
national democracy without demonstrating the viability of supranational alternatives.
'Abraham Lincoln's famous call at Gettysburg (1863) for government of the people,
by the people, for the people is instructive: it reminds us that collective decisions
need to be made in circumstances of fallibility (i.e. things can go wrong), and that
the best way to make sure that this happens both fairly and in a way which allows
mistakes to be rectified is to ensure that everyone has access to, and a role to play in,
9 R
the decision-making process'.
The best way to promote collective decision-making of this kind, in this way, is to
protect our national democratic heritage and restore it. Such a task of restoration
could be approached in the manner of Popperian piecemeal social engineering just as
readily as that of developing the EU.
Social Justice and the European Union
The choice facing Europe in respect of social justice concerns the appropriate
circumstances in which to attempt to achieve it and the nature and scope of the EU's
involvement in this aim.
'On the one hand, the claims of social justice within an integrated Europe would
indicate common standards of service provision and social protection; on the other
hand, the existence of cultural and historic diversity indicates the need for a domain
of collective choice in which diverse preferences can be developed'.29
Fortunately Europe has just such domains of collective choice: nation states. Any
endeavour to initiate common social provision and protection is likely to be difficult
to implement amidst the plurality of models of social and welfare provision that
already exist across Europe amongst different member states.
The European Union cannot make social provision for citizens directly; it can and
must do so through member states. This is in fact what happens via mechanisms
28
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such as the Social Charter which lays out the general social goals of the EU in areas
such as working hours, maternity leave and employment benefits from part-time
workers.30 The Charter is a guide to policy for member states but Europe remains a
very long way from standardised common social provision. Social policy and social
justice is the preserve of national governments and is determined primarily by
resource allocation decisions. Since the EU does not have or constitute a European
government it does not raise revenue from the collection of direct taxes, on income
for example, and so does not enjoy the range of resource allocation or redistributive
opportunities that national governments do.
The European Union is a unique international organisation in terms of the authority
that it has over sovereign states even although that authority is conferred by the
states themselves. The EU has become a powerful economic and political actor in
international politics and is undoubtedly a world power but it is not a sovereign
power. It lacks the cohesive political community and identity that remain the
preserve of nation states and this seems to have impaired attempts to embed
democracy and social justice at the supranational level. Popperians in particular
should therefore think twice before consigning the political community that is the
nation state to the historical scrap-heap since we risk losing with it a valuable forum
for the effective practice of democratic politics.
It is on this basis that I can only agree with the second part of the claim that Tittle
chance of effective governance seems to be left for nation-states and little chance of
democracy for supranational governance'.31 The process of European integration
has seen the gradual piecing together of national government and supranational
governance. It has proved difficult to achieve a balance between efficient and
effective governance on the one hand and EU-level democratisation on the other.
Whilst there is much to admire in the development of the EU from a Popperian
perspective, its outstanding democratic deficit is sufficient to invite both critical
scrutiny and an inclination, for the moment, to preserve national democratic politics.
30 McCormick. J, 'Understanding the European Union', p. 167. MacMillan Press Ltd: London, 1999.
31 Abromeit. Legitimising Politics, p. 169.
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The potential for democratic governance at a supranational level has been theorised
by Jurgen Habermas and it is to his work that the chapter now turns. He seeks to
confront what he terms a 'disturbing problem'; that of the ability of democracies
•7 j
based on the social welfare state to survive beyond national borders. The context
of the EU is regarded by Habermas as a useful framework for exploring this problem
and indeed he sees in the EU a potential means of solving it.
'In the national context ... it is harder than ever for politics to keep pace with global
competition. I see the only normatively satisfactory alternative as a socially and
economically effective European Union, constituted along federalist lines - an
alternative that points to a future cosmopolitan order sensitive both to difference and
to social equality'.
The nature of Habermas's proposed cosmopolitan order warrants scrutiny here from
a Popperian perspective, especially as the concerns of democracy and social equality
with which he begins are central to Popper's conception of open society. The
philosophical basis of Habermas's cosmopolitanism, or post-nationalism, are
examined below with a consideration of the post-national constellation that he
perceives to be emergent in place of the nation state.
5.3 The Postnational Constellation
The Postnational Constellation is the title of a collection of political essays written
by Habermas that address issues of post or trans-national democracy. In this
collection Habermas argues that the nation state is no longer fit for purpose as a form
of political community and locus of political power and authority. He suggests that
the time is ripe to take a further abstractive step in the process of democratic will
formation, a step beyond that of the nation state and into a postnational or
j2




In the essay 'What is a People?' Habermas contends that the nation state can be
viewed as a stepping stone in the development of an ever more inclusive form of
political community and discursive practice but that it is on the verge of being
overtaken and subsumed by supranational developments, most acutely as has been
occurring over the past half century or so in Europe with the development of the EU.
'By expanding the parameters for the implementation of human rights and
democracy, the nation state made possible a new, more abstract form of social
integration beyond the borders of ancestry and dialect'.35 It is clear that Elabermas
does not consider the nation state as a political form to be antagonistic to human
rights or democracy. Indeed he views the establishment of nation states as having
generally been expansionary steps that have abstracted beyond the borders
represented by ancestry and dialect. This shows that for Habermas a) expansionary
steps are feasible and b) that national borders created by nation states do not
necessarily signal the limits of possible democratic participation.
In observing what he perceives to be the pattern of an emergent postnational
constellation Habermas posits globalisation as not only the backdrop but also the
central challenge facing the political and social orders that are present day nation
states. He suggests that politics finds itself playing catch up to global markets that
have moved beyond the reach of nation states and that national governments face an
increasingly complex task of guiding economic policy.36 In the threats and
opportunities exposed by economic globalisation Habermas sees the potential for the
opening up of a political space that expands to occupy similar territory to that
conquered by global markets. Such potential is also identified by Soros but he
->7
envisages more pronounced barriers to its realisation.
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In tandem with the opening up of participative political space has gone the
development of regimes, some more comprehensive than others, of democracy and
social welfare. The welfare state required a relatively advanced bureaucracy to
administer it and just such a bureaucratic apparatus was created within the confines
of the nation state.
'Over the course of the nineteenth century, now in the form of the nation state, the
modern state began for the first time to open itself to democratic forms of
legitimation. In some privileged regions of the world, and under the favourable
conditions of the post-war period, the nation state — which had in the meantime
established the worldwide model for political organization - succeeded in
transforming itself into a social welfare state by regulating the national economy
without interfering with its self-correcting mechanisms'.3
Habermas describes the interconnection between the nation state and democracy and
their concurrent trajectories of development. He also acknowledges the dominant
and hegemonic position that the nation state proved able to establish as a form of
political community. The question that Habermas implicitly poses is whether the
hegemonic position of the nation state as a worldwide model for political
organisation is now in peril or at least in serious doubt. Moreover he seeks to
anticipate what may come to replace it.
The nation state came to prominence in Europe initially and was subsequently
exported, forcefully or otherwise, across the globe. On this basis, and in conjunction
with two savage world wars fought on its territory, it is quite straightforward to
understand that it is in Europe that nation states have come under most scrutiny and
begun to work towards deep and wide ranging mechanisms of cooperation.
However successful or otherwise the European integration process is taken to be
Habermas recognises that giving birth to the EU was an often painful labour for
European nation states and attempts to recreate it globally are fraught with even
more potential complexities and complications.
'8
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'Given all the difficulties of creating a European Union, an agreement for the
creation of a worldwide order - especially one that would not simply exhaust itself in
creating and legally institutionalizing markets, but would introduce elements of a
global political will-formation, and would work toward redressing the undesired
social consequences of global commerce - would be much more difficult'.39
Integrating European nation states is one thing, and not a particularly easy one at
that, globalising politics or instituting a form of cosmopolitan democracy is quite
another and far harder. It is interesting to discover Elabermas's readiness to concede
the obstacles that stand in the way of taking politics beyond the nation state and
creating global institutions that can wield legitimate political authority and in which
individuals can participate as citizens.
Difficult and precarious though the alternatives may be the status quo does not
present itself as a viable option for Habermas not least because he refers to nation
states as being 'increasingly overwhelmed by the global economy'.40 Like Popper
before him, one of Habermas's principle political concerns is the (re)establishment of
political control over economic power41 and he takes the view that if economics has
gone global, or at least trans-national, then politics must do likewise. Habermas also
recognises the tentative steps that have been taken along this path with the network
of institutions that subsist below the level of the United Nations and which loosely
bind together the world's sovereign states.42 It does not escape his attention however
that there is a lack of capacity and authority at this level to exercise positive political
coordination.
Essentially the international state system is stratified, fragmented and prone to
conflict. Or at least, according to Habermas, it can appear so but such perceptions
are possibly misplaced.
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'In a stratified world society, unredeemable conflicts of interest seem to result from
the asymmetrical interdependences between developed nations, newly industrialized
nations, and the less developed nations. But this perception is only correct as long as
there are no institutionalized procedures of trans-national will-formation that could
induce globally competent actors to broaden their individual preferences into a
global governance'.43
Habermas perceives the feint contours of trans-national politics developing in
institutions such as the EU, the UN and the WTO. There is certainly
intergovernmental negotiation occurring within such institutions and particularly in
the case of the EU substantive areas of cooperation have developed underpinned by a
legal order that regulates both individual and member state conduct. Via the process
of actors engaging with each other in trans-national forums the prospect of
broadening preferences does arise as a consequence of increasingly intricate relations
of interdependence but the shift from that circumstance to one of global governance
remains a considerable and profound one and is by no means inevitable.
Habermas is conscious of the scale of such a task as well as that the onus on
achieving it continues to rest with nation states.
'The incorporation of each individual state into binding cooperative procedures of a
cosmopolitan community of states would have to be perceived as a part of states'
own domestic policies. Thus the decisive question is whether the civil society and
the political public sphere of increasingly large regimes can foster the consciousness
of an obligatory cosmopolitan solidarity'.44
On this account the domestic and the international have to become as interdependent
as to almost merge. From a Popperian perspective it might be asked whether critical
rationalism could serve as the basis for cosmopolitan solidarity.
It is not to be denied that such a possibility, however remote, exists at some future
point in the historical trajectory of humankind as a political species but it is difficult
to perceive at present the sort of sustained shifts of perspective from the national
4j Habermas, 'Learning from Catastrophe?\ p.54.
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polity to a would be cosmopolitan one that Habermas himself accepts as a necessary
prerequisite for its emergence. For all the different and shared perspectives that
globalisation can shed light on so too can it illuminate difference and in so doing
sharpen boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders. Moreover, for all the subtle
shifts that globalising processes can initiate it should not be forgotten that they
coexist with a plethora of processes, institutions and mediums that serve to reinforce,
consciously or otherwise, national consciousness and the nation state as the pre¬
eminent political form of political community.
However much Habermas may welcome the coming of cosmopolitan consciousness
and solidarity he is far from blind to the distance that remains to be travelled before
arriving even anywhere close to such a socio-political destination. He accepts firstly
that at this moment in time cosmopolitan solidarity is 'still lacking' and secondly, but
of greater consequence, that cosmopolitan solidarity 'would certainly be weaker and
less binding than the civil solidarity that developed within nation states'45 Soros, as
we have already established, takes a very similar view from a Popperian
46
perspective.
Habermas does not ignore the Hobbesian problem - that of how to create a stable
and secure social order. A shift from national to cosmopolitan democratic
consciousness does not negate this problem and it provides a further obstacle to the
construction of communities of solidarity beyond those that we know to have been
achieved. The importance of this point cannot be overstated in terms of a Popperian
defence of the nation state. Habermas accepts that national communities tend to be
communities of solidarity but he hopes that this can be replicated at a trans-national
level albeit in a diluted form. Even in diluted form he considers it worthwhile in
order to achieve ancillary benefits such as a greater democratic control over global
economic forces. The cosmopolitan consciousness shift offers only projected
benefits whilst imposing considerable risks. That is a trade that Popperians should
be reluctant and hesitant to countenance.
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In view of the question of solidarity and the challenges that it poses, Habermas takes
account of the relationship between democratic procedures and what we might call
regimes of solidarity. The concurrence of democracy and the nation state does not
go unnoticed.
'The phenomena of the territorial state, the nation, and a popular economy
constituted within national borders formed a historical constellation in which the
democratic process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form. And the
idea that one part of a democratic society is capable of a reflexive intervention into
society as a whole has, until now, been realized only in the context of nation
states'.47
The nation state and democratic procedures are both reliant on trust amongst citizens
and participants for their maintenance. In other words, a degree of solidarity must be
constructed amongst community members if citizens are to recognise each other as
fellow nationals (or members of a national community), and legitimate co-
participants in the democratic process that regulates debate and decision-making
within their society. By reference to the conservative element of Popper's thought it
is possible from a Popperian perspective to place a value on the nation state as a
form of political community and institutional mechanism that is already known to be
supportive of and compatible with democracy. Trans or post-national democracy
may or may not be possible but it cannot simply be assumed to work in practice prior
to its attempted engineering.
The national democratic constellation that Habermas describes is put at risk, he
argues, by a range of developments that can be summarised under the term
globalisation. In particular Habermas suggests that global economic forces exert a
pressure of'de-nationalisation' whereby societies constituted as nation states are
compelled, whether they wish it or not, to open themselves to 'an economically
driven world society'.48 Habermas is focused here more on the undermining of the
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concept of the sovereign nation state itself whereby it is left so open and exposed
that it cannot defend the solidarity that made it a viable locus of community in the
first place.
The challenge that Habermas identifies and sets for himself is that of articulating a
political response to the challenges posed, as he sees them, by a postnational
constellation driven by a global regime of (primarily neo-liberal) economics. In
accepting this challenge Habermas barely pauses to consider whether or not the
nation state might be redeemed, whether it is sufficiently and irretrievably in crisis to
warrant its replacement by a different form of political community. Habermas does
however recognise the continued primacy of the nation state as a communal political
form in the contemporary world albeit with the caveat that a number of states
continue to exhibit features of other political forms such as empires (China), city
states (Singapore), theocracies (Iran) and tribal organisations (Kenya). Nevertheless,
Habermas suggests that the members of the United Nations 'form an association of
nation states'.49 As was highlighted in the previous chapter, the starting point for any
consideration of international politics, including a Popperian one, should be that, for
now, the international system remains one comprised of and underpinned by nation
states. Whatever the level, if any, of crisis that nation states find themselves in they
have persisted and continue to persist even in the face of global economic pressures
that can constrain their room for manoeuvre.
That the process of communal abstraction (the creation of abstracted communities in
which most fellow members will be strangers to any given individual but a
communal identity is retained regardless such as in most nations) has come to rest
presently at the level of the nation state does not mean that it is inevitably destined to
continue beyond it. It might take another step at some future point but it may not.
Another option is that a postnational age turns out to be a sub-national one. This is
the broad position articulated by communitarians such as Michael Sandel and
49
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Michael Walzer for example.50 The significance of this point should not be lost on
Popperians: national solidarity is an achievement, and the opportunity exists to
defend the nation state as a form of political community that has been proven to be
compatible with democracy and open society.
To attempt at this stage to rationally conceive and initiate a conceptual shift of
abstraction in terms of political community and consciousness is necessarily a step
into the unknown. A more modest, but less risky, proposal would be to attempt to
repair that which already exists, the nation state, rather than respond to shifting
patterns of economic development by attempting to engineer a radical reconstruction
of political community at a postnational or trans-national level. The rush to replace
can be tempered by a commitment to repair on the basis of piecemeal social
engineering.
Habermas retains little faith in the nation state because he perceives it to have lost
control of effective economic decision-making, and hence coordinated social
policies, as well as the ability of national political communities to be the collective
authors of their own futures.
'While the state's sovereignty and monopoly on violence remain formally intact, the
growing interdependencies of a world society challenge the basic premise that
national politics, circumscribed within a determinate national territory, is still
adequate to address the actual fates of individual nation states'.51
It is not particularly clear what Habermas is referring to when he uses the term world
society or on what basis the basic premise of national self-determination is
challenged by it. It would be somewhat strange to argue for example that the
interdependence of individuals brought about by national economies (beyond their
individual control) and national political communities challenges the basic premise
of individual self-determination within those communities. Considered in this way
50 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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the argument of economic interdependence serving to undermine the viability of
nation states is overstated.
Postnational for Habermas, as we have seen, can only mean trans-national and to
some extent (more) cosmopolitan. He does not conceive of a sub-national possibility
or the merit that could attach to salvaging the nation state as a normatively desirable
political form. This is in spite of the fact that he recognises the nation state as
representing a significant achievement. Habermas however questions:
'whether globalization also affects the cultural substrate of civil solidarity that
developed in the context of the nation state. Regarded as the institutionalized
capacity for democratic self-determination, the political integration of citizens into a
large-scale society counts among the undisputed historical achievements of the
nation state. But today signs of political fragmentation betray the first breaches in
this faqade of the nation'.^
The large-scale political integration of society is an achievement of the nation state
that is not only beyond dispute according to Habermas but is also historic. Is that
political integration and civil solidarity put at risk by processes of globalisation?
That such things should come under pressure does not automatically mean they are
incapable ofwithstanding it; Habermas appears to have written off national political
integration before a proper assessment can be made of its robustness in the face of
global economic forces.
Whilst Habermas argues the necessity of embedding democratic procedures in a
common political culture he does not imply that they have to be embedded in
national political cultures. National political cultures have shown themselves to be
capable of embedding democratic procedures and processes however, and moreover,
this capability has not yet been lost by nation states. Democracy not only can still be
practised in nation states, it is still practised in them. That being so, if democracy is
viewed as normatively desirable then there is a significant element of risk in any
attempt to dissolve nation states and the national solidarity that they can give rise to
Habermas, Postnational Constellation, p.71.
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when we can have a degree of confidence, based on past experience, that this form of
community and solidarity is compatible with democratic practice. Cosmopolitan
community and solidarity, insofar as such things exist, have not as yet demonstrated
such compatibility and thus should be approached with caution by Popperians.
It is suggested by Habermas that the process ofmulticulturalism is operating
alongside and partly as a substrate of, that of globalisation to both shake and shift the
foundations of civic solidarity. He points to the difficulties encountered by nation
states with their particular national histories in trying to develop a politics of
coexistence that gives recognition to different cultural groups. This process,
Habermas describes as often being 'as precarious as it is painful'.53 The majority
culture in a political state, according to Habermas, has to renounce its claims to
being the general political culture as such if all citizens are to be permitted and able
to identify on equal terms with the national political culture. It is not quite as clear
cut as this however because the majority culture is likely to remain the dominant
partner in any cultural coalition, as it were, that emerges out ofmulticultural
processes and pressures. It may not remain undiluted or unaltered but minority
cultures are more likely to have to integrate into it at least to some extent rather than
expect recognition that is instant and equal.
Multicultural integration does open up possibilities though as far as Habermas is
concerned for changes to be made to the basis of civic solidarity within a state and
extend its conceptual boundaries to make it less exclusionary along national lines.
Even in circumstances where integration proves difficult or stalls it serves to rupture
the commonalities upon which the nation state is constructed.
'To the degree that this decoupling of political culture from majority culture
succeeds, the solidarity of citizens is shifted onto the more abstract foundation of a
'constitutional patriotism'. If it fails, then the collective collapses into subcultures
that seal themselves off from one another. But in either case it has the effect of
undermining the substantial commonalities of the nation understood as a community
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of shared descent'.54
Although Habermas does talk in terms of degree he essentially posits a binary
opposition between the success or failure of the decoupling project with success
leading to constitutional patriotism and failure resulting in the rather apocalyptic
collapse of civic solidarity within a state.
Ofmore significance is the concept of constitutional patriotism itself that Habermas
perceives to be constructed on the foundations of successful multicultural integration
as well as being a normatively desirable abstractive step in the development of civic
society. From a Popperian point of view the crucial uncertainty concerns the
elasticity of the concept of civic solidarity. The confidence that Habermas holds in
constitutional patriotism is in part borne from a realisation that the development of
the nation state, and the constitutions it brought in its wake, was itself an abstractive
step in terms of solidarity from previous forms of political community such as the
tribe or city state. That does not mean however that the next development of civic
solidarity will be one of greater abstractness. Indeed Habermas concedes this point
himself in acknowledging that failures of multiculturalism have the potential to
prompt a collapse in civic solidarity leaving a variety of distinct subcultures that
share little by way of commonalities.
It appears to be the case that Habermas is only distantly cognisant of the logic of his
own position in terms of the constructed nature of both communities and identities.
By this I mean that the reconstruction process could result in sub as easily as
postnational communities and identities. At the core of this question is the
relationship between individual citizens and their communities as well as the ability
of those citizens to be active participants in communal political life.
'The tendency of supposedly homogenous subcultures to seal themselves off from
one another may be due in part to attempts to reappropriate real communities, or to
invent imaginary ones. One way or another, this tendency is related to the
,4 Habermas, Postnational Constellation, p.74.
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constructive differentiation of new collective forms of life, and new individual life
projects. Both tendencies strengthen centrifugal forces within the nation state, and
will sap the resources of civil solidarity unless the historical symbiosis of
republicanism and nationalism can be broken, and the republican sensibilities of
populations can be shifted onto the foundation of constitutional patriotism'. 5
This highlights the central thrust of the Habermasian project which is indeed to break
the symbiosis of republicanism and nationalism. A newly reconstructed symbiosis of
republicanism and constitutional patriotism is what he seeks in its place. If all
communities that go beyond face-to-face communities are to be considered imagined
communities however, with the nation representing an imaginary exemplar, then a
postnational community founded on constitutional patriotism cannot avoid having to
be imagined.
Habermas makes two major assumptions that warrant closer scrutiny than he gives to
them. The first is the assumption that processes of economic globalisation are
terminally undermining to national civil solidarity and the second is to assume that
any fracturing of national civil solidarity will result in the reconstruction of that
solidarity at a trans-national or supranational level. It is obvious that the second
flows from the first in Habermas's schematic in that supranational politics is offered
to check, balance and hopefully exert control over global economic forces. The
continued existence of nation states suggests that the nationalism-republicanism
symbiosis is far from broken even if it may be somewhat frayed. The unintended
consequences that could potentially attach to an attempt to radically redesign the
nature of political community are wont to make Popperians wary of embarking upon
such an initiative.
The postnational constellation, in Habermas's view, is made up of both the processes
that can be loosely grouped under the heading of globalisation and some of the subtle
shifts, patterns and implications that flow from those processes such as migrations of
labour and a cautiously developing regime of international regulation over economic
units and practices. The question relevant both to this work and that of Habermas is
55 Ibid, p.76.
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how the nation state has responded to the alignment of this constellation and
furthermore how it should respond to it.
'Under the changed conditions of the postnational constellation, the nation state is
not going to regain its old strength by retreating into its shell. Neo-nationalist
protectionism cannot explain how a world society is supposed to be divided back
into pieces, unless through a global politics which, right or wrong, it insists is a
chimera. A politics of self-liquidation - letting the state simply merge into
postnational networks - is just as unconvincing'.56
Before disregarding neo-nationalist protectionism as he terms it Habermas would do
well to explain what he means by a world society and give evidence as to its actual
existence. It cannot simply be assumed as a foregone conclusion.
Similarly, whilst I concur with Habermas that the politics of self-liquidation
(whatever that may mean in practice) is not a convincing possibility for nation states
there is again an assumed quality to the 'postnational' networks that he suggests to
have come into view beyond the nation state. Habermas does not detail what these
networks consist in and although it is easy to conceive of an array of international
networks as they pertain to politics, economics, commerce, social organisations and
academia for example it is more difficult to envisage postnational networks that are
close to representing viable repositories for national identities and solidarities. In
short, a complex range of networks have developed primarily between nation states
or between organisations such as multinational corporations that remain, to a greater
or lesser extent, regulated and controlled by particular nation states.
This issue is especially acute for Habermas when considered in the context of
European integration and the development of the web of relations, connections and
networks, not to mention legislative competency that is the European Union. A
political postnational constellation can only respond effectively to the challenges
posed by globalisation ifways can be found to develop new forms of democratic
56 Habermas, Postnational Constellation, p.81.
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self-steering for societies.57 Habermas considers the European Union to be an
exemplary case in which to test the conditions for a democratic politics beyond the
nation state. He admits to being interested less in the 'motives for or against the
further development of the political union, and more in the strength of the reasons
that can engage both supporters and sceptics; reasons for and against the gamble on a
CO
postnational democracy'. It is complicated to fully separate out these two issues
and facets of the debate but nonetheless Habermas makes a valid point that whatever
views are taken of European integration the arguments are underpinned by notions of
democracy and the conditions conducive to it. For Popperians, the EU as an
institution can and should be assessed on the basis of the contribution that it makes
to promoting and defending the concept of open society. This is precisely what
Soros attempted to do in setting out a vision of the European Union as a prototype
for a global open society.
5.4 Europe as a Prototype for a Global Open Society
In November 2006 George Soros delivered a speech in Brussels entitled 'Europe as a
Prototype for a Global Open Society' and argued that Europe was in search of a
political identity.59 He sets out his view that 'the European Union embodies the
principles of an open society and it ought to serve as a model and motive force for a
global open society'.60 At the outset Soros draws a contrast between tribal and
universal sources ofmorality and claims that the former leads to closed societies
whilst the latter gives rise to open societies 'guided by universal human rights' that
seek to 'protect and promote the freedom of the individual'.61 What is interesting
about this formulation is that although the contrast could be used to denote different
types of political community - tribal versus cosmopolitan for example - it could also
57
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indicate different principles to underpin a particular form of political community
such as the nation state. Particular nation states could be animated by either tribal or
universal morality. This is a point that Tamir also makes in her defence of liberal
nationalism.62
The process by which the European Union was formed is hailed by Soros for
establishing laws and institutions which have facilitated the peaceful coexistence of
people with divergent views and interests. In this regard, he considers the EU to be a
'textbook' example of the open society.63
'It consists of a number of nations and nationalities, none of which occupies a
controlling position and all ofwhich are pledged to maintain democratic institutions
and protect individual freedoms and human rights. Even this may be appropriate to
an open society because, as Karl Popper argued, our imperfect understanding does
not permit permanent and eternally valid definitions of social arrangements. The
arrangements must reflect the will of the participants and they must be open to
adjustment and improvement'.64
The most striking aspect of Soros' reflections here is his acknowledgement that it is
nations that have created the EU and in doing so, have created a cooperative process
that is not only conducive to open society but is to be considered a textbook example
of it. This is conclusive evidence that a Popperian such as Soros is content to accept
that the nation state is compatible with open society but moreover that the expansion
of open society principles, above and beyond the nation state, can be achieved by
nation states working in concert with each other.
Soros makes the claim that no single nation occupies a controlling position in the EU
and whilst this is a reasonable interpretation it can still be argued that a significant
differential of influence is to be found amongst member states. A small state such as
Luxembourg is hardly likely to be as influential in shaping the direction of European
integration as a large one such as Germany. In a similar vein, although a large
62 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p.79.
63 Soros, Europe as a Prototype Speech, 2006.
64 Soros, Europe as a Prototype Speech, 2006.
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member state, and substantial contributor to the EU budget, the United Kingdom's
influence within the European Union is at least potentially hampered because it has
not adopted the Euro currency.
Slightly more contentious however is the fact that Soros argues the European Union
to be a textbook example of open society but then also notes that in an open society
the arrangements must reflect the will of the participants. It is at best debatable as to
whether or not this applies in the context of the EU and the rejection of the proposed
European Constitution in France and the Netherlands suggests that the will of
participants is not entirely reflected in the arrangements that are the present day
European Union. It does of course depend to some extent as to who the
'participants' are considered to be in this regard given that it was the governments of
France and the Netherlands that were actively participative in the process of agreeing
and then signing the Constitution prior to its rejection by their respective electorates.
This returns us to the democratic deficit of the EU and seems to highlight that there
remains aspects of the European integration process and the operation of EU
institutions that are at odds with open society principles of democratic accountability
and participation.
Soros does accept that the process which has created the European Union 'was
driven by an elite and the population at large has felt left out'.65 If this is so, then the
claim that European integration has been a textbook example of open society in
action appears rather more dubious since for Popper, giving the population a degree
of control over political power was absolutely central to the concept of open
society.66 Soros is far from convinced of the merits of referenda determining the
future direction of Europe, believing them to be raw and capricious devices.67
Whilst Popper did not specifically advocate direct democracy it is likely that he
would have been concerned at the 'population at large' being excluded from decision
making and, more significantly, by elite driven processes.
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Indeed it is particularly unlikely that Popper would have been reassured by Soros's
description of the political elite directing European integration as 'far-sighted and
purposeful'.68 Irrespective of the accuracy or otherwise of that description, the
Popperian concern is with the prospect of bad leaders and seeking to limit the
damage they might be able to inflict on a state and its people.69 By describing the
elite in the manner that he does, Soros conveys the impression of them being almost
Platonic Philosopher King-like figures. The whole thrust of the open society stems
from Popper's insight that the far-sightedness and purposefulness of leaders cannot
be guaranteed nor indeed that such qualities would be employed benignly. The
process of European integration and the development of the EU has brought
considerable benefit when viewed from an open society perspective but it is possible
that it has been beneficial despite being an elite driven process rather than because of
being driven by an elite. From a Popperian point of view, the successes of the
European Union, such as enhanced peace and prosperity, can be celebrated with
Soros whilst still raising concerns about the procedures by which they have been
achieved. The overriding flaw of the European Union in open society terms remains
the concentration of political power in an institution such as the Commission which
lacks democratic accountability in the Popperian sense - that is, the ability of the
70ruled to remove their rulers.
What is perhaps ofmost interest to Soros however in relation to the EU is that he
considers it to have been 'brought into existence by a process of piecemeal social
engineering, the method Karl Popper considered appropriate to an open society'.71
Soros regards the process of European integration as an example of piecemeal social
engineering because it proceeded step by step whilst setting limited objectives with
72limited timetables. He also argues that the integrative process was aided first by
the threat from the Soviet Union and then by globalisation which tended to favour
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larger economic units and worries about a loss ofmomentum following the defeat of
the Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda.73 It is Soros' hope that the future
development of the EU need not rely on perceived threats but rather can be inspired
by the concept of open society and serve as 'the motive force for a global open
society'.74 He envisages the European Union setting an example to the world in
international cooperation and regards it as already having begun to do so.
'Member states have delegated some aspects of their sovereignty in order to create a
common market and they have kept the prospect of membership open to others. This
has been a powerful tool in turning candidate countries into open societies'.75
The issue of sovereignty is raised again here by Soros and he regards what he terms
the delegation of various aspects of sovereignty as practised in the EU as an
instructive model for cooperation on a more global scale. This notion is not quite as
clear cut as Soros might assume though.
Firstly, it is worth reiterating that whilst sovereignty may have been extensively
delegated in some spheres - most obviously the economic - there has been far less
delegation in others such as foreign and defence policy. This is something that Soros
recognises and laments but he offers no indication of how delegation might be
achieved in these areas where hitherto it has been rejected. Secondly, it is not
inevitable that the delegation of sovereignty will inevitably continue and increase
even in those areas that it has reached an advanced stage in currently. If sovereignty
has merely been delegated by nation states to the European Union then it points at
least to the possibility that it may in future be repatriated. It also raises the question
of who is doing the delegating. In 'The Bubble ofAmerican Supremacy' Soros
argues the case that sovereignty belongs to the people.76 It is not entirely evident
then even from his philosophical perspective, that political elites are entitled to
delegate sovereignty such as has occurred in the EU whilst leaving out the
7-1
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population at large.
Soros makes clear that he sees little prospect for the moment of the European Union
taking on a global leadership role to rival that of the United States.77 It is interesting
to note however the extent to which he views the EU as having reshaped political
order and structures in Europe. Most important in this sense has been the prospect of
EU membership serving as a powerful tool to turn candidate countries into open
societies. This highlights from a Popperian perspective that the European Union can
play an important part in promoting and entrenching liberal democracy within nation
states, particularly those states that seek membership of the Union. Soros
understands the key contribution of the EU here as being to create national open
societies that are prepared to cooperate and delegate aspects of their sovereignty. In
this sense the European Union is not creating an alternative post-national form of
political community but rather is facilitating the emergence of national open
societies and providing a cooperative forum for those societies to tackle common
issues.
For Popperians seeking to foster open societies the EU represents a considerable
opportunity but also a potential threat. Insofar as the EU can encourage members to
become and remain open societies then it can be a powerful force in support of
Popper's conception of liberalism. The democratic deficits that it exhibits cannot
simply be ignored or wished away however because they threaten to undermine the
openness of the societies that comprise the EU. It is for this reason that Popperians
should give more thought to protecting and defending liberal democratic nation
states as exemplars of open societies. This need not entail the adoption of a euro-
sceptic position but it would suggest looking anew at the EU's subsidiarity principle
for example to ensure that decision making is indeed taken at the level closest to
those whom it affects and, more importantly, that effective scrutiny can take place.
There is no disputing the many challenges and problems that transcend national
77
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borders, from climate change to international drugs trafficking, instability in global
financial markets to terrorism. Such challenges do require concerted and cooperative
international responses, and they also require that power be exercised. The questions
that Popperians should keep in mind are who wields such power and how can it be
limited in order to prevent damage arising from its potential abuse? Such questions
could usefully guide the future development of the European Union and help it
further enhance a role as a promoter and guardian of open societies. These questions
do not prompt immediate or simple solutions to the democratic and accountability
deficits from which the EU suffers but they can focus attention on open society
principles and serve as a reminder that nation states continue to have great influence
over European integration. Defending the nation state need not be an attack on the
EU and it can be done with a view to protecting democracy and open society.
On the account provided by Soros, the EU has made a significant impact on the
European continent in terms of engineering open societies but substantial untapped
potential remains for it to be a more active engineer on the global stage.78 He points
to the ample resources possessed by the European Union that could be utilised for
the purpose of promoting open societies. These resources include half of the world's
overseas development assistance, the world's biggest single market, 45,000
diplomats, almost 100,000 peacekeepers and the prospect of using trade, aid and the
prize of membership as catalysts to encourage neighbouring states to become open
societies.79 The EU does aim to protect human rights, promote pluralist democracy,
and consolidate the rule of law as fundamental objectives and regards promoting
these objectives as an overarching principle in addressing itself to external
relations.80 Soros does not suggest in any detail how the EU should use its resources
in promotion of open society but it would appear as though he seeks the attachment
81ofmore stringent criteria to trade and aid agreements. The most important point
here though, and indeed of the speech as a whole, concerns what Soros means by *a
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global open society'.
In setting out what he means by this concept Soros posits only a very limited
cosmopolitan ambition and that it is highly unlikely that the European integration
process could simply be extrapolated to a global scale.
'A global open society emphatically does not mean global government. Government
inevitably interferes with the freedom of the individual. A global government could
not avoid being repressive even if it were built on liberal principles. A global open
society could not even be as closely integrated as the European Union because the
affinity among the member states would be less pronounced. What a global open
82
society does stand for is the rule of law on an international scale'.
It is apparent from this description that when Soros speaks of a global open society
he means a society of states that abide by some form of international law in their
relations with each other. Such a vision could potentially be a trans-national one
comprised of various regional blocs, along the lines of the EU, forming a global
society of supranational states. Significantly though, there is absolutely nothing in
this vision that is at odds with a world comprised of democratically constituted
nation states that cooperate and adhere to international law.
The political world we inhabit in the early part of the twenty first century is not a
global open society. How to proceed then for those who wish to make it so, or at
least advance in the direction of that goal? However we might proceed, Soros is
adamant that any global society that can be engineered into existence will be only
loosely integrated with member states sharing perhaps a broad but in all likelihood
thin affinity. The choice that Soros implies but does not explicitly confront revolves
around what to do with the form of political community that is the nation state.
Should Popperians support it as a tried and tested forum for the practice of
democracy and focus theoretical and practical effort on democratising those nation
states that are undemocratic and seek to strengthen international law that governs
relations between (nation) states? Alternatively, is the nation state to be viewed as an
82
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impediment to the development of a global open society and thus support given to
post-national initiatives that seek to overcome the national basis of political
community?
To be fair to Soros he has at least given some indication as to what he means by a
global open society and in doing so has addressed the ambiguities in Popperian
philosophy between open society (universal) and open societies (plural) to a greater
extent than Popper himself did. Popper held that the move from tribalism to open
societies was necessarily a move away from nationalism and the nation state as an
essentially tribal form of political community.83 Soros does not make this
assumption and appears quite content to conceive of the prospect of a global open
society that is at the same time a world comprised of nation states. Of course Soros
is no nationalist and his interest is in democratic communities, and expanding their
number, rather than national communities. It just so happens that many democratic
communities, that is communities who share and participate in a particular
democratic system of self-government, also happen to be national communities.
Popper did not speak of global government and he spoke rather in passing and
dismissively of the nation state without articulating any particular post-national or
supranational alternative. Even more remarkably, he managed to dismiss the nation
state and yet continue to assume it in his theorising since it was western democratic
nation states that he praised as providing a better and more just order for individuals
84than any other in recorded history. In pursuing a global open society Soros is
attempting to spread the democratic state, be it western or not, across the globe. His
philanthropy has this task as its aim and his Open Society Institutes have been set up
to facilitate piecemeal social reform of pre-existing (national) state structures and
nudge them towards democracy and adherence to the principles of open society.
Soros considers the European Union a potential ally in such a task, albeit a hitherto
tentative one. The task that he sets the EU, as that of his institutes, is not the
Popper, Open Society Volume 7, p.9.
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replacement of the nation state but the reform of particular nation states that are to
varying degrees closed societies. Popper viewed the nation state as tribal and
therefore a closed form of society. Soros takes a more nuanced look and sees that
nation states can be either open or closed and regards the immediate task as not to
speculate as to their possible demise but to try and bring a greater degree of openness
to those that remain closed. In laying out his hopes and fears for the future
development of the EU Soros refers to the world being in need of 'a more united
RS
Europe committed to the principles of open society'. The further uniting of Europe
that Soros envisages is not designed to eclipse the nation state and so he conceives of
a Europe of open democratic nation states setting an example for the application of
the rule of law on an international scale.
5.5 Conclusion - Open Society and the Nation State in Europe
This thesis has argued that those of a Popperian persuasion who believe in the
concept of open society as a normative political model cannot afford to ignore the
enduring influence of the nation state as a form of political community and
framework for international politics. If open societies are to be pursued and
instituted at the present time then it is in such a context that they must be so. In the
continent of Europe however that context is complicated somewhat by the extent to
which twenty seven nation states cooperate in a structure of political and economic
integration. Nation states have not been replaced or rendered redundant in Europe
but they have become enmeshed in an intricate cooperative web that has changed the
political landscape and created a supranational institutional structure. In this chapter
an attempt has been made to ascertain the implications of such developments for the
prospects of advancing the cause of open society in Europe and beyond.
As discussed in the case of Soros the EU represents an opportunity for the further
development of the concept of open society. Indeed it could even serve as a
85
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precursor to some form of global, albeit modestly conceived, notion of open society.
Soros holds the development of the EU to be an exercise in piecemeal social
engineering and whilst the process of its creation may bear some relation to that
methodology it has not been straightforwardly so. Piecemeal social engineering
suggests the planning and testing of a system by a recognisable body or group but
the process of European integration has been a slightly more complicated process of
negotiation amongst increasing numbers of national governments, each with varying
priorities, concerns and degrees of influence. This makes it difficult to trace clear
relationships between European integration and its contribution to the development
of the concept of open society.
European Union member states are open societies themselves in terms of being
democratically constituted and upholding individual and human rights. What is
significant though is that those member states are open societies as nation states and
it would be rather a stretch to argue the existence of a European open society at a
supranational level. Where supranational institutions hold power that is difficult to
check, balance and make democratically accountable then the prospect arises of open
society being undermined and marginalised at a national level. Whilst democratic
deficits at the EU level have thus far proved hard to overcome it is certainly not
inevitable that they will remain so. Such a future prospect is not disputed here but
for as long as they exist they cannot be ignored by Popperians. In this sense, a
defence of the nation state, and the democratic politics it facilitates at the moment,
can be interpreted simultaneously as a defence of open society.
An intriguing prospect is prompted by the recognition that EU member states are
nation states as well as being open societies: that prospect is that national open
societies are capable of considerable cooperation with each other and of relating to
each other on a primarily legal basis, underpinned by a supranational judicial system.
If Europe is to serve as an example to the rest of the world in terms of the
development and maintenance of open societies then the global lesson to be drawn is
not for any need to replace the nation state as a form of political community but to
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strive to render nation states open forms of society. Achieving this in Europe has
been neither quick nor easy and we can only anticipate that on a global scale the
process would be markedly slower and more difficult owing to the great diversity of
political, economic and social circumstance to be found in different countries around
the world. A world comprised entirely of open societies remains a distant aim but
for Popperians that seek to bring it closer now is not the time to abandon the nation
state. Nation states remain capable of sustaining democratic politics and open
societies and are deserving of continued support from Popperians in Europe and
beyond. If, in time, supranational entities prove capable of greater democratisation
and display an enhanced ability to sustain social solidarity then advocates of open
society will have little reason to mourn the passing of the nation state. Until the
arrival of such a day however, the best prospects of promoting and defending open
societies are to be found in the frameworks provided by nation states.
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6
Promoting Open Society and Defending the Nation State
6.1 Open Society in a World of Nation States
Karl Popper professed himself to be 'in search of a better world'1 and the nature of
his search is revealed in his philosophies of science and politics. For Popper, a better
world was a more rational world, a world in which the individual is freed from the
perceived strictures of the tribe, and a world in which the fundamental purpose of the
state is the protection of individual.2 Politically and philosophically Popper held that
these sorts of developments accompanied transitions from closed societies to open
societies. Such transitions are not particularly easy to bring about or indeed,
somewhat more surprisingly, come to terms with as Popper concedes in suggesting
that western 'civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth'.3
The civilization that Popper seeks to defend is one that aims at 'humaneness and
reasonableness', at 'equality and freedom'.4 Popper's purpose in defending open
society from its enemies is to counter 'those reactionary movements which have
tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and to return to tribalism'.5 As far as he
is concerned, nationalism is one such reactionary movement and thus a threat to the
civility of open society.6
My aim in this thesis has been to argue that Popper significantly overestimates the
extent to which nationalism is necessarily a reactionary movement and danger to
open society. Even more importantly, there is no reason why the form of political
1 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 12.





6 Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies Volume 2-Hegel andMarx, Routledge, London, 1986,
p.49.
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community that is the nation state cannot aim at humaneness and reasonableness, at
equality and freedom. Insofar as they can and do, nation states can be open societies.
This is something that Popper implicitly acknowledged when praising the openness
of the social order ofwestern democracies.7 The western civilization that Popper
commends is a civilization that is not only comprised of nation states but one that
has also had to confront within itself some of the darkest forces of nationalism.8
Negative or closed nationalism is undoubtedly a threat to open society but positive or
open nationalism need not be and there is scope to defend open societies at a national
level.
Popper does not recognise any distinction between different types of nationalism and
so for him it is inherently a negative and closed force, an enemy of open society.
Popper judges nationalism hostile to open society on account of its tribal appeal to
passion and prejudice as well as for its attempt to replace individual responsibility
with a collective or group responsibility.9 One of the reasons that Popper's attack on
nationalism lacks nuance is that the dichotomies he sets up are exaggerated. Thus,
for Popper, responsibility must either be individual or be collective rather than some
combination thereof, society is ruled either by reason or by passion rather than a
balance between the two, and instincts must be civilised and universal or else must
be regarded as tribal. Popper himself defends open society passionately and so it is
difficult for him to maintain that passion should be marginalised in political life.10
After all, he would surely not object to an individual's passion to combat poverty for
example.
Popper suggests that the fundamental problem of political theory is the problem of
checks and balances, and of trying to create institutions by which political power can
7 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, p. 13.
8 Niall Ferguson, The War of the World, London: Penguin Books, 2007, p.76.
9
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10 In the preface to the second edition of the Open Society and its Enemies Popper writes that 'the fact
that most of the book was written during the grave years when the outcome of the war was uncertain
may help to explain why some of its criticism strikes me today as more emotional and harsher in tone
than I could wish'. Karl Popper, Open Society Volume 1, p.xi.
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be controlled and tamed." Popper appears not to fully appreciate that this
fundamental problem remains whether or not politics is conducted in nation states.
Moreover, it is a problem that can be addressed within the framework that is the
nation state; solving the problem of checks and balances does not necessitate a
search for a new post-national form of political community. Power held at any level
can potentially be abused, including at a supranational level such as in the context of
the European Union. Even in the case of the EU however, checks and balances
could be instituted at a national level in order to ensure greater scrutiny and oversight
ofEU legislation by national parliaments. This would have the potential to offer
greater protection to citizens affected by power wielded at a supranational level.
It is noteworthy that whilst Popper attacks nationalism and clearly regards it as an
enemy of open society his overriding attitude towards it is dismissive. It is almost as
though he does not consider nationalism to be a worthy adversary and so he derides
••12
Hegel for example more as a historicist than a nationalist. Popper considers
nationality to be an opaque concept and expresses bemusement that it has found
acceptance as a fundamental political category.13 He suggests that it is not at all
clear why nationality should be deemed more important as a political category than
religion for instance, or loyalty to a dynasty, or, more importantly, to 'a political
creed like democracy'.14 Popper's advocacy of open society can be read as an
attempt to defend a particular political creed, deemed to be rational, individualist and
universal in potential scope against what he contends are tribal creeds such as
nationalism.
There are two key oversights however that detract from the clarity of Popper's
defence of open society against the tribalism of nationalism and the nation state. The
first, as already mentioned, is the dismissal of nationalism prior to a consideration of
its complexities and varying interpretations. This oversight can partly be explained
11
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by the circumstances of the period in which Popper wrote his 'Open Society and its
Enemies' with the outcome of the Second World War still hanging in the balance but
such an explanation does not prevent the oversight from skewing Popper's attitude
toward the nation state as a concept. Popper is content to simply write off the
national state as not only 'inapplicable' but also as never having been 'clearly
conceived'.15 Although it is readily apparent that Popper found no philosophical
merit in the principle of the national state it is altogether more difficult to understand
his seeming refusal to recognise the political reality of the nation state and its
foundational role in the structure of international politics.
Popper heaps scorn on the nation state by referring to it as 'an irrational, a romantic
and Utopian dream'.16 Even if he means this in a philosophical sense it cannot be
denied that the nation state is a dream that has become a political reality. Indeed it is
owing to the continued reality of the nation state that advocates of open society today
should be prepared to engage with it as a concept. Are nation states and open
societies really incompatible? Can an individual be both a nationalist and a
Popperian liberal? These questions have been interwoven throughout the thesis as
part of a reconsideration of Popper's philosophy. No major incompatibility has been
found between the nation state and open society and so taking up a position as a
Popperian nationalist is not ideologically incoherent.
Popper's own somewhat incoherent position on the nation state, whereby he
dismisses it as a Utopian dream whilst expressing his admiration for the
arrangements constituted by western liberal democracies, can be further explained by
his second oversight in defending open society. The oversight at issue here is that in
formulating his theory of open society Popper paid only passing attention to the
nature and boundaries ofpolitical community that it might be thought to encompass.
Most obviously the extent to which Popper intended open society to be a
cosmopolitan concept is left ambiguous and unresolved.17 He speaks in very general
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terms about reason, supported by imagination, enabling 'us to understand that men
who are far away, whom we shall never see, are like ourselves, and that their
relations to one another are like our relations to those we love'.18 This is far from a
clear and explicit endorsement of cosmopolitanism however. It is, as discussed in
chapter five, far less clear than the explicitly post-national position outlined by
Habermas for example.19
Popper also expresses 'faith in the rational unity ofman' which he views as having a
20Christian basis in the belief in the 'brotherhood of all men'. He makes no mention
though of how far the brotherhood of open society is to extend. Does the rational
unity of humanity entail a political unity of humanity, and if so ofwhat sort? There
are two fairly obvious ways in which a degree of political unity might be achieved.
The first is via some form of cosmopolitan global governance arrangement.21
Popper makes no attempt to articulate or defend such an arrangement however and
this suggests that although Popper may have based his philosophy on a broad moral
cosmopolitanism he did not see a need to translate that into a systematic political
cosmopolitanism.
An alternative way of achieving a degree of political unity for humankind as a whole
is to ensure that all political communities across the world are constituted on a
22similar basis. This would appear to be Popper's preference but he does not make it
clear and so to some extent leaves his position open to a range of interpretation.
Constituting open societies in all parts of the world is at least a plausible
interpretation of Popper's intent and his support for western democracies (plural) is
evidence that it was the spread of liberal democratic states that was the primary
is not clear exactly what he had in mind. Andrew Vincent, "Popper and Nationalism", in Jarvie, Ian,
Karl Milford and David Miller (eds), Karl Popper-A Centenary Assessment, Aldershot: Ashgate,
2006, p. 169.
18
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19
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21 See Brian Barry, International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, in Nardin, Terry and
David Mapel (eds), International Society - Diverse Ethical Perspectives, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998.
22 This is the method detailed by Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace, New York: Cosimo Inc., 2005.
265
concern of Popperian political philosophy. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is
in this way that Soros interprets and applies Popper's philosophy to guide his
philanthropy. Soros is demonstrating through his Open Society Institute that liberal
democratic open societies can be encouraged and spread in the framework and
context of the nation state. To recognise as much is not to posit any kind of
symbiotic relationship between the nation state and open society but merely to
acknowledge that the nation state is not necessarily or intrinsically inhospitable to
the concept of open society.
This sort of insight matters to someone such as Soros because he is attempting to
apply Popper's political philosophy and the notion of open society in particular, in a
very practical sense. His task for the moment remains that of attempting to open up
national societies such as in the countries of the Balkans. Where efforts to extend
the principles of open society have been slow or hampered, as was the case
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soros lays the blame at the door of
existing open societies that failed to recognise the available opportunities and seize
the moment. It is interesting that he does not blame nationalism or the framework
of the nation state. This thesis has sought to provide some theoretical ground to
underlie the kind of practical effort being undertaken by Soros. He instinctively
grasped that furthering the concept of open society required the re-engineering of
existing political communities to make them more open and further, that the nation
state as a form of political community is not an impediment to that task.
It is worth reiterating the two distinct but related tasks that Soros views as being
necessary to create the conditions for a global open society. The first of these is to
foster the development of open societies throughout the world and the second is to
establish rules and institutions that would govern the behaviour of states toward their
own citizens and one another.24 This thesis has focused attention on the issue of
fostering open societies in a world of nation states. The argument that has been
2j
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defended is that the conditions of an open society at the present moment in history,
as set out by Soros, can be accommodated in the political community that is the
nation state. The conditions that Soros outlines are (1) regular, free, and fair
elections, (2) free and pluralistic media, (3) the rule of law upheld by an independent
judiciary, (4) constitutional protection for minority rights, (5) a market economy, (6)
a commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, and (7) laws that are enforced to
25 i • •curb corruption. This is a more comprehensive list than any provided by Popper
but it is unlikely that Popper would have objected to any of the conditions that Soros
sets. Most crucially of all however is that each of these conditions can be achieved,
and indeed have been achieved, in nation states.
It is entirely possible that in the future these conditions will come to be achieved at a
supranational or post-national level. The development of the European Union has in
fact seen some of these conditions met at a supranational level. At the present
historical juncture though it remains liberal democratic nation states that meet these
conditions most fully and straightforwardly and it is on such a basis that a defence of
the concept of open society in the early part of the twenty-first century can be
undertaken in conjunction with a defence of the nation state. The very fact that
nation states are capable of being constituted as liberal democracies undermines
Popper's argument that they are inherently closed societies based on tribal
collectivism. The central aim of this thesis has been to illustrate that, contrary to
Popper's view, open society is not incompatible with the nation state.
6.2 Popper's Conservative Liberalism
The starting point for the work of this thesis was to examine Popper's philosophy of
science. The particular importance of doing so is because Popper theorised science
prior to turning his attention to politics and his philosophy of science very much
informs his subsequent political philosophy and the significance that he attaches to
the concept of open society. The key aim of chapter two was to come to an initial
25
Soros, Open Society, p. 133.
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understanding of the ideological orientation of Popperian philosophy that would
inform subsequent analysis of Popper's approach to political reform and political
community. The chapter sought to uncover both the liberal and conservative
elements that influence the nature of Popper's philosophy, and his political
philosophy in particular.
The comparison between Popper and Kuhn's philosophies of science was broadly
speaking a comparison of a liberal and a conservative understanding of science.
Popper's falsificationism methodology stresses that science proceeds by a process of
trial and error with the propounding of hypotheses that are subsequently subjected to
empirical testing. It was suggested by Fuller that it is more precise to characterise
Popper's deductivism as anti-inductivism and similarly that his liberalism is more
accurately characterised as anti-authoritarianism, just as his individualism
encapsulates an anti-holism.26 Kuhn, by contrast, posits that scientists work for the
most part in secure paradigms that guide and contextualise their everyday research.
The key difference that distinguishes Kuhn's conservative account of science from
Popper's more liberal one is that for Kuhn the establishment of scientific fields of
inquiry comes via the abandonment of critical discourse whilst for Popper precisely
the opposite is true.
This divergence helps to establish Popper's approach to rationality and what he
terms critical rationality. Popper considers all human beings to possess at least the
potential to employ critical rationality and it is this that underpins his faith in the
rational unity of humankind. An element of conservatism is to be uncovered in
Popper's thought however if critical rationalism is itself viewed as a tradition that
Popper seeks to defend. Popper goes so far as to suggest that traditions are needed to
link institutions and the intentions and valuations of individuals.27 The role that
Popper is prepared to accord to tradition also has significance for the defence that he
makes of open society. Popper traces the origins ofwestern civilization and open
forms of society to Ancient Greece and regards Socrates as something of a father of
26 Steve Fuller, Kuhn v Popper, p.142.
27
Popper, In Search ofa Better World, p. 156.
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critical rationalism.28 He is thus defending a civilizational tradition, and seeking to
conserve a particular form of social and political organisation: that of open society. I
have suggested that can best be done currently in the context of the nation state.
In terms of the nature of political change, Popper advocates what he calls piecemeal
social engineering. This is a means of conducting political reform that attempts to be
alert to mistakes and unintended consequences by concentrating on relatively small-
scale tightly controlled reform experiments. Popper's concern is to minimise the
potential for damage that he perceives often to flow from large-scale revolutionary
projects. He says specifically that the piecemeal engineer 'will avoid undertaking
reforms of a complexity and scope which makes it impossible ... to disentangle
causes and effects'.29 In terms of fostering the development of open societies it
would make sense, on this basis, for piecemeal engineers to continue to work with
the familiar framework of the nation state rather than seek to circumvent the nation
in a bid to construct a post-national open society. Even although Soros regards the
development of the EU as an experiment in piecemeal social engineering it does not
currently, as a political entity in its own right, fulfil the conditions of an open society.
Chapter two explored the extent to which there is a conservative aspect to Popper's
liberalism and did so without denying that Popper is indeed a liberal. He defines a
liberal as someone who values individual freedom and is alive to the dangers
30inherent in all forms of power and authority." Popper fits his own description of a
liberal and the normative thrust of his political philosophy aims to emancipate
individuals from closed societies and find institutional checks and balances to
minimise the ability of power to do harm. Opening up closed societies is a
potentially revolutionary undertaking however, as Soros readily admits.31
This poses a challenge for contemporary Popperians and advocates of open society,
28
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is revolutionary action designed to transform a closed society into an open one an
acceptable risk to take? The conservative element to Popper's philosophy invites
caution in answering this question and Soros is perhaps even more cognisant of that
with his insight that chaos, be it revolutionary or otherwise, can be as much an
enemy of open society as authoritarianism.32 His philanthropy has focused on
attempts to gradually engineer the opening of societies from within and by
employing such methods pays heed to Popper's warnings of the dangers of
revolution and large-scale Utopian planning. A further cautionary note is struck by
this thesis with the proposition that for the moment to try to engineer post-national
forms of political community to replace the nation state would be to undertake
reform of a scale and scope that is unlikely to be able to remain piecemeal and
gradual for long.
6.3 Open Society and the Nature of Political Community
Having explored the ideological orientation of Popperian philosophy in chapter two,
the third chapter of the thesis took a closer look at the institutional requirements of
open society as well as addressing the nature of political community entailed by it.
A fuller understanding of the notion of open society was sought by examining it in
relation to the communitarian critique of liberalism developed by Michael Sandel.
An additional comparative framework utilised here to assess the nature of political
community represented by open society was that of the pluralist perspective outlined
by John Gray.
One significant conclusion drawn in chapter three from a close study of Popper's
defence of open society is just how little he has to say as regards the nature or
boundaries of the type of political community that he defends. With his repeated
stress on the value of the individual over and above the collective, Popper does not
",2
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really define an open society as a community in any systematic way. ~ In Sandelian
terms Popper's open society can be categorised as a procedural republic but not in an
altogether straightforward manner. Sandel suggests that whilst liberty can be
'understood as a function of democratic institutions and dispersed power, liberty in
the procedural republic is defined in opposition to democracy, as an individual's
guarantee against what the majority might will'.34 Popper's conception of open
society understands liberty in both of these respects.
Popper does consider democracy to be a necessary check on the power of rulers and
3 S
as such a central aspect of an open society. ~ We recall that he also takes the view
however, which is in no way contradictory, that 'majorities often arrive at mistaken
decisions, and we must insist that minorities have rights and freedoms that no
majority decision can overrule'.36 Sandel would likely view this claim as indicative
that Popper's open society is at least to some extent a procedural republic and
thereby 'must draw on a sense of community it cannot supply and may even
37undermine'. As was pointed out in chapter three, Popper does not envisage open
society as binding individuals into a tight form of community but his procedural
account of politics does have a sense of unity that is central to it with an attendant
morality. Popper's open society is not to be regarded then as devoid of communal
bonds. As far as instituting open societies goes the nation state offers at least the
prospect of communal solidarity to underpin Popper's procedural liberalism.
John Gray's pluralist philosophy is also employed in chapter three as a challenge to
Popperian liberalism and the concept of open society. Gray's argument is that the
real agenda for political thought is to be found amidst the conflicting claims of
38communities and diverse ways of life. In contrast, the political morality of
■"
Popper, Open Society Volume /, p. 101.
,4 Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, Volume
12, Number 1, February 1984.
Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies Volume 2, p. 160.
36 Karl Popper, In Search ofa Better World, p.221.
37
Michael Sandel, 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', Political Theory, Volume
12, No. 1, February 1984, p.91.
~'8 John Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 129.
271
Popper's open society is rooted in individualism. The vagueness of the common
ways of life to which Gray refers is more pronounced than the relatively vague
account of political community that Popper provides. Gray proposes a tolerance of
non-liberal regimes that Popper would not be prepared to countenance but the key
insight of Gray's work as it applies to attempts to engineer open societies is that
grand projects of liberal transformation are likely to encounter a multitude of barriers
in a world comprised of a plurality of regimes and political communities. This adds
further weight to the fairly cautious and modest approach that Soros has taken in his
attempts to institute open societies in formerly closed states. In this sense, the
promotion of open society is only a tentatively global project and is most
productively pursued on a (nation) state by state basis.
Chapter three concluded with a sketch of the importance of critical rationality and
the manner in which it bridges Popper's philosophies of science and politics. The
notion of frameworks was introduced as significant at this point, with reference to
the work of Lakatos, in a bid to establish the extent to which Popperian liberalism
can accommodate the coexistence ofmultiple frameworks such as different nation
states but still find common ground for inter-subjective testing and communication
between them.
6.4 National Open Societies
Chapter four began with a discussion of liberal nationalism. It served as a useful
comparative framework for assessing Popperian liberalism given that Popper found
little or no affinity between liberalism and nationalism as political ideologies. With
his description of nationalism as irrational it has been suggested that Popper regarded
nationalist ideology as more a pathology than a legitimate theory of politics.39 The
initial task of the chapter was to explore the general compatibility of liberalism and
nationalism as a precursor to further examination of the compatibility of open society
39 Vincent, Popper and Nationalism, p. 159.
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and the nation state.
Tamir draws from liberalism a commitment to personal autonomy and individual
rights and from nationalism the importance of community membership for
individuals whilst highlighting the status of national community membership in
particular.40 As we have seen, Popper's normative individualism is such that
individuals are the fundamental political category that matter to him. It is interesting
however that Tamir does not dispute normative individualism and finds it can be
accommodated by liberal variants of nationalism which simply seek to respect such a
principle within the framework of a national state. It is here that Popper's oversight
in failing to distinguish amongst types of nationalism becomes apparent and serves
to weaken his case against the nation state.
Both Tamir's account of liberal nationalism and Popper's conception of open society
face a similar challenge in respect of attempting to balance the universalism implied
by upholding human rights and the particularity entailed by different cultural forms.
Tamir suggests that liberal nationalism, and by implication the nation state, seeks to
simultaneously recognise the particularity of culture and the universality of human
rights.41 Popper is more ambiguous on this issue since he does not address in any
signi ficant detail the prospect of pronounced cultural difference between open
societies. Soros is more sensitive to such a possibility however and makes clear his
view that no single design exists for open society since different countries have
different traditions.42 He also makes plain that whatever plurality may be
permissible democracy is a non-negotiable component.43 On this point Popper and
Tamir can surely agree because for Popper a non-democratic society is a closed
society whilst it seems unlikely that Tamir could endorse an undemocratic nation
state as liberal.
40 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p.35.
41 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, , p.79.
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A further point of agreement between Popper and Tamir concerns the aversion that
they hold in common toward organic forms of political community in which
individual identities are virtually entirely constituted by some sort of communal
membership. Tamir contrasts her liberal version of nationalism with alternative
organic interpretations and considers liberal nationalism to cherish both 'reason and
the open society'.44 There is no theoretical reason to suggest that nation states are
incapable of being constituted as open societies so long as they are liberal. This is
crucial because Popper's primary concern in relation to the state is that it should be
liberal rather than whether or not it is national.43 This permits the drawing of the
conclusion that the commitment to liberalism that unites Popper and Tamir appears
more robust and significant than differences stemming from her simultaneous
embrace of national forms ofpolitical community. Popperian liberalism can be
interpreted as capable of tolerating the nation state but liberal nationalism, as the
name suggests, can only be intolerant of illiberal forms of political community,
national or otherwise.
The question arises for Popperians as to what to do about closed societies. Is there a
basis in Popper's philosophy to justify some kind of liberal interventionism that aims
at the spread of open society and the principles underpinning it? Chapter four sought
to address this question via reference to a particularly high profde attempt to build a
case for liberal interventionism - that put forward by former British Prime Minister
Tony Blair in a speech which he delivered in Chicago in April 1999. At a
fundamental level Popper's political philosophy held that institutions of the state can
and should be judged on the humanitarian basis of the protection that they offer to
individuals.46 Couched in this way, Popperian philosophy does appear to hold out at
least the prospect of some form of external intervention in circumstances where a
particular state is inflicting substantial harm on its citizens.
It was noted that Blair's doctrine of liberal interventionism is predicated on a world
"l4Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.80.
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order comprised of nation states and indeed that it was just such a world order that
formed the backdrop to Popper's theorising. Blair mentions open society in his
speech when proposing that liberal democracies can make themselves safer and
further their interests by establishing and spreading the values of liberty, the rule of
law, human rights and open society.47 For Blair, a safer and more just international
order requires the spread of liberal democracies and his speech makes the case that
there are circumstances in which the international community can and should
intervene in the domestic arrangements of a sovereign state in order to protect
individuals.
As we have encountered throughout, the protection of the individual is a
fundamental Popperian concern. Chapter four revealed the extent to which 'existing
democratic states', as Popper puts it, represent a considerable achievement of social
48
engineering. Popper goes on to express confidence that ways can eventually be
found to uphold the rule of law and administer justice in relation to international
conflict just as democratic countries have increasingly come to maintain civil peace
and protect human rights.49 Flere Popper shows himself to be in alignment with
Blair's general world view that suggests the enhanced protection of individuals on a
global scale is best achieved by trying to extend the reach of liberal democracy
across the world to those states where it is lacking or absent.
This brings us to one of the most significant conclusions of the thesis: Popper is
content to support and promote a world comprised of open society states even where
those states take a national form. Democratic nation states which apply the rule of
law impartially and defend human rights within their respective jurisdictions can be
interpreted as positive examples of Popperian social engineering. The further
development of this model is thus a viable theoretical and practical option for
contemporary Popperians who seek to advance the cause of open society. Exactly
how that might be done is addressed cautiously by both Popper and Blair.
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Tony Blair suggests that identifying the appropriate circumstances to justify
intervention in the domestic affairs and arrangements of a sovereign state presents a
pressing foreign policy problem for the international community. He recognises the
difficulties of utilising war and military force as an instrument to right humanitarian
distress but concludes that it may on occasion be the only way to deal with
dictatorial and authoritarian regimes.50 For his part, Popper is prepared to accept that
violence can be justified against tyrannical regimes but only if it has as its purpose to
bring about a state of affairs that makes non-violent reform possible.51 Although
Popper framed this argument in a domestic context it does allude to the potential for
Popperians to support instances of liberal interventionism.
A further crucial conclusion from this section of chapter four concerns Popper's
warning against the nation state seeping deeper into political thought stealthily in
being unconsciously accepted and taken for granted. Popper fears the nation state
increasingly becoming an 'implicit assumption' of political thought, and a 'basic
52
postulate' of political ethics. The analysis of Popper's approach to open society in
this thesis suggests that he did not heed his own warning in according a more or less
taken for granted status to the nation state as the context of his political theorising.
Perhaps more significantly however, the compatibility that has been demonstrated
between the concepts of open society and the nation state are such that Popper's
liberalism is not undermined by being placed in a national setting.
Having utilised Blair's doctrine of the international community to tease out the
extent to which Popper tends to assume the nation state in his political philosophy,
focus subsequently shifted to the work of George Soros and his bid to institute and
engineer open societies throughout the world. Part of the value for this thesis in
examining Soros's conception of open society is that he provides a more detailed
account of the institutional framework that he deems necessary to support open
50
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societies. In noting that open society must be anchored in the universal human
condition rather than in tribal belonging Soros takes up a position that actually has
considerable affinity with the liberal nationalism that Tamir theorised.53 This is
because Tamir holds that for nationalism to be at all liberal then it must also have its
basis in the universal human condition and that this does not preclude the
simultaneous recognition that individuals can be socially and culturally embedded in
particular nation states.54 The significant point is that advocates of both liberal
nation states and open societies are shown here to be similarly opposed to notions of
tribal belonging.
It is striking that the account of open society that Soros provides takes seriously the
question of national sovereignty and the extent to which it could represent a barrier
to achieving notions of the common good at an international level.5:1 More
significantly, Soros regards it as Utopian to think that anything other than national
sovereignty serves as the basis of the current world order."6 It is with such a world
order that attempts to promote open society must contend. Whilst that may pose
challenges for developing international cooperation and for determining legitimate
grounds to pursue liberal interventionism, it also provides opportunities to seek
democratic reform, where necessary, of a type of political community - the nation
state - that is capable of being constituted as an open society. Whatever barriers may
be entailed by the concept of national sovereignty it cannot be considered a
fundamental impediment to the development of open societies since the two
concepts have been shown to coexist in national states.
The final section of chapter four outlined a distinction between positive and negative
nationalism and reiterated that Popper dismissed the latter without conceiving of the
possibility of the former. It was argued that this oversight on Popper's part permits a
reassessment of the relationship between open society and the nation state. The
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nation state can serve as a vehicle for spreading the liberal democratic principles of
open society because many nation states are liberal democracies.
Positive nationalism is described by Saul as 'a belief in the positive tension of
uncertainty and the central importance of choice'57 and with this line encapsulates
Popper's liberal political philosophy. Popper advocated open society as a form of
political community that had its foundation in the positive tension of uncertainty as a
. • S 8 • ... .
principle of politics. Democratic states can deal positively with the tension of
uncertainty because democracy 'provides the institutional framework for the reform
ofpolitical institutions. It makes possible the reform of institutions without using
violence, and thereby the use of reason in the designing of new institutions and the
adjusting of old ones'.59 This thesis has highlighted that the nation state provides a
framework within which such democratic reform can take place and so the nation
state is shown to be a capable and durable host of open society.
6.5 Open to Supranationalism? Open Society and the European Union
Chapter five considered the concept of open society in the context of the
development of the European Union. It began by pointing out that the process of
European integration has been one of nation states cooperating and constructing
common institutions together. The issue of sovereignty was again central to this
discussion with particular emphasis placed on the extent to which sovereignty is
being re-conceptualised as nation states share power and authority with supranational
institutions. The important point to emerge from this is that whilst national
sovereignty may be in the process of being reengineered it remains accurate to
describe nation states as sovereign, including those that are member states of the EU,
not least because they have shared or pooled sovereignty voluntarily and retain the
ability to reclaim it exclusively to the national level. The development of the EU has
37 John Ralston Saul, The Collapse ofGlohalism, Atlantic Books, London, 2005, p.270.
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been a profound change in Europe's political landscape and circumstance but it has
not resulted in the transcendence of the nation state as a form of political community.
It was noted that of primary interest and concern to Popperians should be the
perceived democratic deficits pertaining to the European Union. Recalling Popper's
contention that the fundamental problem of political theory is the problem of checks
and balances, the nature of governance at the supranational level of the EU makes
this problem all the more pressing.60 Whilst the EU provides governance in areas
delegated to it by its member states it does not really have a recognisable
government in the way that a nation state does. This makes power somewhat more
elusive to check and hold to account which is concerning from the point of view of
Popper's open society. The development of the EU can be welcomed for
encouraging the spread and entrenchment of liberal democracy across Europe but a
cautionary note should be struck by Popperians in respect of the democratic and
accountability deficits that it exhibits. In doing so however it must be remembered
that the nation state is not immune to such difficulties but perhaps just a little less
susceptible relative to the development of supranational accountability to this point.
Having raised the issue of supranational democratisation the chapter turned to a
consideration of the account of the post-national constellation put forward by
Habermas. Here we encountered the Habermasian argument that the nation state is
placed under increasing pressure by processes of globalisation that have extended
decision making beyond national borders.61 That said, Habermas accepts that
cosmopolitan solidarity remains lacking and more significantly, that we can never
expect such solidarity to develop the strength and binding quality of national
solidarity. This need not present a problem as far as Habermas is concerned because
he both posits and seeks the emergence of a more abstract form of solidarity to
underpin political community, that of constitutional patriotism.62 As we have seen,
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both Popper and Soros conceive of the foundations of open society in a similar
manner. It remains to be determined the extent to which a concept such as
constitutional patriotism, or indeed open society, can serve as a basis for some form
of post-national solidarity. Whilst that discovery is awaited however, Popperians and
Habermasians alike can console themselves with the recognition that both open
society and constitutional patriotism are concepts that can be developed in the
context and framework provided by the nation state.
The final section of the previous chapter examined George Soros' views on the
development of the European Union as a process of piecemeal social engineering.63
Soros regards the EU as having been instrumental in helping to encourage societies
to become more open, particularly candidate countries seeking membership but
argues that the EU could be a more proactive engineer of open societies on the
global stage.64 Most significant in this section of the chapter however is the
description and understanding that Soros offers as to what is meant by a global open
society. He is clear that it does not mean global government and that owing to the
likelihood of less pronounced affinity among members it would not be as closely
integrated as the European Union. Global open society, as conceived by Soros, is
indicative of the rule of law applied on an international scale.'65 By conceiving of
open society in this way he opens up the prospect of it being engineered by nation
states because there is no theoretical impediment to nation states cooperating in the
development of international institutions to uphold an international rule of law. It is
in this sense that the nation states of Europe have created a prototype for a global
version of open society through the model of European integration.
6.6 Popperianism in the Twenty-first Century
My thesis has endeavoured to provide an account of the compatibility between Karl
63





Popper's concept of open society and the form ofpolitical community that is the
nation state. The nation state continues to structure and frame political circumstance
for many, perhaps most, people around the world and so advocates of open society
would be negligent to ignore the nation state or assume that it has faded into
irrelevance. I have argued that in his defence of open society Popper was indeed
somewhat negligent in this regard. He dismissed nationalism without any great
reference to its nuances and complexities as a political ideology. In particular, he
ignored any prospect that nationalism could be conceived and manifested in a liberal
form. Tamir's account of liberal nationalism highlights a version of the ideology that
has very similar foundations to Popper's own liberalism.
Given the haste with which he dismissed nationalism it is rather surprising that
Popper proceeded to then assume the context of the nation state in much of his
theorising of open society. He made no systematic attempt to envisage or develop a
post-national or cosmopolitan form of political community as a host for open society.
Part of the work of this thesis then has been to illustrate that Popper had a vague
awareness that open society and the nation state are compatible but he declined to
make this explicit. George Soros, in seeking to foster the development of open
societies through his Open Society Institute has generally accorded a greater
recognition to the framework of the nation state as the systemic backdrop to his
efforts.
The case that Popper makes for open society as a form of political community is
compelling and one aim ofmy work here has been the advancement of that case in a
contemporary context. The focus has been on highlighting that those who would
advocate open societies can do so without needing to renounce the nation state. The
continued existence of the nation state does not present a fundamental impediment to
the development of open societies in either a practical or theoretical sense. In
defending open society Popper is defending liberal democracy. My argument is that
on this basis, those nation states that are liberal democracies warrant a Popperian
defence. Those nation states that are not liberal democracies and are closed societies
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in one way or another can and should be the focus of Popperian attention in any bid
to engineer a world comprised of open societies.
If such a situation is ever to be achieved it is not likely to be a quick or easy process
and this point is well acknowledged by Soros. Popper's own approach to political
reform suggests that we should not expect it to be quick or easy however and
moreover that it is far safer to proceed gradually on the basis of piecemeal social
engineering. The point is that Popper's vision of a world of open societies can
potentially be achieved by reengineering particular nation states to transform them
from closed to open societies. It does not require the reengineering of political
community to find an alternative to the nation state.
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